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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the nature of biological 
species, and argues that species are real. The thesis 
starts with a descriptive account of species drawn from 
biology. This includes taxonomic views, theories of 
spéciation and theories in ecology. In this chapter a 
particular definition of species, ‘the biospecies’, is 
reached. The thesis continues in Chapter Two with a 
philosophical account of species, which aims at 
reaching an understanding of the kind of entities 
species are. The chapter concludes that species are 
natural kinds, but not as traditionally construed. 
Chapter Three looks closely at the use biologists make 
of species terms, and argues that biological theories 
are committed to such terms. That species terms cannot 
be dispensed with in biological statements indicates 
that species are real. If species are real, they are 
entities for which questions of identity make sense. 
Chapter Four reviews different criteria for the 
individuation and identity of species. All the 
criteria are found to suffer from problems of 
vagueness. In view of the difficulty of providing 
criteria for species identity, the thesis turns in the 
fifth chapter to two biological views - numerical 
taxonomy and neo-Darwinism- which claim that biological 
theories can dispense with species terms. But a look 
at these reductive theories shows that one loses a 
certain measure of explanation if species are dispensed 
with. In the light of the failure of the reductive 
theories, a fresh attempt is made in Chapter Six at 
giving a criterion for species sameness. This last 
chapter also serves as a general conclusion to the 
thesis.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ............................................ P. 8
1. The problem of the reality of s p e c i e s ............ P. 8
2. Structure of the t h e s i s  P. 14
Chapter One A scientific account of species. . . .  P. 21
Part 1 T a x o n o m y ......................................P. 22
1. Morphological classifications ...................  P. 23
2. Cladistic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ................... .. . P. 34
3. Biological classifications and the biospecies . P. 40
Part 11 Theories of s p é c i a t i o n .....................P. 50
1. Geographical isolation ........................... P. 51
2. Genetic i s o l a t i o n .................................. P. 56
3. Ecological i s o l a t i o n ............................. P. 57
4. Ethological i s o l a t i o n ............................. P. 53
Part 111 Concepts in e c o l o g y ....................... P. 62
1. The e c o s y s t e m ....................................... P. 63
2. The n i c h e ............................................P. 65
3. A d a p t a t i o n ......................................... P. 68
4. Species-specific relationships .................  P. 74
Chapter Two A philosophical account of species . . P. 85
Part 1 Different possibilities for species
as e n t i t i e s .............................................. P. 85
1. C l a s s e s .............................................. P. 85
2. I n d i v i d u a l s ......................................... P. 86
3. Natural kinds. The received v i e w .............. P. 92
4. Natural Kinds. An ammended v i e w .............. P. 101
Part 11 Species and p r o p e r t i e s .................P.108
1. Essential features ...............................  P.108
2. Distinguishing characteristics .................  P.110
Chapter Three The reality of species . .......... P.118
1. A reality sustained by d i v e r s i t y ............ P. 119
2. Models and theorems in b i o l o g y ...............P. 126
3. The use biologists make of species terms . . . P.136
4. Vagueness. An objection to the reality of species P. 140
5Chapter Four Individuation and Identity of species P.146
1. Phenotypes and genotypes  ................... P. 148
2. Reproductive i s o l a t i o n ............................ P. 149
3. Gene p o o l s ........................................... P. 157
Chapter Five Two reductive theories ................. P.163
Part 1 Numerical T a x o n o m y ............................. P.164
1. A nominalistic a p p r o a c h .......................... P. 164
2. Critique of numerical taxonomy ................... P.169
Part 11 N e o - D a r w i n i s m ............................. P.174
1. The selfish g e n e .................................... P. 174
2. The unit of natural s e l e c t i o n ................... P. 178
Chapter Six A criterion for species sameness. . . . P.200
1. A non-reductive a p p r o a c h .......................... P. 201
2. A new criterion for species i d e n t i t y ............. P. 204
3. C o n c l u s i o n ................ .......................... P. 214
Appendix Different levels of reality in biology . . P.217
B i b l i o g r a p h y ............................................P.245
6LIST OF TABLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
Tables
Chapter Three
Table 1. Derivation of the Hardy Weinburg theorem . P.123 
Table 2. Factors in the winter moth life table . . P.133 
Table 3. Model of the interaction between the
winter moth and its p a r a s i t e s ............ P. 133
Illustrations 
Chapter One
Figure 1. Phyletic diagram ..........................  P. 36
Figure 2. C l a d o g r a m ..................................P. 36
Figure 3. Cladistic classification ................. P. 38
Figure 4. .Geographical isolation ..................  P. 53
Figure 5. Darwin's finches ..........................  P. 55
Figure 6. Ecological isolation .....................  P. 59
Figure 7. Energy flow diagram in an ecosystem . . P. 64
Figure 8. The partridge's n i c h e ................... P. 64
Figure 9. The thrush's n i c h e ........................ P. 67
Figure 10. Adaptation of the moth Biston betularia. P. 6 9
Figure 11. Biston betularia, the typical form and
the carbonarian f o r m ......................P. 70
Figure 12. Meadow sage and b e e s ..................... P. 78
Chapter Three
Figure 13. Matrix of possible genotypes for two
genes A and a ............................. P. 12 2
Figure 14. Predator/prey relationship ..............  P.128
Figure 15. Predator/prey interaction as predicted
by the Lotka-Volterra equations . . . .  P.129
Figure 16. Predator/prey oscillation ..............  P.130
Chapter Four
Figure 17. Circumpolar ring-species of gulls . . . P.154
Append! X
Figure 18. Schematic view of a generalized cell . . P. 221
Figure 19. Human chromosomes ...................... 223
Figure 20 . Mitosis .................................. 224
Figure 21. Meiosis .................................. 226
Figure 22. DNA molecule ............................. 229
Figure 23. DNA replicator ........................... 231
Figure 24. DNA, chemical structure .............. 232
Figure 25. The genetic code ........................ 233
Figure 26. mRNA and tRNA ........................... 234
Figure 27. Building a chain of amino acids . . . . P. 235
Figure 28. A protein ................................ . P. 236
Figure 29. Multiple alleles ........................ . P. 238
Figure 30. Chromosomes crossing over ............ . P. 238
Figure 31/32. Chromosome mutation ................. . P. 241
INTRODUCTION
This thesis investigates the concept of biological 
species and aims at showing that when living organisms 
are classified into species, the classifications are 
not artificial but natural. They reflect the natural 
order of the world. In other words the aim of the 
thesis is to show that species are real. Before 
outlining the overall argument, it will be useful to 
see how the reality of biological species has been put 
in question.
1. The problem of the reality of species
One may wonder why the reality of species should 
be a problem. As it happens, it was not a problem 
until the last century. Indeed, in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, naturalists such as Ray, Paley and Linnaeus 
believed species were real - species consisted of 
organisms conforming to a type created by God. Species 
for these naturalists were as they are described in the 
Bible, distinct types of individuals able to 
reproduce only after their kind. In practice when 
biologists tried to identify which organisms belonged 
to which species, the criterion used was that if two 
individual organisms could be successfully mated then 
they were said to belong to the same species. This 
17th and 18th century view assumed that species were 
fixed, and that God had created each species and fitted 
it to an environment which was stable. Any variation
between individuals was confined within well-defined 
limits. Before the 19th century, therefore, species 
were seen as real and unchanging, and explanations for 
the origin of species were nearly always given in terms 
of creation. It is true that there were a few 
naturalists such as Buffon and Lamarck, who had thought 
that species could undergo transformation and that 
these transformations could give rise to new species. 
But they were in a minority. Surprisingly, they would 
still be in a minority today, but for a different 
reason. They would be in a minority, not because of 
their evolutionary views, but because they explained 
change in finalistic terms which would not be 
acceptable to modern biologists.
Concepts of species changed in the 19th century 
with Darwin. Darwin was impressed by Lyell's successes 
with geological explanations which were given in terms 
of natural laws alone (without recourse to a divinity 
or to any concept of purpose). Most science had 
already been influenced in this way by Cartesian 
philosophy. Descartes was the first to attempt a 
complete physico-chemical account of life (excluding 
the mind). He had not, however, attempted an 
explanation of how organisms had evolved in the first 
place. This is what Darwin wanted to do. Before Lyell 
it was thought that the earth had had a relatively 
short history. But Lyell showed how extremely ancient 
the earth in fact was: "the belief that species were
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immutable productions was almost unavoidable as long as 
the history of the world was thought to be of short 
duration" (1). Darwin, therefore, hoped to give 
biological evolution a mechanistic explanation instead 
of a vitalistic or finalistic one. But in fact a 
mechanical account of how evolution by natural 
selection operates was not found until much later, when 
Mendel put forward his genetic theory.
As the species concept changed, so did 
explanations given for biological phenomena. One major 
puzzle for biologists had always been the great variety 
of organisms existing in the world. Darwin did not 
accept the creationists' explanation of this, namely 
that God created every possible creature to diffuse 
every possible happiness (this is the view that Charles 
Bonnet holds in Contemplation de la Nature 1764). On 
the contrary, Darwin believed that organisms had 
evolved into increasingly complex forms, developing all 
possible means of survival and occupying all possible 
niches, by a process of natural selection. The 
characteristics of organisms were the result of chance, 
Darwin argued, and there was as much evidence in nature 
of randomness as there was of design.
Why for example create the upland geese with 
webbed feet, if they never swim? Webbed feet do not in 
themselves contribute to a creature's well-being. For 
Darwin creationism did not offer any adequate account 
of such cases, the explanation must be sought
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elsewhere. He therefore proposed that the geese's, 
webbed feet were something left over from the past.
His claim was, in other words, that an organisms' 
characteristics bore the mark of their origins. In 
this way Darwin introduced a historical dimension into 
biology: the explanation for the immense variety of
organisms was to be found in their past.
That things in nature point to the past did not 
fit the creationists' view, and of course they rejected 
Darwin's theory of evolution. But surprisingly, 
Darwin's contemporaries among physical scientists were 
also opposed to his view, and they were not impressed 
by Darwin's efforts to explain biological phenomena in 
terms of natural laws. The reason for this was that 
the physics of that time suggested a very static view
of the world, in which a finite number of fixed
elements (coupled with definite natural laws) made up 
the fabric of the universe. Evolving species did not 
fit into that picture any more than it did into the 
creationist's one. Kelvin, Joule and Maxwell for 
example all opposed the idea of evolution, although 
they were no doubt motivated by their Christian beliefs 
as much as by their scientific views. It seems 
therefore that scientists in Darwin's day, whether 
biologists or physicists, opposed the idea that species 
evolved and supported the idea that species were fixed 
and real.
At the time Darwin developed his views, Linnaean
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hierarchical classifications were widely accepted. 
Darwin did not oppose these but gave new meaning to the 
classification by showing that the relationships 
between species, genera and families were grounded in 
natural laws : organisms bore the similarities they 
did because they had developed out of common ancestors. 
But whereas Linnaeus treated species as real, Darwin 
did not. This was because there were aspects of 
evolutionary theory which weakened the hold of the idea 
that species were real, quite independently of the fact 
that the reality of species had been associated with 
creationism. The main point against reality was the 
mechanism postulated for evolutionary change, which 
depended for its operation on variability and natural 
selection. This mechanism only works because 
individuals vary and are unique, and because some 
individuals have selective advantages over others and 
therefore survive. It follows from this that species 
are neither uniform nor fixed. It was this which led 
Darwin to believe that species were not real: "we
shall have to treat species in the same manner those
naturalists treat genera, who admit that genera are
merely artificial combinations made for
convenience"(2).
Since then, the view that species are not real has 
been held by many biologists, and even quite recently 
Haldane claimed that "the concept of a species is a 
concession to linguistic habits"(3).
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After Darwin, it was for a long time as if the 
belief that species were real belonged necessarily to 
creationists, evolutionists believing species to be 
arbitrary classifications of the mind. Paradoxically 
though, most biologists today claim that species are 
real entities. Is this a legitimate shift within 
evolutionism? Creationism is no longer a credible 
scientific explanation for the origin of species.
Almost all contemporary biologists are evolutionists. 
Why do contemporary biologists believe species are 
real, when evolutionary theory once appeared to give 
good grounds for seeing species as not real? In other 
words, what motivates biologists to see species as 
real? These questions give rise to the central 
question of this thesis; what is the importance of 
species (as real entities) to biology?
Biological sciences can, very broadly, be said to 
answer questions on how organisms evolve, how they 
relate to the environment and how they relate to each 
other. Within these questions biologists ask more 
specific questions, concerning particular types of 
organisms, such as: 'why has this kind of organism
evolved in this particular fashion?' or 'why does it 
inhabit this particular environment?' or 'why does it 
relate in this particular way to this other kind of 
organism?' The biological explanations given to answer 
such questions will be looked at in this thesis. This 
will enable us to shed some light on the question of
14
the reality of species.
1 aim to show that there are good grounds for 
seeing species as real entities in nature. In doing 
this, 1 also aim to give an account of the way in which 
the analysis of good biological explanations furnishes 
an answer to the reality question. The overall claim 
will be that if good explanations given for important 
questions (questions we cannot lightly dismiss) 
necessarily include an assumption about the reality of 
species, then there are good grounds for accepting this 
assumption. To see how an argument for this claim will 
be developed, it will be helpful now to reveal the 
intended plan of the thesis.
2. Structure of the thesis
Before engaging on arguments for the reality of 
species and before attempting to analyse the way in 
which biology assumes this reality, 1 start by giving a 
purely descriptive account of what constitutes a 
species. This is important because it lays down the 
ground upon which the ensuing arguments are based.
Chapter One surveys current biological knowledge 
concerning species. The first part of the chapter 
compares differing definitions taxonomists have given 
of species, and tries to determine which seems the most 
fruitful. The traditional taxonomic view seems 
inadequate. This view uses morphological criteria for 
classifying organisms into species according to type
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specimens. This approach is rejected on the ground 
that it misrepresents the way organisms are grouped in 
nature. Indeed in nature organisms do not conform to a 
standard type. I also hope to show, in this first part 
of Chapter One, that the more recent biospecies 
classification is the most acceptable. The biospecies 
definition of species sees the species primarily as a 
group of genotypes making up a gene pool (an 
interbreeding group). The problems engendered by the 
biospecies definition are considered, but 1 am not 
persuaded these are serious enough for the biospecies 
concept to be abandoned. The second part of Chapter 
One looks at theories of spéciation. The third part of 
Chapter One is on Ecology. Chapter One ends with the 
conclusion that theories of spéciation and theories in 
Ecology are equally committed to a biospecies concept 
of species.
Chapter Two lays the ground for arguments for the 
reality of species and looks at the philosophical 
problems about species. If species are real we want to 
know what sort of entities they are. Several 
possibilities are considered. 1 start by rejecting the 
position held by David Hull and others, that a species 
is the sum total of all its individual members - a 
spatiotemporal whole. 1 then consider the possibility 
that species are natural kinds, and this view is looked 
at in some detail. What makes a natural kind the kind 
it is is its nature. Philosophers from Aristotle to
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Kripke have seen the nature of any natural kind in 
terms of some microstructure, and this element has been 
extended to species seen as natural kinds. It would 
mean that something in each and every individual making 
up a species accounted for its belonging to that 
species. (This 'something' could be an essence.) 
However, such a view is untenable in the face of 
present day biological knowledge. The immense variety 
among organisms of one species is such that individuals 
within the same species do not have a set of identical 
characteristics at any level - not even the microscopic 
level. Nevertheless, 1 argue in this chapter, species 
do have a nature which explains the groupings we find 
in the world, and this is a nature that scientists 
discover. Scientific explanations need not necessarily 
be given in terms of microstructure. The last part of 
the chapter looks at the kinds of things one does say 
of species and the properties that are attributable 
to species.
Whereas Chapters One and Two were concerned with 
outlining the sort of entities species are, the rest of 
the thesis (chapters Three to Six) concentrates on the 
central argument of the thesis, supporting the reality 
of species. Chapter Three looks closely at the use 
biologists make of species terms. It looks at the way 
in which biological theories need species to explain 
the things they do explain. It also looks at what 
would happen to these theories if one got rid of the
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species terms. , I take the view that if true statements 
of biological sciences are committed to species terms, 
then species are real. Most of the chapter is devoted 
to examples where we find essential use of species 
terms. Ecology is particularly rich in such examples, 
because here many species-specific relationships can 
only be explained and predicted by theoretical models 
using species terms. 1 consider several of these and 
argue that one could not say the things that these 
theories do say without using species terms.
Having argued that species are real, it seems 
appropriate for me to say something of their identity, 
and Chapter Four turns to some of the questions in this 
area. Species are natural kinds, but as shown in 
Chapter Two, there are no characteristics which could 
be said to belong to all and every individual making up 
a species. Yet, if species are real, there must be 
some way of grouping together all members of a species. 
Chapter Four, therefore, investigates different 
possibilities for the individuation and identity of 
species. We see that the criteria for sorting 
individuals exhaustively into species all fail because 
of the inherent vagueness infecting the boundaries of 
species. Indeed, any criterion for species' identity 
which relies on the properties of individuals within 
the species is bound to fail. For this reason the 
properties of populations which make up the species are 
also considered. However the problem of individuation
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and identity is not solved by the end of the chapter 
and the question is left in suspence for the space of 
the next chapter.
The difficulty of individuating species, 
considered in the light of the claim ‘no entity without 
identity', calls for a review of certain modern views 
which deny reality to species. The fifth chapter, 
therefore, examines two reductive views.. In spite of 
the fact that most contemporary biologists assumes that 
species are real, there are some well known biologists 
who maintain that they are not. These include 
numerical taxonomists and neo-Darwinians who both claim 
species are arbitrary and do not play any essential 
role in nature (or in scientific theory). Numerical 
taxonomists deny that species are real on the grounds 
that organisms are unique and cannot be classified into 
any finite number of groups. Numerical taxonomists do 
classify organisms into species, but see these as 
arbitrary groupings based simply on calculated 
similarities between individuals. The methods used by 
numerical taxonomists for classification purposes are 
very successful, but they do not of themselves imply 
that species are not real (in spite of the belief to 
the contrary held by numerical taxonomists). The 
arguments underlying this nominalistic view are shown 
in this chapter to be in fact weak philosophical ones. 
In addition they are not even related in the right way 
to the scientific methods used by numerical
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taxonomists. The second reductive attempt is 
neo-Darwinism. One of the main claims made by 
neo-Darwinians is that the unit of natural selection is 
the gene. It is this aspect of neo-Darwinism which is 
of interest here, in as much as it implies that it is 
never species which are selected but always genes. I 
try to show that the arguments for a reduction from 
species, groups or individuals to genes do not hold. 
Indeed certain cases of natural selection cannot be 
accounted for without reference to species. Some 
examples of group selection which are not reducible to 
gene selection are given to illustrate this point.
In the light of the failure of the reductive 
theories, the sixth and final chapter returns to the 
question of the individuation and identity of species, 
and attempts a new approach to the question. The 
criterion proposed is not formulated in terms of any 
constitutive property of species. Roughly speaking, 
the criterion I propose is that groups of individuals 
should be seen as representing different species as 
opposed to one species just if the scientific 
outcome of such identifications are significant. That 
is to say, the criterion given here seeks to exploit 
the explanatory advantages that accrue in, for example 
assigning populations to different species, as opposed 
to different races within one species. Finally some 
suggestions are made concerning the implications this 
criterion has regarding the nature of species.
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At the end of the thesis there is an appendix. 
This covers basic biological knowledge referred to in 
the thesis, and is meant mainly for reference purposes 
The appendix also gives an idea of the different 
levels of explanation in biology.
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CHAPTER ONE
A SCIENTIFIC ACCOUNT OF SPECIES
This chapter is largely descriptive. It aims to 
reach an understanding of the way in which biologists 
see species (irrespective, for the moment, of whether 
they consider species to be artificial or natural 
groupings). The main concern is with species as a 
determinable notion and not with particular determinate 
species - which is to say, that therefore this chapter 
concentrates on what species in general are rather than 
on why any particular species is what it is. In this 
chapter I hope to arrive at an understanding of species 
which will accomodate the aspects of living organisms 
already mentioned in the introduction. This includes 
change over time and variety at any one point in time. 
In order to achieve this understanding I shall consider 
three areas of biological science. This chapter is 
accordingly divided into three parts. Part I is on 
Taxonomy, and deals with the way in which organisms are 
classified. Part II reviews theories of spéciation, 
which explain the way in which new types of organisms 
arise. And Part III looks at concepts in Ecology, and 
the way in which different types of organisms relate to 
each other and to the environment. Factual examples 
taken from the present chapter will be used to
22
illustrate points made in the other chapters of this 
thesis.
PART I. TAXONOMY
Taxonomy is the classification of organisms into 
species, species into genera, genera into families. 
Species, genera and families are all different 
taxonomic categories (see Appendix for more detail). 
Only that aspect of taxonomy which deals with the 
species category concerns us here.
Much taxonomy has stemmed from a desire to collect 
and classify organisms without any wish to find 
explanations or justifications for such 
classifications. But there are different ways of 
arriving at a classification and these different 
methods reflect different beliefs, in particular about 
the species concept. This is true even when different 
methods result in the same classifications or 
groupings. Indeed organisms are on the whole grouped 
into the same distinct species whatever method is used. 
Three different views on classification will be 
considered here: the first view is found in 
morphological classification, the second in cladistic 
classification and the third in biological 
classification (postponing a fourth view,
VY^ ':) j until the fifth chapter).
There is in the minds of philosophers another
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classification which I shall not discuss here for the 
simple reason that it does not exist in biology. This 
is a classification of organisms according to their 
microstructure (genes or whatever).
1. Morphological Classifications
These classify according to phenotype 
(appearance). The method followed is sometimes 
referred to as typology since organisms are 
classified according to type specimens. For 
instance, this is a tiger if it looks like a standard 
or typical tiger. On this conception a species is 
therefore a type.
What justification can be given for classifying 
according to type specimens? Before Darwin the 
justification was that God had created organisms 
according to type. After Darwin some scientists in the 
19th century like Agassiz, did not accept evolution and 
continued to hold this view. For Agassiz species have 
no reality in the world, the type itself exists but 
only as a thought in God's mind. Agassiz like all 
creationists believed that in the world there are ■ 
representatives or copies of the type (God's thoughts 
made incarnate), and anything which does not 
approximate to the type is not of that species. New 
organisms only emerge with successive creations 
following God's plan. For Agassiz the aim of taxonomy 
is to uncover this plan: the biological world has a
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rational basis which should appear in the relationships 
between species displayed in taxonomic classifications.
Virtually no biologist today holds this 
Creationist's view. One exception however, is W.R. 
Thompson (1), a Canadian Entomologist, who believes 
that Darwin's theory has little evidence to support it 
and much against it. He points out that species appear 
suddenly in the geological strata, and that this is not 
the exception but the rule. There is a conspicuous 
lack of the interim species that would be needed to 
support evolutionary theory. Species, Thompson says 
(quoting Aristotle and St. Thomas), are like numbers. 
One cannot connect the numbers 2 and 3 by any 
intermediary, the transition from one number to the 
next is abrupt and not gradual. We shall come back to 
this question of saltation (jumps or discontinuity in 
evolution) later in the thesis. Thompson, following 
Agassiz, also holds the creationist's belief that 
characteristics of living organisms show finality, 
purpose and therefore design. But in this he is like 
other upholders of the argument from design, confusing 
function with purpose. The eye may function in such a 
way that we can use it to see, just as a stone may 
function as a dam if it falls in a stream. This, 
however, does not mean that its purpose is to be a dam 
any more than the eye's purpose is sight. Neither 
needs to have been designed in order to have a 
function. Functions can result from chance.
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Although Thompson is an exception and creationism 
is not a serious scientific theory, morphological 
classifications are still more common in taxonomy today 
than any other forms of classification. The 
justification for classifying according to 
type-specimen is, of course, no longer given in terms 
of God's creation. The evolutionist's justification is 
merely that it is the most practical system of
classification. A set of characters is chosen to be
representative of a species. This set of characters 
becomes the 'type' for that species. The choice of a 
type is not directed by biological principles, but is 
arrived at by comparing the overall resemblances 
between organisms. No biological explanation is 
offered for this classification.
Morphological classifications present many 
difficulties :
(i) There are no rules or clear principles 
governing which characters are to be chosen as
important in representing the type, because there are
no biological principles to guide choice. There is 
also no criterion of what does or does not constitute a 
species if types are not seen as real in the sense in 
which they were for creationists, but rather as 
arbitrary conveniences.
(ii) More specific problems arise with difficult 
cases such as sibling species, where one has two groups 
of organisms which are manifestly distinct species
26
(they never mix, even when living in the same locality) 
and yet which 'look alike'. Sibling species are 
separate groups of organisms possessed of remarkable 
phenotypic resemblance. On the morphological criterion 
these groups should be classified as one species. Yet 
they cannot be one species because they only share 
looks, and in all other respects they are biologically 
different. For example. Drosophila pseudoobscura and 
D. persimilis do not interbreed, they differ in their 
chromosomes and in their ecology; and so they 
constitute two different groups, even though they have 
a similar morphology and live together (2). Criteria 
other than phenotypic resemblance have to be used to 
determine the distinctiveness of the group. Different 
species of European.leaf warbler (Phylloscopus) are 
also impossible to distinguish visually, but they are 
readily identifiable by their different songs. At this 
point someone may say : why not group sibling species 
as one species using only morphological criteria for 
distinguishing species? However, finding other 
criteria which enables biologists to distinguish 
sibling species has led to many important advances in 
science. Preventive medicine is one example which I 
shall return to later in the thesis (Chapter Three).
(iii) There is third problem and this is the most 
serious one. Even if one could decide upon a type to 
represent a species, putting aside the problem of 
sibling species, such variation exists in nature that
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no two individuals within any one species are exactly 
alike. In other words there are in fact different 
'looks' within the same species. So not only is 
resemblance insufficient, it is not even necessary. If 
one chooses as the 'type' an adult, how does one 
classify larvae? Moths and their caterpillars are 
the same species. In many organisms males and females 
are quite different in appearance. For example, the 
females of very many different species of ducks are 
more similar to each other than to the males of their 
own species. It would be nonsensical to group all the 
females into one separate species. Within some 
species there are castes of individuals looking very 
different from each other such as the queen bee, the 
drones and the workers, but there is no genetic 
difference between the queen and her workers (3). 
Although castes of this kind are rare in organisms 
other than insects there is at least one mammalian case 
the naked mole rat (Heterocephalus glaber) from 
Africa. In each population there is one large queen 
rat, two castes of small worker rats and one caste of 
male non-worker rats - for mating (4). In all these 
cases the individuals do not look alike and yet they 
all belong to the same species. Many errors in 
classifying organisms have occurred as a result of 
this. Linneaus who followed a morphological system of 
classification often unintentionally described males, 
females, young and adults as different species (5).
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One of the most outstanding features of living 
organisms is their uniqueness. This third problem 
concerning morphological classifications needs 
emphasizing because it is pertinent to many points made 
elsewhere in this thesis. Before turning to the 
section on cladistic classification I intend, 
therefore, to spend the rest of this section outlining 
the importance of variety. (Cloning - where there is 
no variety, as individuals are all identical with a 
common ancestor - is an exception but clones are very 
rare.)
Typologists have attempted to account for variety. 
Since Aristotle variation from type has been held to 
result from some external interference with nature's 
programme; the environment somehow causing the natural 
intended development of an organism to change course. 
This hypothesis has had to account for the whole range 
of variations from small aberrations to monsters. But 
in truth variety is an important and not an incidental 
feature of organisms. In Drosophila it has been 
found that there is such immense variety in natural 
populations that there appear to be few characters that 
cannot be selected for (6). Variety has been at the 
basis of all domestic breeding and crop development. 
Natural variation has made it possible to breed cattle 
with greater milk yield, higher butterfat percentage, 
higher conception rate and so forth. Farmers select 
phenotypes and since most phenotypic characteristics
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have some genetic basis, those selected tend to be 
passed on. (I.e. cows who yield milk with high 
butterfat percentage tend to have calves which will 
grow into cows who yield milk with high butterfat 
percentages and so on.) Another way of putting this 
would be to say that these variations are genetic since 
they breed true. Variations which were not directly 
caused by genes would not be passed on to future 
generations. Breeding by farmers merely illustrates 
the fact that for them at least variability has never 
been seen as an abnormality. On the contrary it is an 
important aspect of what a species is.
Variation that is not purely phenotypic, 
geographical or due to mutations is called 
polymorphism. Polymorphism refers to the genetic or 
chromosomal variation that exists within a species in a 
balanced state (7). On the whole when a population is 
not undergoing spéciation, variation is constant from 
generation to generation. This is the Hardy Weinburg 
principle (this principle will be explained in greater 
detail in Chapter Three). Blood groups in man for 
example represent a polymorphism : the proportion of 
people with each blood group remains the same from one 
generation to the next.
It is therefore not true, within sexual species at 
least, that organisms approximate to a type. Variation 
exists at the phenotypic and genotypic levels. It is 
an essential part of what constitutes a species. No
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one type within a species is a better or more typical 
representative of the species than any other. Which 
blood group could be said to be more typically human?
So far we have seen that variation does exist, now 
I wish to look at its role in maintaining a species. 
Variety is important for survival. If it were not for 
variety species could not adapt to environmental 
changes. Environmental change triggers selection for 
new phenotypes. This can be illustrated by an example: 
following industrialization, the peppered moth like 
many other species developed different colours, thus 
avoiding being conspicuous to predators against soot 
covered backgrounds. Such changes in phenotype are 
possible only because of the variety already available 
in the population, upon which the forces of natural 
selection can act : "For a species to remain in 
existence in the face of a constantly changing 
environment it must have sufficient heritable variation 
of the right kind to change adaptively" (8). Failing 
this it could become extinct. It is sexual 
reproduction which ensures that variety is maintained 
and that different combination of genes are tried out 
(9). In this respect sexual organisms have a definite 
advantage over nonsexual ones. Of course too much 
variation could prevent a species from being well 
adapted to its environment and from being able to 
reproduce successfully. (This is what would happen 
where genes were no longer compatible.)
31
Potential variation is not always actualized, 
indeed much variation is hidden in the genes and cannot 
be known to exist from looking at the phenotype alone. 
Much of this variation only comes to light in breeding 
programmes or at times of natural selection. Gene 
frequencies within a population are, to a large extent, 
dependent on natural selection. Genes which confer an 
advantage on the species are more frequent.
In sexual species all individuals carry two 
alleles (genes) for each phenotypic characteristic.
A heterozygote carries two different alleles (an 
allele is a length of DNA coding for a particular 
characteristic or phenotypic trait - for more detail on 
genes see the Appendix), each allele coding for the 
same trait. A homozygote carries two similar 
alleles, for example blue eyes and blue eyes. 
Heterozygotes, therefore store more variation than 
homozygotes. A human individual may for example have 
one allele coding for brown eyes (inherited from his 
father) and one allele coding for blue eyes (inherited 
from his mother). On the whole only one allele 
expresses itself : the dominant one, brown eyes in this 
case. The other allele (the recessive one) may however 
be passed on to the individual's offspring.
Variability is therefore preserved from generation to 
generation. All this means is that there is more 
variety within a population than can be seen by looking 
at the phenotype alone. It is possible for a
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population to be composed entirely of brown eyed 
individuals and yet carry alleles for blue eyes.
Hidden variations can be drawn upon in times of 
selection pressure.
Even without selection pressures, there can be a 
benefit to having hidden variation, this is what is 
sometimes called heterozygous advantage. In West 
Africa, for example, many people are heterozygote for 
the gene coding for haemoglobin (the oxygen carrying 
substance in red blood cells). Heterozygotes for this 
gene are rare outside Africa. Why? Research showed 
that one allele is the normal one for that trait 
(leading to the production of normal red blood cells), 
the other is a lethal one producing sickle cells (cells 
that collapse, becoming sickle shaped instead of 
round). Any individual who is homozygous for this 
second allele, and has two alleles coding for sickle 
cells, dies of anaemia before reaching puberty. But it 
also happens that a lethal form of cerebral malaria is 
endemic in the West coast of Africa. The malarial 
parasites reproduce in red blood cells. Those people 
who have the sickle cell trait but are heterozygotes 
(so are alive and healthy, the sickle cell being lethal 
only in homozygotes) have red blood cells which tend 
to collapse and therefore which do not last long enough 
for the parasite to reproduce itself. These people are 
at an advantage over homozygotes for normal red blood 
cells since the latter run the risk of dying of
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malaria. In other words, both homozygotes (those with 
2 alleles coding for normal red blood cells and those 
with 2 alleles coding for sickle cells), have high 
death rates compared with the heterozygotes (10). (In 
this situation both alleles are active and play a role 
expressed in the phenotype, the haemoglobin. To this 
extent it is unlike the case of a brown eyed 
heterozygote with a recessive blue-eyed allele which 
does not play any role.)
This was an example of polymorphism conferring 
advantage in heterozygotes at the chromosomal level. A 
good example of polymorphism at the phenotypical level 
conferring survival advantages to a group of 
individuals is found in the snail Cepaea nemoralis. 
within a population there are brown, yellow and pink 
snails with and without bands of dark colours of 
varying widths. Why such variety here? These snails 
are eaten by predators hunting by sight. The banded 
ones are better camouflaged in hedgegrows, the unbanded 
ones are better camouflaged in woods or on open ground. 
So long as there is a variety of forms, some will 
survive (those which best match their habitat). 
Selection pressures maintain this variety (11).
We have just seen that variety is advantageous for 
species to maintain themselves. Variety is also 
drawn upon in the formation of new species. Since 
new species develop out of racial difference, the kind 
of variety which may lead to spéciation can be found in
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the differences between races. One of the most 
variable species within the British Isles is the field 
mouse Apodimus sylvaticus. This is surprising 
because its form is constant from China to Britain.
But it is not constant in Britain where each island 
along the western coast has it own variety. Mice must 
have colonised these islands at different times. Each 
occupation of an island was probably made by a small 
number of individuals carrying their own selection of 
genes (travelling probably on the boats of Viking 
invaders, they tend to resemble Norwegian mice more 
than those of mainland Britain). Each race therefore 
developed its own form since it had just a small amount 
of variation within the colonising population and was 
isolated from the rest of the mainland population (12). 
In time these races could develop into distinct 
species.
In conclusion to this section we can say that 
although morphological classifications are frequently 
used, there is no future in the idea that the species 
is a group of individuals conforming to a type (where 
the type is a perfectly defined ideal to which the 
actual individuals conform to a greater or lesser 
degree).
2. Cladistic Classifications
Most methods of classification take two factors 
into account when deciding how to group organisms into
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species, genera or families. One factor is the 
phylogenetic branching (which groups of organisms split 
off from which other groups and when they split off), 
the other factor is the amount of change or variation a 
group of organisms undergoes after splitting. Cladists 
avoid the problems encountered by morphological 
classifications by taking account only of the first 
factor. An added advantage of cladistic 
classifications is'that they appear more natural since 
they are based on actual relationships between groups. 
Their classifications are based on relationship alone, 
and no amount of variation after splitting makes any 
difference to whether a group of organisms is 
classified as one species or another. This has 
important consequences for assigning organisms to 
species, genera or families and also important 
consequences for the concept of species itself.
Cladists proceed by building a cladogram (a phyletic 
diagram) which shows which organisms gave rise to 
which, this is similar to the usual phyletic diagram 
used by other schools of taxonomy. (See, for example, 
the 4 different groups of imaginary organisms A, B, C,
D in Figure 1). Cladists then translate this into a 
classification ignoring any change species may undergo 
in between splitting (see Figure 2).
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A different taxonomic group emerges from each 
branching point. In Figure 2, there are 3 taxonomic 
groups each represented by a different colour. C and 
D are said to be more closely related than B and C, and 
so C and D are placed in the same taxonomic category 
(same genus or family) and B in a separate one. It 
could be that the organisms at C resembles those at B 
more than those at D (morphologically or genetically), 
this would be the case if D had resulted from rapid 
evolutionary change after the splitting. Normally 
taxonomists would then place B and C in the same 
taxonomic category and, D in a different one. Ranking 
(placing species in taxonomic categories) is usually 
done according to overall differences, for cladists it 
is done only according to time of origin. This leads 
to different taxonomic groupings. One actual example 
of difference in ranking is that for cladist birds and 
crocodiles are classified into one taxonomic category, 
whereas for other taxonomists crocodiles belong to the 
reptile category and birds are in a category of their 
own. The phyletic diagrams in Figure 3 illustrate 
these two different classifications. (In the 
cladistic classification different colours represent 
different categories.)
The species concept which results from cladistic 
classification is as follows : a species comprises all 
those organisms between two branching points on the 
cladogram (phyletic diagram). Any question of species
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identity is irrelevant to cladists, species are given a 
purely formal definition : a species is those organisms 
between branching points.
The gravest objection to cladism is that it seems 
unrealistic not to take into account either the 
quantity or the quality of change a population 
undergoes, in deciding whether it is still to be 
considered of the same species or not. For this reason 
not only does cladism seem an unsatisfactory method of 
classification because of its odd results (e.g. 
classifying birds and crocodiles together which goes 
against all our intuitions about organisms), but it 
also yields an unaccceptable concept of species.
Indeed, the point about when differentiation starts is 
not the same as the point concerning what a species is. 
Cladists seem to confuse the two. In an effort to get 
away from the pitfalls of typology, cladists appear to 
have over-reacted to the unsatisfactoriness of the pure 
morphological conception of species.
Note: cladistics is used in most of the displays 
connected with evolutionary themes at the British 
Museum (natural history). This has created an enormous 
fuss in scientific journals as well as in the popular 
press, on radio and on T.V. The reasons for this have 
nothing to do with my objections to cladism. The 
fuss has been engendered by an accusation by Halstead 
in Nature (1980, Vol. 288 p . 208) that cladistics is a 
Marxist view of nature. In this article Halstead talks
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of change - the emergence of new species - being 
gradual (as it is for many evolutionists), or sudden 
(as it is for cladists). For Halstead sudden change is 
revolutionary change. The fear that all this aroused 
was that the British Museum was presenting a Marxist 
view to the public under the guise of scientific 
authority. But as Gould (Nature Vol. 289 p . 742) and 
many others have pointed out, cladism is not a Marxist 
plot. Not every view that holds that change occurs 
suddenly is necessarily committed to Marxism. 
Furthermore saltation (the view that evolutionary 
changes occur in jumps and not gradually) is not a view 
which is exclusive to cladism. It is doubtful whether 
views of these sorts are in any way derived from 
Marxist philosophy.
3. Biological Classifications and the Biospecies
A different and I think better reaction to the 
unsatisfactoriness of the morphological conception is 
what Mayr and others have called the biological 
classification. This takes both phylogeny and genetic 
knowledge into account, it also takes account of 
variety and change. To engage in biological 
classification as so conceived is to aim at grouping 
organisms into taxa reflecting natural groupings found 
in the living world.
Although the variety within a species is often 
just as great as the variety between species, the gap
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between individuals has a different physiological basis 
from the gap between species. There is a relationship 
among organisms of one species quite different from the 
relationship between organisms from different species, 
and the relationship is much more than mere 
resemblance. In sexual species, this relationship is 
reflected in the fact that individuals of one species, 
however different morphologically, can interbreed in 
the wild (producing viable offspring); individuals from 
different species, however similar morphologically, 
cannot. So, in sexual species at least one criterion 
for sameness of species is interbreeding. Individuals 
within a species can interbreed because their genes 
(chromosomes) are sufficiently similar to be recombined 
during reproduction (see the Appendix for mechanisms of 
reproduction). The genetic make up of a species is 
part of the explanation of why a species is what is is, 
however varied its members may be. Biologists such as 
Mayr and Dobzhansky prefer the term gene pool to 
genotype since there is no type at the genetic level 
(14). This means that members of a species are more 
than a mere collection of individuals resembling each 
other. They are linked together by natural bonds.
They form populations cohesively held together. In 
summary, the definition of a species adopted here is : 
a species is composed of populations which are 
reproductive communities, genetic units and ecological 
units (15). This is called the biospecies.
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Since this concept is the one I shall favour 
throughout the thesis I now want to look at it in 
greater detail. The gene pool is the integrated 
collection of genes that make up the genetic component 
of a species : "all genetic information distributed
among an interbreeding group of individuals 
collectively forms a gene pool, which is temporarily 
dispersed and held as a set of particular genotypes" 
(16), and it is "the entire effective population that 
is the temporary incarnation and visible manifestation 
of the gene pool" (17) (attempts to give formal 
conditions for the membership of gene pools will be 
explored in Chapter Four.) The gene pool explains both 
variation and inheritance, why individuals are like 
their parents yet different from each other. Seeing 
the species in this way explains how it can evolve and 
yet maintain its identity. It can evolve and maintain 
its identity because of the relationship and bonds 
between the individuals. As we have already said, in a
given environment the amount of variation within a
species remains constant (in the absence of migration, 
mutation and selection) (18).
A species is to a large extent a unique genetic 
response to a particular environment (19). The
populations of a species form particular genetic and
ecological groups. It is in this sense that the 
species concept is biological - it uses concepts which 
have no meaning outside the biological world (20).
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The morphological species concept on the other hand has 
no specifically biological implications and "provides 
no guarantee that the species groups which it yields 
will be uniform with respect to biologically 
significant relationships" (21).
The genetic differences between species are often 
reflected in the morphological differences between 
them. Therefore biological species are usually 
morphological species. The genetic make up explains 
morphology, and on the whole similar phenotypes will 
result from similar genotypes, though the correlation 
sometimes comes apart. In addition to this we have 
already seen that there is more genetic information 
than can be seen expressed in the phenotype, so that 
although it is true that genes are only manifest when 
expressed phenotypically, a hidden gene may have a part 
to play. If one were to adopt the purely morphological 
criterion for species one would lose some of the 
information needed to group organisms into kinds. One 
would also be left with the need to explain why 
morphology is indicative of a species in the biological 
acceptation. Morphology does not have the same 
theoretical input as genetics. Nevertheless reference 
to morphology itself is necessary for any explanation 
of what a species is and how it relates to the 
environment, since the environment and selection 
pressures in particular can only act on the phenotype, 
which is the principal expression of the genes. The
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genotype is more basic than the phenotype, but 
phenotypic terms are needed in a comprehensive account 
of what a species is.
The biospecies classification, taking into account 
general factors concerning species (gene pool, ecology 
and so on) seems to me the most satisfactory. However, 
many criticisms have been levelled against it and now I 
shall look at them in some detail.
(i) The gene pools for the vast majority of 
species are as yet unknown. Although this is the 
reason that many biologists give for rejecting the 
biospecies concept and preferring the morphological 
one, this is not a theoretical problem. It is at most 
a practical one.
(ii) It is often impossible to tell whether a 
population is an interbreeding group or not. Again 
this is a practical difficulty and not a theoretical 
o n e .
(iii) Species are not always reproductively 
isolated. Some species hybridize occasionally (eg. 
horse, donkey), some do frequently, and some species 
are progressively fusing through hybridization. For 
example, Pinus muricata and Pinus nemorata in 
California have been hybridizing since the 
Pleiostocene, slowly forming one new species (22), this 
process is called secondary spéciation (or 
introgression). Hybrids are much commoner in plants, 
no doubt because plants have simpler reproductive
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systems : "the ability of a species to tolerate the
presence of foreign genes is thus a function of the 
degree of complexity and integration attained by a 
system of genic determinants" (23). Grant adds here, 
by way of illustration, that one can build a good 
bicycle from old bicycle parts but not a good watch 
from old watch pieces. It is also possible that 
natural selection may favour hybrids in plants as a 
means of introducing new genetic forms into a species 
with simple genetic systems.
(iv) A fourth objection frequently raised against 
the biological species concept is that, because of 
hybridization, boundaries between species are vague. 
This is thought to imply that species in the natural 
world do not form sharply discrete units and fit badly 
therefore into the biological conception of species.
It is said that this phenomenon undermines the strict 
individuation of gene-pools and therefore of species. 
The question of vagueness and of hybrids will be 
considered in Chapters Two and Three.
(V ) A final objection is that some organisms do 
not reproduce sexually and therefore do not share a 
gene pool, although they do constitute a collection of 
genes. In these cases there is no reshuffling of genes 
at reproduction, although many asexual plant species do 
have mechanisms for exchanging genetic material prior 
to reproduction (for example, oats, wheat and barley 
have such mechanisms).
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Among the different kingdoms of the living world, 
only half the species of protozoa are sexual (the 
asexual ones reproduce by fission). Many plants 
reproduce asexually (by bulbs or runners), nevertheless 
there are good biological species to be found in all 
major plant groups. In animals asexual reproduction is 
rare. When it does occur there is often an alternation 
of generations, one generation being sexual, the other 
asexual, thus providing some source of genetic 
variation in each alternate generation. This is the 
case for some jelly fish, the Medusa for example is the 
sexual swimming phase of the stationary non-sexual 
polyp. Other species form huge aggregates where some 
members are asexual, others sexual. The Portuguese man 
of war is a colony of polyps all attached to a large 
gas filled bag keeping them afloat. Each polyp plays a 
different role in the colony. Some have mouths for 
feeding, some have stings for defence, some have sexual 
organs for reproduction. All this gives us an idea of 
the range of asexual species, but generally asexuality 
is rare.
Asexual species are rarer than sexual ones because 
they are less able to adapt to new environments. They 
often represent "blind alleys" (24) from an 
evolutionary point of view. New genotypes cannot arise 
from re-combinations as in sexuality, but only from 
mutations or by polyploidy. Polyploidy is the doubling 
of chromosome numbers, and this can lead to the
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formation of new species (for all these sources of 
variation see the Appendix). Although asexual species 
may seem a serious problem for the biospecies concept, 
they do form populations with recognisable genetic and 
ecological structures. It is also worth noting that in 
both plants and animals non sexual species have often 
been derived from sexual species, which suggests that 
sexual species are more basic. A study of their genes 
shows that "in most cases remnants of an organisation 
into biological species clearly persists" (25). For 
example plants often have flowers which are not used 
for reproduction, but were at one time. Sometimes they 
have remnants of flowers (26). In this case one could 
say that the biospecies is still applicable in as much 
as these species are derived from true sexual ones.
One solution to the problem posed by asexual species 
would be to say that asexual organisms are not of a 
species. Under this view asexual species could be seen 
as one large organism or a clone (all the individuals 
in the species being descended from one individual 
zygote). Clones show little variation since they lack 
the import of new genes. V. Grant would prefer to call 
these species "binoms" since "clones" gives the idea of 
all individuals being exact copies of each other (which 
they are not necessarily in asexual species). Binom on 
the other hand suggests a whole polymorphic complex 
descended from one ancestor. One such example is the 
common bramble, Rubus fruticosus. It reproduces by
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apomixis, i.e. seeds and fruit developing without 
fertilization. 2,000 different kinds of blackberry 
have been named as separate species (having slightly 
different morphological characters, different leaves, 
prickles, fruit). But it may be more reasonable to 
call them one large aggregate. This, however, still 
seems unsatisfactory since we want the individual 
instances (individual plants) to be organisms too. As 
Mayr says, this "overlooks the fact that the word 
species has not only the biological meaning of a 
reproductively isolated population but also the purely 
formal meaning 'kind of'" (27). If one accepts the 
biospecies concept, how is one to classify asexual 
organisms? Where there are sexual generations, or 
remnants of a gene pool, one can still see such 
groupings as true biological species; otherwise 
groupings must be made morphologically.
These are the five main criticisms of the 
biospecies concept and I shall return to some of them 
in the course of the thesis. At this point it will 
suffice to state my opinion that they do not show that 
the biospecies conception is inferior to the cladistic 
and morphological conceptions. The biospecies 
conception enables one to understand how species are 
related to each other genealogically: related species 
have a similar genetic make up (28). More importantly 
the biospecies enables one to see variation and change 
as essential to what a species is. This helps
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understand domestic breeding as well as normal 
adaptations to new environments. Breeding is no more 
than the selection of some genotypes from the original 
population with a view to their adaptation to the 
specialised environment of the farmer (29).
Some have felt the temptation to see the question 
of species as an artificial or idle problem, answerable 
to nothing but a self-contained interest in classifying 
things for the sake of classifying them. I cannot hope 
to refute such a deeply mistaken view in one stroke.
In advance of the conclusion of this thesis, I would 
simply point - for the benefit of those of a crudely 
instrumental attitude to theoretical questions - to the 
practical importance of correct classification for 
agricultural purposes. One may, for example, need to 
tell two similar sorts of beetle apart (one harmful the 
other beneficial) if one wants to use an insecticide.
It may also be of practical importance in matters of 
public health, eg. in the identification of parasites 
and vector borne diseases. Here the biological species 
concept gives a more correct means of determining what 
is and what is not a separate species (that is to say 
when two populations should be seen as of different 
species). It would indeed have been impossible 
following the pure morphological concept to distinguish 
between the six sibling species of mosquito Anopheles 
maculipennis of which only three are vectors of human 
malaria (30). Programmes for the control of malaria
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would not have succeeded if these had not been seen as 
different species. They are different species 
according to the biological species concept because 
their populations form different breeding units and 
different ecological units. Here good biological 
classification has made for insightful intervention 
into the workings of nature.
Finally good biological taxonomy (good in the 
sense of helping us to understand what species are and 
not merely how to identify them) has been the starting 
point for an increase in our scientific knowledge of 
the process of spéciation (31).
PART II. THEORIES OF SPECIATION
Spéciation is the process which leads to the 
formation of new types of organisms. Spéciation can 
occur by phyletic evolution, that is to say through 
change over time. It can also occur by the splitting 
of one species into two groups followed by the 
divergence of each group. In practice, two forms are 
said to belong to different species if they are 
morphologically and genetically so distinct that they 
cannot interbreed (or even if they can still mate, fail 
to produce fertile offspring). If one observes that 
two populations for one reason or another do not in 
fact interbreed in their normal environment, then again 
however morphologically or genetically similar they may
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be, they are said to be of different species (32).
Spéciation is brought about in several ways. It 
can only be identified once the process is complete, 
but it is the initial step that is crucial in 
establishing a new species. Although the initial step 
is crucial - e.g. one population's becoming isolated 
geographically after a volcanic eruption - it is what 
happens to the group after this that determines whether 
it becomes a new species or not. All mechanisms of 
spéciation are isolation mechanisms of some kind. 
Isolation gives new genes a chance to get established. 
Whereas they might have been swamped in a large group 
of organisms, they can have some impact in a small 
group of organisms. As new traits are selected, a 
group of organisms that finds itself in isolation or in 
a new environment, will fail to maintain its genetic 
and phenotypic identity. There are four isolating 
mechanisms :
1. Geographical Isolation
If a population becomes geographically isolated 
from the rest of the species, then it is highly likely 
that in the course of time it will be reproductively 
isolated. Following the accumulation of new genetic 
variations (eg. through mutations), it may become
a new species. This sort of spéciation is found where 
there are geographical barriers enabling small isolated 
colonies to develop their own gene pools. Islands
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furnish a good example of such developments. First one 
has islands with populations showing merely racial 
differences. These populations are not fully separate 
species and can still interbreed. This is the case of 
the British field mouse mentioned earlier. And 
secondly there are cases where the races are closer to 
spéciation, as for example with the plant Nigella 
degenii in the Aegean area. This species is divided 
into subspecies which interbreed but at a lower than 
normal rate of fertility (See Figure 4 ).
(This figure is taken from V. Grant, Organismic 
evolution, p. 16 7.)
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Finally, one finds complete isolation and 
consequential diversification. An example is furnished 
by the animals of the Galapagos Islands. Darwin's 
finches resemble those of mainland South America, and 
presumably they are descendants from the finches which 
originally came to the Galapagos Islands and then 
diversified as a result of geographical isolation. The 
Islands have fourteen different species of finches.
Some species inhabit the same island, but because of 
selection pressure (due to competition for food), each 
species has its own beak shape and size, according to
the type of food it eats (see Figure 5).
Species which live in different geographical 
areas such as different islands are called allopatric 
species, sympatric species are species that live in 
the same territory but are reproduct ively isolated. 
These terms (allopatric, sympatric) are relational 
terms and refer to the spatial arrangement between two 
species. Whether a species is allopatric or sympatric 
depends on the point of reference. For example, there 
are three species of Homo sapiens lice. Since these 
can live on the same members of the species in all 
parts of the world, they are sympatric. But if instead
of taking the world as a point of reference, we take a
human being, then the three species are allopatric 
since one species inhabits the axillae (Phthirus 
pubis), one the head hairs (Pediculus capitis) and 
the third the body (Pediculus humanus) (33).
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Darwin's finches comprise some allopatric species and 
some sympatric (those which inhabit the same island, 
but have diversified into different species through 
competition for food). The deer family (fallow deer, 
roe deer, red deer, moose, reindeer) is another example 
of reproductively isolated species living in the same 
regions. They are sympatric species. It is not known 
what gave rise to such breeding barriers between the 
different deer species, but the outcome has been 
different species with no genetic exchange (34).
2. Genetic Isolation
Many biologists believe that most spéciation has 
taken place not on islands but on continents. It may 
be, therefore, that genetic mechanisms have sometimes 
been the initiating factor in spéciation (35). We know 
that variation accumulates within a species before 
there is geographical isolation. It must therefore be 
possible for genetic differences to arise between two 
groups without physical isolation.
The phenomenon of polyploidy affords a different 
sort of case of spéciation following genetic 
differentiation. Polyploids are common in plants but 
rare in animals. When the chromosomes from the parents 
are doubled the offspring are tetraploid and have four 
sets of chromosomes instead of two. When they are 
trebled the offspring are hexaploid with six sets of 
chromosomes. When they are quadrupled the offspring
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are octaploid with eight sets of chromosomes. So long 
as the numbers are even the new organisms can 
reproduce. Polyploids are separate from their 
ancestors because any hybrids between them and 
organisms similar to their ancestors would be sterile. 
The reason for this is that the hybrid would have an 
uneven number of chromosomes (36). A diploid parent 
and a tetraploid parent for instance would contribute 
each 1+2 chromosomes to their offspring (a total of 3). 
New polyploid species have their own morphology. They 
usually have, for example, larger cells which result in 
thicker petals or leaves. They also have their own 
physiology and their own ecology. Polyploids are very 
common in the wild amongst ferns where 95% of fern 
species are polyploids. This sort of spéciation is 
also extensively exploited in crop development: cotton, 
bread wheat, tobacco are usually polyploids (37).
3. Ecological Isolation
New species may evolve when a population develops 
new environmental habits. For example Pinus radiata 
and Pinus attenuata are seasonally isolated. One 
sheds its pollen in February and the other in April. 
This has meant that they are effectively isolated 
reproductively, and so represent two different species. 
The same isolation is found in the sibling species of 
flies mentioned earlier : Drosophila pseudoobscura 
and Drosophila persimilis. They share the same
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breeding season but one is sexually active at night and 
the other by day (38). Other species have different 
ecological requirements which can result in a 
mechanical isolation. For example, Salvia mellifera 
and Salvia apiana are pollinated by different bees.
A species of large bees pollinates Salvia apiana and 
a species of small bees pollinates Salvia mellifera. 
Small bees cannot, for mechanical reasons, pollinate 
Salvia apiana. Apart from this there is very little 
difference between the two species of Salvia. 
Occasionally these two species do form hybrids when 
they are accidentally pollinated by medium sized bees
(39) (see Figure 6).
4. Ethological Isolation
Two species may be isolated because they have 
different behavioural patterns. The members of a 
species often recognize each other because of certain
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behavioural patterns. If one group for example 
developed new courtship patterns, it would not be 
recognized by other members of that species. Bufo 
viridis are a group of green toads which call to each 
other. They have developed into different species 
following a division into different breeding groups, 
each group with a different voice (40). Something 
similar has isolated two species of wolf spider, 
Schizoloza ocreata and Schizoloza rovneri, in the 
United States. Both species of male approach their 
mates by making noises. Schizoloza ocreata by 
tapping their legs and clicking, and Schizoloza 
rovneri by press-ups on the legs and rapid clicking.
If females are rendered insensitive to the noises, they 
mate with either species of male and produce fertile 
offspring (41).
It is important to note that some species are 
distinguished by behavioural patterns which are learned 
and not innate. For example, different species of 
gulls in Britain have different sequences of calls and 
displays in courtship. These are learned and not 
innate. The Herring gull and the Lesser black backed 
gull in Britain are interfertile. But they do not 
breed. The barrier is behavioural and learned. Mate 
selection by the female depends on ring colour around 
the male's eyes, which are different for each species. 
Young chicks learn these colours when newly hatched (by 
the process of 'imprinting'). If they are hatched in
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the other species’ nest, they will recognize them as 
potential mates when they grow up instead of 
individuals from their own species.
Competition leads to spéciation, different groups 
occupying the same area (sympatric groups) may 
diversify slightly thus avoiding competing for scarce 
resources. This spéciation can be maintained by 
different forms of behaviour.
All these forms of isolation lead to spéciation 
and also serve to keep species separate. They all 
result in a failure to mate, or in a failure to 
fertilize (if for example gametes are incompatible), or 
in a failure of the offspring to survive. This later 
case would include zygote mortality, hybrid 
unviability, hybrid sterility and even reduced 
fertility for hybrids (these would be found in species 
in the process of spéciation). Usually several 
isolating mechanisms operate at the same time to keep 
species apart.
The above examples illustrate how 
reproductive organisms form units in which each 
organism recognizes its own kind. If this were not so 
they would not mate. Indeed in the case of the spiders 
mentioned above, if the female does not recognize the 
male's noise she mistakes the male for food and eats 
him. The problem of recognition is acute in some 
species such as the Angler Fish who live in 
semi-permanent darkness where it would be difficult to
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find let alone recognize ones mate. These fish have 
resorted to being attached together from birth. The 
male is a third to half an inch long and the female 
reaches two feet. They attach after hatching and their 
union is so perfect it is difficult to tell exactly 
where the female ends and the male begins. Even their 
two blood streams connect, the male drawing his food 
from the female's blood (42).
All the various types of spéciation reviewed here, 
illustrate the need to see species as unique genetic 
systems. The examples also point to the dynamic nature 
of species. The biospecies concept is the best
means we have to do full justice to those
considerations simultaneously.
PART III. CONCEPTS IN ECOLOGY
Ecology is the study of the interaction of 
organisms with each other and with the non-living 
world. It is not simply the study of some kind of
fixed balance of nature. Indeed organisms change the
world they live in. Plants for example change the 
nature of the soil they grow on. Grazing cows maintain 
the grass in a field, preventing it from returning to 
scrubland. The relationship between living and 
non-living things is an active one. Since the 
environment itself also changes independently from the 
species living in it, evolution is not the adaptation
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of species to something fixed, but the repeated 
adaptation of species, constantly keeping pace with 
the changes in their environment: "Natural selection 
over the long run does not seem to improve a species ' 
chances of survival but simply enables it to "track" or 
keep up with the constantly changing environment" (43). 
To continue the description of what constitutes a 
species, I shall look at four different concepts in 
Ecology: the ecosystem, the niche, adaptation and 
species-specific relationships. All these will 
emphasize the close relationship species have with 
their environment and the need to take this into 
account when deciding on the definition of species.
1. The ecosystem
A basic concept in ecology is the ecosystem. The 
ecosystem is defined by the workings of climate, soil, 
bacteria, fungi, plants and animals within a particular 
area. It embraces both the abiotic environment 
(organic and inorganic) and the biotic environment.
The biotic environment is divided into producers 
(organisms which convert energy from the sun), 
consumers (organisms which get their energy by eating 
plants or animals), and decomposers (organisms such as 
bacteria which recycle nutrients). Figure 7 shows the 
energy flowing through a community of organism in an 
ecosystem.
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For any organism the rest of the ecosystem 
represents its niche.
The whole system can be quite fragile, for example 
part of the partridge's niche includes aphids, rabbits 
and ants. Figure 8 is an illustration of the 
ecological factors which could affect the patridge's 
survival.
2. The niche.
The niche corresponds to the total range of conditions 
under which an individual, or even a population or a 
species, lives and replaces itself. Different species 
may occupy the same kind of niche, for example 
kangaroos in Australia and bisons in North America live 
in the same type of environment. Other species can 
live in a variety of niches as for example human beings 
do. Large numbers of organisms making up an 
ecosystem can add to the stability of the system, and 
to the stability of each organism's niche. An 
organism's niche will vary according to the amount of 
competition the species encounters from other species 
within the same ecosystem. For example the white eyed 
bird Zosterops palpebrosa, lives at a high altitude 
in Burma where it has little competition. But in 
Malaya and Borneo where other species of Zosterops 
live and occupy the higher zones, Zosterops 
palpebrosa lives in the lowlands because the 
competition is so intense higher up (44). Another
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example is the warbler in the North East forests of 
America, which lives at three different levels within 
the same area : the Cape May warbler (Dendroica 
tigrina) and Dendroica fusca live in the upper crown 
of the forest; Dendroica virens and Dendroica 
castanea live in the middle crown; Dendroica 
coronata in the lower crown (45). As we saw earlier 
competition leads to specialization and therefore 
spéciation. If a species cannot adapt to a special 
niche in the face of competition, it becomes extinct. 
There is also a difference between regions of the 
globe. In the tropics, where seasonal fluctuations are 
minimal organisms can specialize and adapt to narrow 
niches. In temperate climates the seasons change 
dramatically, and organisms need to be adapted to a 
wide variety of niches to survive the seasons. The 
niche of the thrush Turdus ericetorum for example has 
to be equivalent to the niches of six tropical bird 
species to enable it to cope with the seasons (see 
Figure 9. From Open University Course S323, Unit 14 
p . 29).
67




32?sfisrr m m #small fruit
worms
W Ê M
The niche o f a thrush Turdus 
ericetorum  in B ritain  compared with 
niches o f tropical bird species.
68
3. Adaptation
As the environment changes^ species change with it- 
drawing upon the store of variation within their gene 
pools to adapt. One of the best known examplesof this 
is the peppered moth Biston betularia (mentioned 
earlier). Within a normal population nearly all the 
moths are speckled grey (the 'typical form') and a few 
individuals are dark (the 'carbonarian form’). The 
moths live on tree trunks. These trees are usually 
covered in lichen, and the typical form is well 
camouflaged against predation by birds hunting by 
sight. Following the industrial revolution lichen 
disappeared and tree trunks were covered in soot around 
towns such as Manchester. Consequently, the 
carbonarian form proved better adapted and the common 
grey form became rare, since was now conspicuous 
to predators hunting it. The cause of the change from 
grey to black in the peppered moth was selective 
predation following environmental change. In 1848 
there were less than 1% of Carbonaria in the 
Manchester area, by 1898 these represented 95% of the 
Biston betularia moths (46) (see Figures 10 and 11).
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This phenomenon is known as industrial melanism.
It occurs also with ladybirds (Adelia bipunctata).
In this case though, it is not due to predation but 
to the fact that dark ladybirds (black with red spots) 
can absorb more radiation. This is an advantage in 
areas where smoke reduces the amount of sunshine, as 
for example in Liverpool and Glasgow where 97% of 
ladybirds are black (47). Other examples of 
environmental change and species adaptation are found 
in pest resistance to poisons such as DDT (all house 
flies Musca domestica in Denmark are now resistant to 
every safe insecticide known) (48), and in bacterial 
resistance to antibiotics and so forth.
Organisms constantly adapt themselves to a 
changing environment. Resistance to DDT takes only two 
years to accrue in flies and mosquitoes (49).
Selection pressures from the environment are constantly 
at work, thereby helping to maintain or select certain 
characteristics of a species. For example mosquitoes 
in the wild will need the ability to suck blood fast.
If they are too slow they get killed by their host.
90% of wild mosquitoes can bite and get away with it, 
only 59% of mosquitoes reared in laboratories can 
manage this feat. Inefficient mosquitoes do not 
survive in the wild (50).
Other species do not change with environmental 
changes by adaptation and by natural selection, but 
instead have within themselves an adaptive genetic
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mechanism which causes an existing population to 
change its form instead of being eliminated in favour 
of other better adapted forms. The desert locust 
Shistocerca gregaria has two forms, solitaria and 
gregaria. Until 1911 these different forms were 
named as different species. These two forms do not 
represent some type of polymorphism since both forms 
are not found together in any population of desert 
locust. It is rather that the desert locust as a 
species adopts one form or the other according to 
environmental conditions. Usually the species is 
composed of solitary grasshoppers, but occasionally 
these swarm. Swarming occurs as a result of changes in 
climate, heavy rain causing many eggs to hatch, or 
strong winds blowing grashoppers together. It seems 
that crowding and density of population is what 
determines the change. The transition takes several 
generations. During this time the locusts change^ 
crowding leading first to behavioural changes, which 
then lead to physiological changes, which lead to 
morphological changes (in sizes, shape, colour). The 
solitaria also has a high fecundity and a short life, 
the gregaria a low fecundity and a long life. These 
changes mean that the locust in the gregarian form is 
capable of sustained flight and of swarming (51).
Other species such as aphids reproduce either sexually 
or parthogenically (virgin birth). They produce 
wingless individuals when the food supply is good and
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winged individuals (by sexual reproduction) when 
conditions become crowded, thus enabling individuals to 
fly to better feeding grounds (52). Such alternation 
of methods of reproduction and morphological formsy 
following external conditions,is not uncommon in other 
species. Some species only metamorphose when 
conditions become harsh. The Axolotl (the larval form 
of an American species of Salamander) is an example of 
this. There are twenty different species of Axolotl. 
The Axolotl usually lives in water and remains at the 
larval stage throughout its life, but sometimes changes 
into a salamander and takes to dry land if the food in 
the water becomes scarce. So long as conditions are 
good it can reproduce itself while still in the larval 
stage :
The Axolotl and the Ammocoete (53)
Amblystoma’s * a giant newt who rears in swampy waters. 
As other newts are wont to do, a lot of fishy 
daughters :
These Axolotls, having gills, pursue a life aquatic. 
But, when they should transform to newts, are naughty 
and erratic.
They change upon compulsion, if the water grows too 
foul.
For then they have to use their lungs, and go ashore to 
prowl:
*Amblystoma is the generic name for Axolotl.
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But when a lake's attractive, nicely aired, and full of 
food.
They cling to youth perpetual, and rear a tadpole 
brood.
All these variations exist in the genetic make up 
of each individual organism within the species, and go 
towards illustrating the importance of a store of 
latent variety within species. Different genes can 
express themselves at different times, or the same 
genes can express themselves differently, the 
explanation always depending on the environment:
"there are many possibilities for the gene products 
which are the raw material of an individual. They are 
like butcher's meat: it can be stewed, roast, fried or 
grilled, under done or over done, seasoned or plain,
sliced or served whole ..... all our characteristics
are the result of an interaction between genes and the 
environment and usually between different genes as 
well" (54). This is seen in the examples given. Even 
more immediate results may be observed in the case of 
flamingoes, which go white if they do not eat pink 
food (such as shrimps). Another example is Siamese 
cats which develop black fur on the colder parts of 
their bodies, usually on their toes, noses and ears but 
also on any part which has been shaven (55).
4. Species-specific relationships
There is a special relationship between a predator
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and its prey which is species-specific and usually 
remains stable. If predation increased the prey would 
run the risk of extinction, with the result that the 
numbers of predators would then decline. Population 
sizes of predators and prey therefore regulate each 
other. A similar relationship exists between parasite 
and host (a form of predation). In this way many 
species evolve together. Many parasites and hosts have 
synchronised fertility cycles, so that when the young 
hosts are born, young parasites are ready to colonize 
them. This occurs in rabbits and rabbit fleas for 
example. Other species depend on each other for 
survival in more complex ways ; there is for instance 
the mite, Digamasellus which hitch-hikes on the 
mushroom fly, Lycoriella auripila, in order to get to 
the mushrooms on which it feeds. This mite can also 
develop wings if conditions get bad and there are no 
mushroom flies around (56). The British large blue 
butterfly (now extinct?) relies on ants to feed its 
larvae with the ants' grubs. In return the larvae 
secrete a sweet substance for the ants to eat. The 
ants even pick up the larvae which fall off thyme 
bushes where the butterfly lays her eggs and then 
transport them back to their ant nests (57).
This sort of co-evolution is extremely common 
between flowers and the insects which pollinate them.
In some cases flowers are pollinated by animals 
(insects, birds, bats and some other mammals), wind and
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even water. In other cases they are self pollinating. 
Most commonly pollination is by insects. Insects are 
usually faithful to the species they pollinate. 
Obviously this is important if pollination is to 
succeed. Flowers need to be easily recognizable and 
need to advertize themselves with particular shapes, 
colours and textures. They need also to provide 
landing places and food to attract the insects.
"The origin of flowers as we know them must ... be 
closely bound up with the evolution of the 
flower-insect relationship .... The evolution of 
flowers and insects proceeded hand-in-hand" (58).
Flowers often have rigid and specially adapted 
structures to ensure contact with visiting insects. 
Insects and bees in particular have evolved different 
sorts of pollen collecting devices, baskets on legs for 
example. Flowers open at particular times of the day 
to fit in with the habits of pollinating animals (and 
also to avoid getting wet with dew at night). 
Pollination involves collecting pollen (a spore 
containing two sperms and a third cell) from the stamen 
(male organ) and transporting it to the stigma (female 
organ). Then the process of fertilization starts and 
the pollen is transported to the ovary. Plants usually 
avoid self-pollination. Mechanisms which prevent 
self-pollination present an advantage because 
self-pollination reduces the amount of variation, such 
mechanisms are therefore favoured in the selection
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process. Self-pollination is avoided by having the 
stamens mature at an earlier stage than the stigma, or 
by having a mechanism which prevents the pollen from 
reaching the stigma. Some plants can only be 
pollinated by different varieties of the same species. 
Apple trees for example need a different variety of 
apple tree to pollinate them. Most flowers attract 
insects by offering them food (nectar of pollen), and 
then while the insect is feeding ensure that it 
collects the pollen and thus transports it to the next 
flower. Meadow sage. Salvia pratensis is one of many 
such flowers. It is pollinated by bumble bees and in 
order to suck the nectar inside the flower the bumble 
bee has to touch a lever that results in the pollen 
being stamped onto its back. The stigma matures later 
and the pollen attaches itself to the stigma from the 
bumble bees back following the same mechanism (59) (see 
Figure 12).
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The previous example illustrates the reliance 
between species on the capacity of recognition of other 
species. Another example which exploits recognition is 
that of flowers which attract insects by exploiting 
their sexual drive: fly orchids (Ophrys insectifera) 
resemble the female wasp, the male pollinates the 
orchid by copulating with it. Other orchids resembling 
bees are pollinated by being attacked by bees deceived 
into thinking that they are under attack themselves. 
Some orchids (Coryanthes and Gongora) intoxicate 
bees with their scent, or with certain fluids, so that 
the bees fall into a reservoir out of which they can 
only climb by pollinating the flower (60).
These last relationships benefit the flowers but 
not the insects. Where the relationship is mutually 
beneficial it is called symbiotic. Such relationships 
exist between many organisms apart from flowers and 
their pollinators. There are, for example, birds which 
live on the backs of water buffalos feeding on their 
parasites. Other species of birds live with 
crocodiles, picking food between their teeth, thereby 
cleaning their teeth for them (61).
At the end of this third Part of Chapter One, we 
can reaffirm our acceptance of the biospecies concept.
A species is not only a particular genetic system, it 
is also a particular ecological system. This concept 
enables one to explain reversible change such as in the 
axolotl or even the peppered moth. In these cases
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change, although permanent for the individual, is 
reversible as far as the species is concerned. It is 
only because we know that genes are maintained in the 
gene pool (even if they are not phenotypically 
expressed) that we can account for phenotypes recurring 
predictably with specific environmental changes.
Conclusion to chapter One
What emerges from this chapter is the necessity to 
adopt a certain definition of species (represented by 
the biospecies concept). In addition, although the 
chapter only aimed at a descriptive account of species, 
it appears from all the examples described in the 
chapter that a species is not an arbitrary aggregation 
of individuals. On the contrary, there seems to be an 
accepted understanding among biologists that specific 
relationships hold between the individuals which make 
up a species. This points towards the view that 
species are not artificial classifications of the mind, 
but represent real entities in nature. The point will 
be argued more fully in Chapter Three.
For the present, having seen that scientists 
describe organisms as unique but as falling into 
distinct kinds, we are now in a position to ask the 
following philosophical question : if species are real, 
what sort of entities are they? This question is 
addressed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
A PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF SPECIES
In the first part of this chapter I shall suggest 
that species are natural kinds. In the second part I 
argue that species themselves have properties that do 
not necessarily belong to their individual members.
PART I. DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES FOR 'SPECIES AS 
ENTITIES
One view I wish to eliminate from the start is 
that a species is a concept. Those who hold this view 
claim that the species lion, say, is the concept of 
what it is to be a lion. But a species, I would 
counter, cannot be a concept because things can be said 
of a species that cannot be said of concepts. We can 
say : a species grows, or it becomes extinct. So a
species must be something other than a concept, which
means that we are left with several further 
possibilities : these are that a species is a class, or
it is an individual or it is a natural kind.
1. Classes
The first possibility I shall consider is that a 
species is the sum total of all its individual members. 
In other words a species is a class. The strongest
86
argument for this view has been advanced by Caplan, who 
has argued that species must be classes since we can 
apply biological laws to them (1). One may add that 
any scientific investigation will focus on the members 
of a species since it is only through observing 
specimens that scientists can discover that a species 
exists, and ascertain what makes it the species it is. 
However, one may ask: is it correct to identify a 
particular species with the extension of the species 
term? In my view it is not, because things can be true 
of the species without their being true of the class. 
For while a species may develop or become more 
numerous, classes cannot do so (2). Moreover a species 
does not have the members it has essentially. Indeed 
it is quite conceivable that the lion species of today 
might have been composed of a different set of 
individuals from the ones it in fact does consist of. 
Yet it would still be the same species,the lion 
species. Whereas a class, on the other hand, does 
essentially have the members it has.
2. Individuals
The second possibility is that a species is not a 
class but some sort of concrete individual. This is a 
view held by, among others, David Hull, who believes 
that a species is one large organism. He says that 
species have too often been seen by philosophers as 
spatiotemporally unrestricted classes (3). For we have
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just seen, species evolve and split, whereas classes do 
not. Hull goes on to make a similar point when he sayss 
"I cannot describe intelligibly what it could mean to 
say that a class buds off another class. The reason 
for the conceptual difficulty is that such terms imply 
temporal and causal connections, connections which are 
incompatible with species as spatiotemporally 
unrestricted classes" (4). Hull points out that 
species emerge as a result of unique selection 
pressures (5). For this reason a species is identified 
by its parentage and is therefore a historical entity. 
Particular determinate species can exist only once (6), 
and species are "spatiotemporally localized cohesive 
and continuous entities" (7). In other words 'lion' 
does not refer, to a universal, as for example 'table' 
does, but refers to an individual of which all lions 
are parts. In response to Caplan's view, Hull believes 
that generalizations about particular species are 
merely empirical generalizations and cannot function 
within explanations in the way in which laws can. Hull 
points out that there are no internal characteristics 
which make a species the species it is (as was pointed 
out in the preceeding chapter). Yet species form 
cohesive wholes which remain relatively stable through 
time. From this Hull draws the conclusion that a name 
is given to a species, and to organisms within that 
species, not because of any typical properties, and 
not because the species name is a general term (8),
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but because the species name refers to a 
"spatiotemporally localized individual". Just as an 
individual person is baptized, so "a taxon has the name 
it has in virtue of the naming ceremony, not in
virtue of any trait or traits it might have" (9). An
organism is not given a name because it is typical of 
a species, but because it is a part of a species and 
is born of that species. So long as there is no 
spatiotemporal discontinuity a species will remain the 
same species according to Hull, regardless of the 
amount of change it may undergo, just as a caterpillar
will turn into a moth while remaining the same
individual (10). Absence of essential characteristics 
and spatiotemporal continuity being typical of the 
way in which we think of individuals^ Hull draws the 
conclusion that species terms are proper names.
Hull says that seeing species as classes brings 
conceptual difficulties (viz. how can a class bud off 
another?). But one can object to Hull's own view by 
using precisely the same argument, for seeing species 
as individuals also brings conceptual difficulties. 
Indeed if Hull's view is taken fully seriously, strange 
consequences would follow : we should for instance be 
able to say what weight a species hasi The truth is 
that species do not really function as concrete 
individuals.
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Without doubt species are spatiotemporally 
restricted in the sense that they are determined by 
their ancestors and their environment. But it does not 
follow that there is no more than this to a species 
being the species it is. Species are also 
characterized by a gene pool. What makes a species the 
species it is, is something more than spatiotemporal 
continuity. Lions are lions as opposed to tigers not 
merely because of a spatiotemporal link between all 
lions. Hull is right in saying that morphological 
descriptions do not define a species-they are anyway 
intended primarily to be used for identification 
purposes. And he is right too in saying that traits 
(cluster properties) do not give us the nature of a 
species. But as we shall see later, this does not mean 
that species terms are not general terms. Nor does it 
mean that there is nothing that accounts for a variety 
of organisms all belonging to one kind. The fact 
that there is no similarity in the description of two 
members of the same species (caterpillar and moth for 
example), does not mean that the explanation for one 
member belonging to that species is not the same as the 
explanation for the other member belonging to the same 
species. The reason for Tom being a cat is the same as 
the reason for Tabby being a cat - whether they look 
alike or not, and whether we know the reason or not. 
This seems to be true independently of Tom's being born
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of Tabby, or of both being born of a common ancestor.
Hull's view does not adequately explain why all 
the members o^ a species are of the same kind. All 
individuals within a species, according to Hull, belong 
to the species, simply in virtue of spatiotemporal 
links. But human beings and bees are not different 
species merely because bees are spatiotemporally 
related to each other and not related in the same way 
to human beings. Bees are spatiotemporally related 
because they share in whatever it is that makes bees 
bees (gene pool...). As I shall argue later, there are 
biological principles (even if we do not as yet know 
them), which account for bees being different from 
human beings. Furthermore, if we were to discover 
creatures on other planets which were just like bees, 
which looked like bees, which could interbreed with our 
bees, and which therefore had the same genes and habits 
as our bees, then, contrary to what Hull asserts, they 
would be bees, whatever their origins. It is indeed 
possible, although unlikely, that evolution on some 
other planet has given rise to bees, even if the 
evolutionary processes which resulted in bees on that 
planet were different from the evolutionary processes 
which resulted in bees on earth. However much one may 
wonder how this came about, one would not call them by 
some other name simply because they were not part of a 
spatiotemporal continuum.
Another reason why species cannot be seen in the
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way Hull wishes to see them, is that it is not 
impossible (theoretically at least) for extinct species 
to be resurrected. Although extinct species remain 
extinct, there are exceptions. Zoologists have indeed 
been able through selective breeding from present day 
individuals to recreate the wild ox (aurochs) extinct 
for 350 years, and also the wild horse (tarpan) extinct 
since 1876. Their work has been based on the 
assumption that contemporary populations of cattle and 
horses must contain within their gene pools the 
scattered genes of the extinct forms (from which they 
were developed). Today we now have animals of each sex 
exactly like individuals from the extinct species.
These animals could eventually form populations, 
compatible in theory (forgetting the time barrier), 
with those which are extinct. Another possibility for 
resurrecting extinct species, would be to take a 
fertilized egg from a present species (say an 
elephant), insert into it the nucleus of a mammoth 
(from any frozen mammoth cell), and then replace the 
embryo in an elephant womb. The elephant would give 
birth to a mammoth. This would be quite feasible since 
cells store well when frozen, and nuclei can be 
transplanted, so that fertilized eggs from one species 
can develop in the uterus of others. Thus we could 
obtain several populations of the same species which do 
not form spatiotemporal wholes (11).
As far as change within a species is concerned.
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Hull's view accomodates a certain amount of change but 
it does not take into account the fact that grand 
scale change within a population will lead to the 
formation of a new species. Like the cladists Hull 
seems to accept only splitting as a case of spéciation, 
and rejects evolution through time (12). Lions may 
have evolved from lion-type creatures and form with 
these a spatiotemporal whole; but they are not of the 
same species as their remoter ancestors. Were we to 
rediscover one of these ancestors it would not be a 
lion, and it would not be able to interbreed
with present day lions : whatever it is that made those 
lion-like creatures lion-like is not what makes todays' 
lions lions. Hull's view that species are individuals 
must be wrong.
So far I have argued that species are neither 
classes nor individuals. The next possibility I shall 
consider is that species are natural kinds.
3. Natural kinds. The received view
I shall introduce the first version of the natural 
kind view by Putnam's definition of a natural kind term: 
"a natural kind term is simply a term that plays a 
certain kind of role in scientific or prescientific 
theory : the role, roughly of pointing to common 
'essential features' or 'mechanisms', beyond and below 
the obvious 'distinguishing characteristics' " (13). 
(Although I adopt this definition, I do not agree with
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other aspects of Putnam's view on natural kinds.)
Traditionally these 'essential features' have been 
called essences. The essence explains the 
'distinguishing characteristics' of the kind. The 
essence of water, for instance, is H^O. This 
chemical structure explains the apparent 
characteristics of water (liquidity, boiling at 
100°C, freezing at 0°C...). Moreover, essences are 
seen as underlying structures, existing in each and 
every individual of the kind (all molecules of water 
are H^O). This means that essences have an 
explanatory role and also enable one to determine which 
individuals belong to the kind (this molecule is water 
if it is H 2 O ).
Should we say then that species terms are natural 
kind terms and that species have essences? In order to 
answer this question, I shall look first at Aristotle's 
view, and then at more recent views such as those of 
Putnam and Kripke.
For Aristotle, the essence (d^O'iS ) of an organism 
is that which explains its visible characteristics (its 
function and form), i.e. that which explains how the 
creature lives, moves, changes, behaves and so on. In 
the case of living things, this essence is in some way 
contained within the organism itself. But this would 
not be true for artifacts. Lions give birth to lions, 
chairs do not give birth to chairs. The essence of 
chairs (if they have one) lies outside themselves :
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"Nature is the distinctive form or quality of such 
things as have within themselves a principle of motion, 
such form or characteristic property not being 
separable from the things themselves, save 
conceptually"... "Men propagate men, but bedsteads do 
not propagate bedsteads; and that is why they say that 
the natural factor in a bedstead is not its shape but 
the wood - to wit, because wood and not bedstead would 
come up if it germinated" (14). Although the essence 
comes first logically, it is not first in time :
"Matter and the process of formation must come first in 
time, but logically the real essence (cbt^ôi5) and the 
form of this thing come first" (15). To understand an 
individual we need first to know its essence. For the 
same reason, we understand what an individual embryo is 
by bearing in mind the adult it will become : "For
coming-to-be is for the sake of being, not being for 
the sake of coming-to-be" (16) and "The seed, then, is 
the origin and productive agent of what comes out of it 
Yet still prior to this is that of which it is the 
seed; for the seed is a coming-to-be, but the end is a 
being. And still prior to both is that from which the 
seed is. For it is the seed in two ways, of that out 
of which it is and that o^ which it is" (17).
According to Aristotle, any individual organism is one 
of a kind represented by the type (usually the adult 
male). Abnormal individuals (and females) are a 
deviation from the type.
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In the 18th and 19th centuries, after Linneaeus 
and before Darwin (apart from a few exceptions), 
species were still considered to have fixed essences. 
Most natural scientists believed science could find 
some properties which would be diagnostic of a 
particular species. These properties would be 
properties which each and every member of that species 
possessed. Any deviation from these properties would 
be the result of some outside interference with 
nature's programme. This view of essences resulted in 
the typological conception of taxonomy where the 
essence of the species was exemplified by type 
specimens.
Philosophers such as Locke and Leibniz had already 
made the point that the real essence of a kind is not a 
matter of convention. The essence is those underlying 
structures of the organism, which may not be known, but 
which cause the properties we can observe J.n the type 
specimens. These structures account, therefore, for 
the groupings into kinds we find in nature. These 
views of real essences lie close to those of Putnam (a 
post Darwinian!) for he has written : "If I describe
something as a a lemon, or as an acid, I indicate 
that it is likely to have certain characteristics 
(yellow peel....); but I also indicate that the 
presence of those characteristics, if they are present, 
is likely to be accounted for by some 'essential 
nature' which the thing shares with other members of
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the natural kind. What the essential nature is is not 
a matter of language analysis but of scientific theory 
construction" (18). And again the same view can also 
be found in Kripke : "In general, science attempts, by
investigating basic structural traits, to find the 
nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical 
sense) of the kind" (19). More recently, with specific 
reference to biological species, Kitts and Kitts say 
that underlying traits such as genetic structure, 
serve as the explanation for species being natural 
kinds (20).
Now, the view I have outlined above asserts that 
species are natural kinds, and have essences (internal 
structures or underlying traits) - the essence being a 
set of underlying properties which is causally 
responsible for the properties we actually observe 
(teeth and claws for example). What those from 
Aristotle down to Kripke are claiming is that it is 
the underlying traits that distinguish organisms of one 
species from organisms of any other species; and the 
underlying traits also serve as an explanation of the 
exclusive relationship of members to their species 
( 21) .
But when we come to evaluate this claim we can see 
that there are good reasons in biology today why none 
of the above views can be held as they stand. The 
major blow to the traditional view of natural kinds in 
biology is dealt by modern knowledge of the importance
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for evolutionary processes of the enormous variety 
found within the members of a species (see Chapter One)
(22). Indeed natural selection can only operate where 
there is a differential. Variety means that the 
traditional view of essence in biology is no longer 
tenable. Each individual within a species is unique, 
and differs from all the other individuals in that 
species. I have tried to emphasize the point that 
uniqueness is a distinctive feature of biological 
phenomena. One piece of a given stuff will be exactly 
like another piece of the same stuff (for any one 
molecule of water is like any other molecule of water), 
having the same external appearance and the same 
internal structure. This is not so in biology. The 
idea that biological classification could be based on 
microstructure is a philosophical myth. The view does 
not match the facts.
Aristotle was wrong to think of variation as 
abnormal (a deviation from the norm) and the male as 
the adult type. Indeed evolutionary forces act both on 
embryos and also on females. In this respect and in 
various other respects embryos and females are just as 
much representatives of a species as males are. But 
Aristotle was not alone in this: neither Linneaeus nor 
Agassiz could account adequately for variation.
The main argument, then, against Aristotle and the 
Putnam/Kripke view, consists in species not having 
essences - where essences are seen as microstructures
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existing in each and every individual of the kind. As 
a result of this, many have claimed that species are 
not natural kinds. Mayr (23), Sober (21) and Dupre 
are among those who reject essentialism in biology on 
account of the existence of variety. Dupre, for 
example, says : "given all the organisms existing at a
single time, there are no privileged properties or 
relations by means of which these can be sorted 
unambiguously and exhaustively" (24).
Tiensen (25) uses an imaginary example to show how 
variety is an argument against this view of species as 
natural kinds. This imaginary example is based on the 
fact that variation within species permits the 
coexistence of two individuals which are exactly alike 
- both phenotypically and genetically - but which 
belong nevertheless to two different species. Here, 
each individual would be a borderline case of its own 
species - so much on the borderline indeed as to be 
exactly like another case on the borderline of another 
species. Tienson asks us to imagine two organisms 
'Bessie' and 'Bossie' which are exactly alike in 
appearance and in genetic make up, yet Bessie is a cow 
and Bossie belongs to a different species Guelph 
(Martian type cow). If both have the same phenotype 
and genotype, there seems little reason according to 
Tienson not to classify Bessie either as a cow or as a 
guelph and Bossie either as a guelph or as a cow and it 




interbreed with either species. In spite of this, cows 
and guelphs are not the same species. Their overall 
characteristics (phenotype and genotype) bear 
differences. It is just that variation among 
individuals within each sp-ecies is such that Bessie is 
atypical of cows and rather like a guelph, and Bossie 
is atypical of guelphs and rather like a cow.
Tienson's final point is that variety is such that 
there is no way of determining membership. Yet, 
determining membership is part of the definition given 
for natural kinds. We are therefore forced to conclude 
that species cannot be said to be natural kinds.
An additional objection one can level against the 
Putnam/Kripke view is that it centres on the false 
belief - in so far as the view appears to commit itself 
to this - that a reduction from characteristics to 
genes is possible. But genes are not sufficient to 
explain the distinguishing characteristics of a 
species. As we saw in the last chapter, other factors 
enter into any explanation of a species ' 
characteristics. These other factors may include 
environmental, ecological or ethological factors. As 
we have seen, some species are differentiated by 
ethological factors alone (the gulls and the spiders 
mentioned in Chapter One). And in these cases it is 
learnt behaviour that is the differentiating factor.
Finally, we should note as a postscript to this 
section, that it is necessary to make a distinct, but
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cognate, point regarding genes. Although the essence 
of water may be said to be H 2 O, there is no proper 
counterpart in the case of species for the chemical 
composition of matter. Genes are the instructions 
for making individuals (see Appendix) and in this sense 
they are not even the right sort of thing to be 
microstructures of organisms, in the way in which H 2 O 
is the microstructure of water. Similarly gene pools 
are not the microstructure of populations. Genes are 
used to instruct other molecules on how to build
bodies, they are not the direct cause, nor the only
cause, of what we see as bodies. There are no genes 
actively producing at all times what we see as f u r , 
claws or teeth, in the way in which an atomic structure 
is directly and immediately responsible for the 
external appearance of say water. Genes are causally 
responsible for building bodies at a certain time of 
development, when the cells which make up the body are 
being made. But once cells are made the genes no 
longer play a role, they are no longer active, although 
they can be re-activated if necessary for repairs and 
for the renewal of cells.
In conclusion to this section, we can say that the
Putnam/Kripke view fails. The view that a species is a
natural kind at least when that is seen as something 
determined by a microstructure and determining an 
essence, is unacceptable.
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4. Natural Kinds. An amended view
Are Aristotle, Leibniz and Putnam and his 
followers completely in error concerning species ' 
essences? Are species' terms not then, natural kind 
terms at all?
If members of a species are not grouped up by 
reference to a collection of marks or an underlying 
collection of marks (i.e. an essence as described 
above), how are we to explain why organisms are 
grouped into kinds? To deny that species have at least 
a nature would mean that in order to be of one kind 
there is no particular way an animal has got to be.
Yet surely this is nonsense. For groupings are not 
arbitrary and species are natural kinds.
Although for most philosophers natural kind terms 
refer to some essence seen as a microstructure, and 
although we now know this to be an untenable view for 
species, I nevertheless believe species terms are 
natural kind terms.
At the beginning of the last section, I defined 
natural kinds in terms of essences. This definition 
waSj howeveiy complex. First essences were given as
those essential features which explain the 
distinguishing characteristics of a kind, and then 
essences were described as underlying structures 
enabling one to determine which individuals belong to 
the kind. The argument against natural kinds, set out 
above, does indeed show that the second part of the
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definition cannot apply to species. But it does not 
affect the first part. For so long as we do not 
suppose that essences are underlying structures 
(existing in each and every member of a species), we 
may still be able to make a case for species being 
natural kinds. And this is what I intend to attempt in 
this final section of Part I. Since I no longer adopt 
the traditional understanding of an essence, but only 
one part of what figures in that understanding, I shall 
henceforth use the term 'nature' instead of 'essence'.
I shall claim that species terms are natural kind terms 
in as much as each species has a particular nature that 
explains its overall characteristics. And although the 
question of membership is no longer part of our 
definition of a natural kind, it is still an important 
question in its own right, we shall therefore return to 
it in Chapter F o u r .
What a kind is is not a matter of mere description 
but of scientific discovery. It is by virtue of its 
particular nature that a kind is what it is, the nature 
of a species explaining its overall characteristics. 
Science attempts to discover the nature of things in 
the sense that science proceeds from observations 
(descriptions of what we see) to explanations.
Medicine, for example, proceeds from symptomatology to 
etiology (26). (This shift has also occurred in 
taxonomy, for as we saw in Chapter One taxonomy moved 
from descriptive morphological classifications to
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explanatory biological classifications.) The 
properties which enter into an explanation of 
characteristics of the kind need not be underlying 
traits in order to be scientific; they need only to be 
explanatory, they need to explain and predict. The 
explanation needs to involve causal mechanisms which 
work on each and every individual organism within a 
species. Causal mechanisms need not be 
microstructures, nor do we need even to make essential 
references to microstructures in causal explanations.
Whether something is or is not a natural kind is 
ascertained by scientific discovery. It may happen 
that what was thought to be one natural kind turns out 
in fact to be two. That groups of organisms are 
classified into the same or different species, 
following discoveries concerning their natures, can be 
shown by actual examples. One example is bacterial 
species causing pneumonia. Pneumonia is a disease with 
various causes, and is in fact the general name for a 
variety of symptoms (congestion of the lungs, 
fever..,.). One cause of pneumonia is bacterial 
infection. Mycoplasma pneumonia is the name of a 
disease caused by the Mycoplasma sp. bacteria.
Until recently^ what was meant by Mycoplasma
pneumonia was the disease caused by this particular 
species of bacteria. Then it was found that the same 
symptoms were also caused by another species of 
bacteria. (Bacterial kinds are usually called
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'strains' not species, but this does not detract from 
the main points of this example.) Following this 
discovery, it was decided to call symptoms caused by 
the second species of bacteria by a new name. The 
disease caused by the different bacteria has been 
called Legionnaires Disease and the species of bacteria 
which cause it Legionella sp. Cases of Legionnaires 
Disease have always existed and were thought to be 
cases of Mycoplasma pneumonia until it was realised 
that two different explanations were required for what 
must then be two different diseases. This has been 
important for the treatment of the disease, since 
different bacteria cause them and these different 
species of bacteria have different characteristics 
(different ecological ways for example). This means 
that the prevention of the diseases will follow 
different routes. Mycoplasma and Legionella are 
therefore two different natural kinds.
Many other similar examples exist. The organisms 
responsible for River Blindness make a similar case, 
this time several populations being found to be in fact 
different species having only slightly different 
ecological and genetic natures, but yet sufficiently 
different to make them fall into distinct groups, only 
some of which could cause River Blindness. (This 
fact led to improvement in the efficiency of the 
prevention of the disease (27).)
Both of these cases also illustrate the way in
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which new terms such as ’Legionnaires Disease’ emerge 
with advances in scientific knowledge. This is an 
actual example comparable to Putnam’s example of jade 
and jadeite (28).
Following our definition of a natural kind in this 
section, a species is a natural kind if it has a 
nature (discoverable by science) which explains the 
overall characteristics of the species. The examples 
above show that species are indeed natural kinds.
But are there any objections to this view? One 
objection may stem from the vagueness that one 
encounters at the boundaries between species.
This is similar to the Bossie/Bessie objection 
mentioned above. But the difference here is that 
Bossie/Bessie was an objection concerning membership 
and this is no longer at issue. We are still left 
however with a question regarding such casesy namely 
what are we to say about borderline cases, e.g. what 
kind are they?
Making arbitrary decisions does not help, since an 
arbitrary decision does not tell us what kind of 
thing a creature truly is. Thus to the question: what 
kind of creature is a mule? We cannot reply: it could 
be arbitrarily either a horse or a donkey. For indeed 
it is not either. Mules are not in any way atypical 
horses or atypical donkeys, nor does the mule come from 
one species alone, since there is of course no 'mule’ 
species (mules being, like most hybrids sterile). One
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may be tempted to say that hybrids such as mules simply 
do not have a nature, do not belong to a kind. But in 
fact, a mule results from crossing a mare with an ass, 
and is therefore part horse and part donkey. So we 
don't need to deny completely that it has a nature, 
since we can say that its nature consists of bits of 
both species' natures. So far as the mule's 
distinguishing characteristics (its size, habits and so 
on) are concerned, we can provide an explanation: this 
explanation draws on the nature of horses and the 
nature of donkeys. A hybrid is a bit of one species 
and a bit of another. Although it doesn't itself 
belong to a kind, this does not however mean that there 
is no explanation for what it is. It cannot be said to 
belong to a kind because any mule's existence depends 
on there being horses and donkeys, and a mule 
population could not survive on its own for more than 
one generation because of its sterility.
A similar and related problem arises with 
borderline cases which result not from hybridization 
but from evolving populations. Such intermediary 
individuals belong to intermediary populations which, 
unlike hybrids, can survive without the parent 
populations (i.e. they can reproduce). On the whole 
these are populations in the process of spéciation, and 
as such are considered to be of subspecies or races. 
Such populations could be said to be of species in 
formation and as such they have their own natures
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which are emerging, and from which their individual 
members benefit. But these populations may, however, 
be truly borderline cases and it may be difficult to 
tell at which point one should start considering them 
as separate groups (new species) with their own natures.
This brings us back to the problem encountered in 
Chapter One on spéciation. Science tells us when 
spéciation has occurred. This is a difference between 
all the biological cases of vagueness and many 
traditional sorites problems - the cause of baldness 
has nothing to do with when one calls a man bald or 
with what determines whether we call a man bald or not 
(the number of hairs on his head is not the cause of 
baldness); but what accounts for a species being what 
it is, what causes a species to be what it is what
determines whether we are entitled to say that a 
population is of one species or another. When to call 
a man bald is not a matter for scientific discovery, 
naming the species a population is of is a matter for 
scientific discovery. Baldness has no real nature, but 
species do.
Vagueness does not appear to threaten seriously 
the claim that species are natural kinds (the amended 
v iew). There is no reason why natural kinds should not 
have vague boundaries. But we shall pursue this 
point further in Chapter Three.
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PART II. SPECIES AND PROPERTIES
In this part of Chapter Two, I wish to discuss the 
definition of a natural kind that I have adopted here: 
namely that a natural kind does not include criteria 
for membership in the kind. Membership is not decided 
on the basis of either essential features or 
distinguishing characteristics, for neither of these 
necessarily belongs to every single member of a 
species. Moreover, both include properties which 
cannot be ascribed to individuals. I shall start by 
establishing this claim and then continue to discuss 
the role such properties play in descriptions of 
biological kinds.
1. Essential features
The essential features must be such that they 
explain why the kind has the distinguishing 
characteristics it has. They must, for instance, 
explain why the lion species has fur, claws, and high 
fertility rates, and why it is carnivorous, aggressive 
and so on.
Many seem to assume that one can answer these 
questions simply by saying that the kind has the 
characteristics it has because it is reproductively 
isolated from any other kind. This, however, is not 
satisfactory. Reproductive isolation may enable one to 
identify different kinds; but it does not explain why
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this species has fur, c^aws and so on. It might be 
claimed that it does explain it, in as much as one can 
say that the population inherited these characteristics 
from the parent population. But this is not a 
sufficient explanation. We would still want to know 
why their parents had these characteristics. 
Reproductive isolation and origins are both 
insufficient for explaining these distinguishing 
characteristics. Furthermore, reproductive isolation 
itself stands in need of explanation (e.g. why is the 
population reproductively isolated?). Reproductive 
isolation does not determine a kind; on the contrary, 
it is something which follows from a population being 
of one kind rather than another. Dupré makes this 
point, by saying that origins cannot be an essential 
feature of a kind, and he illustrates this by saying 
that even if a chicken did lay walnuts which grew into 
trees, one would not call it a grove of chickens (29).
A similar point is made by Kitts and Kitts ; "the 
fact that all horses are begot by horses is something to 
be explained. To suppose that an explanation is 
possible and to suppose further that the explanation is 
the same for all horses is to suppose that horses have 
some property in common which they do not share with 
members or any other species. To suppose otherwise is 
not to give reason to change our view of species but to 
give reason to abandon the concept of species 
altogether" (30). As mentioned earlier Kitts and Kitts
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believe the common property is an underlying structure, 
and this as we have seen cannot be true. Nevertheless 
there are thoughts here that do not necessarily imply 
an underlying structure and these at least can be 
accepted as tru e .
What then could count as an explanation of the 
distinguishing characteristics of a species? In 
Chapter One, I adopted the biospecies definition of a 
species - that a species is a genetic and ecological 
system. Thus we can say that explanations too will 
draw on Genetics and Ecology, for both gene pools and 
ecological features determine the characteristics of a 
species. Moreover, these features account for 
reproductive isolation.
To conclude, the essential features of a species 
will be features of gene pools (frequency of genes, 
dominance of particular genes..), and of ecological 
relationships (role in the food web for instance).
These will explain the distinguishing characteristics 
in as much as they are causally implicated in the 
production of these characteristics.
2. Distinguishing characteristics
There are no distinguishing characteristics to be 
found in each and every member of a species, therefore 
distinguishing character^istics must belong to 
populations rather than to individuals. Which 
properties do populations have that are not applicable
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to individuals? First we say general things such as 
sexual species change more rapidly than non sexual 
ones. Secondly we predicate of a species specific 
properties that cannot be predicated of any of its 
members. (For example, 'smallness of populations' - if 
it is a species where the numbers of individuals in 
each populations is small, or 'low density' where the 
concentration of individuals per square mile is low.) 
Finally there are properties which are predicated of 
some members of a species and yet correspond to 
something which is true of the population or species 
as a whole. Take 'virulence' or 'fertility' for 
example, a species can be characterized as virulent or 
fertile in virtue of only some of its members being 
virulent or fertile. It may seem strange if not 
strained to say of a population or a species that it is 
virulent or fertile. In the same way, it seems strange 
to say that the lion species is 'carnivorous'. These 
may seem to be category mistakes since a species does 
not for example eat meat or have offspring, only its 
members do. Yet biologists do say such things of 
species. And it is actually essential that they should 
be able to say these things. For in cases where what 
we say of a species ('carnivorous', for example) is 
true in virtue of something attributable to all its 
members, then it is easy to see that we may not need to 
say this of the species itself (that it is for 
example carnivorous). Saying it of the species could
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then be merely a shorthand way of talking about its 
members. But if a species has a property such as 
virulence or fertility which very few of its members 
actually possess, but from which all its members 
benefit (in virtue only of being members of that 
species - they benefit if for example this helps in the 
survival of the species), then it seems that we are 
obliged to say that the species itself has that 
property. That it is, say, a virulent or fertile 
species. And if we can say it for these properties, 
there is no reason why we should not also say it for 
properties which may apply to all the members of a 
species (the property of being carnivorous for 
example). These properties can all be said to be 
distinguishing characteristics of the species as a 
whole. They may differentiate it from other closely 
related species and they may play an important role in 
spéciation (by conferring a selective advantage).
There are things we could not say if it were not 
possible to say that species have, in some sense, these 
properties. We could not indeed make much sense of 
some cases of natural selection. It is possible that a 
species only establishes itself successfully in a new 
niche because of its virulence. It is also possible to 
discover a new kind of creature with say canines. We 
could not be sure was a carnivore, as for some 
reason or other it may never have eaten meat. But we 
should be able to say correctly that it belongs to a
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carnivorous species. We could not say this if being
carnivorous were not something which could, in some
good sense, be attributable to species.
What then can it mean to say of a species that it
is carnivorous, fertile and so on? The justification 
for applying these properties to species is as follows: 
to say these things of species is to say that certain 
conditions have been met. To say that a species is 
carnivorous, fertile, virulent, is to say not only that 
at least some of its members have these properties but 
also, that all of its members benefit (or suffer) from 
these properties, i.e. are in some sense affected by 
the presence of these properties. It is necessary to 
add this last point because some members can possess a 
property we would not wish to ascribe also to the 
species. Some humans have blue eyes for example, but 
the human species is not a blue eyed species. On the 
other hand you only need a few fertile fleas to have a 
fertile flea species.
The things we say of species in this way can be 
parallelled with things we say of other entities. We 
correctly say such things as : a battalion marches, 
Liverpool scored a goal or France went to war. We say 
these things in virtue of some individuals who do 
march, score goals and fight battles. It is in virtue 
of these individuals but it is not the same as saying 
simply that these individuals do these things. To say 
Liverpool scored a goal is different from saying that a
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certain player scored a goal. The same is true for 
species. Some things we say of a species are true of 
all its members (lions are carnivorous), of some of its 
members (lions are fertile) or of none of its members 
(lions have small population sizes). Yet all these 
properties are in some sense true of the lion species 
itself. So, to say that the lion species is 
carnivorous, fertile and so on is to say something 
about the species even though this does not mean that 
the species itself eats meat or reproduces. The 
important point here is that if we did not accept that 
these things could be said of species, we should lose a 
certain measure of explanation. To repeat, it would be 
impossible to explain the survival of a species whose 
success depends on its virulence, if one could not say 
of that species that it was virulent. Saying these 
things of species cannot be seen as a category-mistake.
In summary, we have seen in Part II of this 
chapter that species have properties which belong to 
all, some or none of their members. We have also seen 
that individuals within a species benefit or suffer 
from the characteristics pertaining to the species. In 
order to understand what an individual organism is, one 
needs to have an understanding of the kind it belongs 
to. This understanding will depend on scientific 
discovery.
The conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is 
that species are natural kinds. Their essential
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features are those which enter into a biospecies 
definition and their distinguishing characteristics are 
often properties belonging to the species themselves. 
This chapter has discussed species as entities, but we 
have yet to establish firmly that species are entities. 
Although much of what has been said in the last two 
chapters points in that direction, the next chapter 
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CHAPTER THREE
THE REALITY OF SPECIES
Much of what was said in Chapter Two indicated 
that species were real. Important scientific 
discoveries, revealing the existence of new species, 
as in the case of Legionnaires' Disease, pointed to 
the fact that species are objective and not 
arbitrary groupings. The fact that species have 
properties, which are not reducible to the properties 
their members have, also shows that species must in 
some sense be real. The present chapter concentrates 
on justifying the claim that species are real.
First, I outline the way in which variety, far from 
being seen as an obstacle to real groupings in nature, 
can on the contrary be seen as sustaining such 
groupings. Secondly, I argue that species are real 
since there are statements in biology concerning kinds 
of organisms, which cannot be reduced to statements 
dispensing with species terms. Thirdly, I look at the 
use biologists make of species terms, and at the 
scientific advantages (in terms of better explanations 
and predictions) which accrue from seeing species as 
real. Finally, I consider an objection to the reality 
of species.
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1. A reality sustained by diversity
Variety has not weakened biologists ' belief that 
the individuals within a species belong together : 
"Penguins, bats, or even beetles are not groups 
arbitrarily made by the operations of our mind, like 
the categories in a library, but are groups produced by 
evolution" (1). The definition of a species adopted 
in Chapter One was that a species consists of 
individuals each of which is unique but which all share 
a gene pool and belong to a particular ecosystem : 
"species are not merely classes of objects but are 
composed of natural populations which are integrated by 
an internal organization and this organization Cbased 
on genetic, ethological and ecological properties) 
gives the population a structure which goes far beyond 
that of a mere aggregates of individuals" (2). This 
sort of organization does not exist at levels of higher 
taxa than the species. Indeed there is no interaction 
between the members of a genus or a family. One would 
not expect for example all those species who are 
mammals to relate to each other in any way. The 
species category is the only taxon whose reality can be 
argued in this special way. Organisms of one species 
form cohesive populations, for this reason population 
biology has replaced studies on individual organisms. 
This point is made by Elliott Sober : "the population
is an entity, subject to its own forces, and obeying 
its own laws. The details concerning the individuals
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who are the parts of this whole are pretty much 
irrelevant... population thinking involves ignoring 
individuals" (3) (A species contains populations, how 
populations are identified as belonging to one same 
species will be discussed in the next chapter.)
Ignoring individuals does not mean that a new 
mutation in one individual may not lead that individual 
to have an important role to play in a population, nor 
does it mean that diversity itself is to be overlooked. 
Variety is, as we have seen, an essential part of a 
population but "rather than looking for a reality
that underlies diversity, the populationist can 
postulate a reality sustained by diversity" (4). 
Diversity gives a species the flexibility it needs to 
adapt to the continual changes encountered in its 
environment. One mechanism for maintaining diversity 
is sexuality. Sober in the same article says : "The
deploying of prodigious quantities of variability is 
not a dysfunction which sexual organisms are vulnerable 
to. Rather it is the principal advantage of sexuality; 
it is standardly construed to be what sexuality is 
for" (5). Diversity therefore is an essential part of 
a species and bell-curves are normal, "they are real 
they enter into explanations because the variability 
they represent is lawful and causally efficacious" (6). 
Indeed, as already mentioned in this thesis, natural 
selection can only operate where there is a 
differential.
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Diversity itself is the subject matter of 
biological theory. There are models and theorems which 
are concerned solely with diversity, for instance the 
Hardy-Weinburg theorem referred to in Chapter One.
This theorem shows how diversity, over generations, is 
maintained by the reshuffling of genes in sexual 
species. What the theorem does is to demonstrate how 
allelic frequency in a population will tend to remain 
constant from generation to generation, and how the 
genotype will reach an equilibrium within one 
generation of random mating and will remain at the 
frequency thereafter.
The Hardy Weinburg theorem (7) was arrived at 
independently by G.H. Hardy (a mathematician) and W. 
Weinburg (a biologist) in 1908. The basis of the 
theorem is as follows : it assumes that we have a 
population with random mating (where each individual 
has an equal chance of mating with any other individual 
of the opposite sex). On all chromosomes there are two 
genes (alleles) at each locus (the part of the 
chromosomes that carries the genes for a particular 
trait), one allele from each parent. Gene (allele) A 
and gene a for example. The three possible genotypes 
for these genes would be AA, Aa, aa :
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Figure 13:







If the genotypic frequencies are D for AA, H for 
Aa and R for aa, we have D + H + R = 1. And if the 
gene frequencies are p for A and q for a, then p = D 
t 2 H (all AA individuals and i Aa individuals, see 
matrix), and q = R + i H (all aa individuals and i Aa
individuals) We also have p + q = 1, and also p +
2 2 2pq + q = 1  (see matrix, and of course (p + q) =
2 2 
p + 2pq + q , i.e. 1 x 1 = 1 ) .  In addition to
this, the probability of mating betwen two individuals
with AA genotypes is the product of the probabilities
that each individual has the AA genotype, it therefore 
2
is D . In this way we can calculate the probability 
of mating between all individuals, and then we can get 
the probabilities for all the possible genotypes of the 
offspring (see table 1 overleaf).
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Table 1:
Derivation of the Hardy-vveinburq theorem 
(after) D.J. Futuyma Evolutionary Biology, p. 228.
Offspring genotype frequencies
Mating Frequency of mting AA Aa aa
AA. X AA d2 d2 - -
AA X Aa 2DH DH DH -
AA X aa 2DR - 2ER -
Aa X Aa H^A H^/2 a^/4
Aa X aa 2ER - m m
aa X aa - - r 2
Totals (D + H+R)^=1 (D+V2H)^=:p^ 2(D4-1/2H)(>2H+R) 
= 2pq
(1/2H + R)2 = q2
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Looking at the totals at the bottom of table 1, we
see that the frequency of genotypes in the offspring is 
2 2
p + 2pq + q , that is to say exactly the same as
2
in the parent population (see matrix : AA (p ) + aa 
2
(q ) + 2Aa (pq). Gene frequencies do not change from 
generation to generation, and diversity is maintained 
(except under special circumstances, where for example 
environmental changes bring about new selection 
pressures). The Hardy Weinburg theorem can now be 
restated thus : under the conditions we have implicitly 
assumed, a single generation of random mating 
establishes binomal genotype frequencies, and neither 
these frequencies nor the frequencies p and q will 
change in subsequent generations (8). The theorem can 
be extended to three genes, with frequencies p, q and r
1 + ^2
2
where ( p + q + r )  = 1 ,  or more (p. + p_ +
Pn)'.
This theorem was worked out mathematically, then 
tested in the laboratory and in the field. These tests 
showed that indeed, all other things being equal, 
diversity is maintained from generation to generation. 
The theorem can be used to check evolutionary stasis : 
if there is some variation in the conditions assumed 
and a population is undergoing evolutionary change, 
then the frequencies will change.
We have seen in this section how variety 
contributes to the stability of populations. This 
shows that variety is not in itself an argument for the
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belief that only individuals are real. However, the 
Hardy Weinburgh theorem is about populations and not 
about species as such. i shall now outline the 
attitude I take to the question of the reality of 
species. If species terms are an essential part of 
some true biological theory, or indispensable to our 
best considered account of the nature and operation of 
individual organisms, then species are real. Species 
have without doubt been an essential part of a false 
theory (creationism). But of course the fact that this 
theory is false does not mean that species are not 
real, it only means that Linnaeus' or whoever's theory 
does not establish species' reality. If we count a 
theory as true, however, then the entities to which it 
is committed have to be counted by us as real. So far 
as the commitments of a theory are concerned I follow 
Quine's view that to be is to be the value of a 
variable : "entities of a given sort are assumed by a
theory if and only if some of them must be counted 
among the values of the variables in order that the 
statements affirmed in the theory be true" (9). Our 
task now is to see whether species need to be 'reckoned 
among the entities' (10) in order to render biological 
theories true.
If we were dealing with physics and we were 
dubious about the credential of some notion, we could 
see if it were essential to any laws of physics. But 
there are few laws in biology, so we cannot proceed so
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directly. Instead it may be sufficient to show that 
certain theorems or models or classes of phenomena 
cannot be explained or properly described without 
referring to species. This would mean that biological 
theories are ontologically committed to species, and 
that species terms play an essential role in important 
causal explanations in biology. In order to ascertain 
whether species terms are dispensable, I shall now look 
at models and theorems concerning species, and then see 
what other scientific interests these models and 
theorems subserve.
2. Models and theorems in biology
Biological theories result from studies of 
populations either in the field or in the laboratory. 
Populations vary in number, density, dispersion and so 
on. Populations act as systems with their own rates of 
loss and replacement of individuals. Regulatory 
processes act on the populations to keep these 
properties (density, dispersion...) stable. These 
properties are dependent on factors such as climate, 
temperature, moisture, food supply, competition from 
other species, predation, parasitism, diseases and so 
on. A combination of any such factors may affect the 
stability of the population either by keeping it stable 
or by estabilising it. With these models we can predict 
what will happen to certain organisms under certain 
conditions, or to certain relationships between kinds
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(predator/prey for example) under certain conditions.
To see this in more detail, I shall consider some 
examples from Ecology. In predator/prey relationships 
there is a reciprocal relation in population numbers 
which shows cyclic oscillations (see Figure 14).
This same type of oscillation is found in almost 
all predator/prey population numbers. For this reason 
this relationship betwen predator and prey can be given 
by a series of equations called the Lotka-Volterra 
equations. A.J. Lotka and V. Volterra independently 
derived a set of equations describing the interaction 
between predator and prey. These equations are now 
used as simple mathematical models for the description 
and for predictions of population numbers within 
particular species.
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Figure 14 P red a to r-p rey  relationship
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From M.E. Solomon Population Dynamics 1969 p.18.
prey a plant mite Eotetranychus in a complex
laboratory habitat (3 trays of oranges with some
paraffin barriers).
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The equation for the predator population is : (11)
(dependent on the prey cfensity)
dN-, = (individual birth rate - individual death rate) x Nn 
df^ ^
=  (B^ N2 - D^)
=  N2 -
: the number of predators
: a constant measuring the prey birth rate
N2  : the nuirter of pregy
: a constant measuring the prey death rate, which is
dependent on predator numbers.
The equation for the prey population is:
(dependent on the density of predators)
dN  ^= (individual birth rate - individual death rate) x Ng 
dt ^
= (B^  - D2 N^ ) 2^ 
^ 2  «2 - ^2 Ni N2
B : a constant measuring predator birth rate, which is 
dependent on prey numbers
: a constant measuring the predator death rate.
The predator prey interactions as predicted by the equations are : 
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When this graph is plotted as a function of time we get
Figure 16
Time
This graph shows that the equations are 
characterised by a periodic solution : the populations 
oscillate in a systematic way. The amplitude of the 
oscillations depends on the starting densities 
(different predator species consume different numbers 
of prey). Any population will continue indefinitely to 
follow the cyclical path on which it starts. These 
equations are satisfied in the example given above 
(Typhlodromus and Eotetranychus).
To say that there is a particular relationship 
(expressed by these equations) between any two kinds of 
populations, where one kind preys on the other, is to 
say that there exists interspecific relationships 
which cannot be understood without reference to 
different kinds of organism in general.
But as they stand, in their generality, one may 
think that these equations quantify over 'predator' and 
'prey' and not over species. This is true if all we
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wish to say is that 'the population numbers of any 
populations of predator and prey will oscillate in a 
systematic fashion, all other things being equal'. 
However, the equations say more than this, they 
describe and predict definite population numbers over 
time. And these numbers vary from one kind of organism 
to another, but are constant for different populations 
of similar organisms, where the appropriate criterion 
for similarity has to be explained in terms of 
belonging to the same species. The graphs for 
different kinds of predators and prey oscillate at 
different rates (N^ and N 2  have different 
values), whereas the graphs for the same kinds of 
predators and prey oscillate at the same rates.
These kinds can only be understood as particular 
predator species and particular prey species, as for 
example Typhlodromus and Eotetranychus. So that, 
once we know the values of and N 2  for two 
populations of Typhlodromus and Eotetranychus, then 
we know that for any population of Typhlodromus and 
any population of Eotetranychus,population numbers 
will always vary in exactly the manner described by the 
equations - all other things being equal.
These equations could not be understood by 
reference to individual organisms alone, or by 
reference to prey and predators classes alone. A 
commitment to the Lotka Volterra equations is a 
commitment to the existence of individual species.
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As well as models to describe and predict the 
relationship between certain kinds of populations, 
biology also uses models to predict what may happen to 
a particular species under predictable environmental 
changes. These models too make essential references to 
species terms. For example, the population model for 
the winter moth (Operophtera brumata) shows the 
different mortality factors of any population of 
Operophtera brumata. It can therefore be used to see 
whether any particular population of the winter moth is 
stable or not. If it is not stable, the model can also 
be used to see which factors are causing the change in 
population density. The model is valid for any 
population of Operophtera brumata. The model will 
have been originally drawn up from a life table such as 
the one shown in table 2. From the life table 
biologists can construct a model of the interaction 
between the winter moth and its parasites, (see table 
3, from Varley, p. 130). As with the predator/prey 
models, these life models use specific species terms, 
for example the parasites in the winter moth's life 
table.
If the species terms used in the models are only 
abbreviations for something else, then of course the 
models and equations are committed to that something 
else and not to species. Could these ecological 
principles be reformulated without loss in a way that 
dispensed with species terms? Reference to a species
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term is essential even if just one sort of scientific 
statement is irreducible. And such irreducibility 
suffices for the reality of species to be established, 
since this would show that reference to species is 
essential for that statement at least to be true. A 
sceptic might react by saying 'so much the worse for 
that statement^ But the statements we are concerned 
with answer questions it would be irrational for us to 
give up. Neither the predator/prey models nor the 
population models described above could have been 
formulated in terms of individuals or populations 
alone. They quantify over types of populations.
Species might as well be just this - not populations 
but kinds of populations. Anything that is true of an 
individual or of a population is no more than a 
spatiotemporal generalization. On the other hand, 
anything, that is true of a kind of population (a 
species) goes beyond actual cases. It applies to any 
other similar kind, under similar conditions. Theories 
about species are of a different calibre.
But to make the point concerning the reality of 
species more forcefully, let us look at another 
specific example : the relation between a host and its 
parasite, the rabbit and rabbit fleas (this is again a 
predator/prey relationship). And let us see if this 
can be rephrased without the use of species terms. 
Rabbits and their fleas (Spilopsyllus cuniculi) have 
a very complex species-specific relationship : their
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life cycles are synchronized. When female does become 
pregnant, the does' hormones induce maturation of 
female flea ovaries, and also some changes in male 
fleas (the rabbit hormones passing through the blood 
upon which the fleas feed). When the baby rabbits are 
born, the fleas move onto them and copulate (this is 
probably triggered off as a result of another hormone 
released by baby rabbits). The fleas then lay their 
eggs in the rabbit nest. These hatch and mature and 
take as their hosts the young growing rabbits. The 
cycle then starts all over again (13). All this was 
discovered as a result of attempts to control 
myxomatosis, which is spread by rabbit fleas. 
Experiments in the laboratory with fleas and rabbits 
were unsuccessful for a time, as the fleas would not 
reproduce. This was because the rabbits were kept in 
separate cages and did not breed. It was then 
discovered that fleas will only reproduce on 
reproducing rabbits. The discovery of this 
relationship enabled biologists not only to increase 
their understanding of rabbits and their fleas, but 
also to advance research on myxomatosis.
The rabbit/flea relationship is a very specific 
one, particular to those two species. The relationship 
is between one species and another. It won't do to say 
simply that to each rabbit there is a flea colony. 
Bucks, for example, do not stand in the same 
relationship as the does or as the young to fleas. If
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the relationship were expressed in terms of individual 
rabbits it would miss the point of an interspecific 
relationship. The statements describing this 
relationship quantify indispensably over species terms. 
These statements go beyond actual populations. Such 
statements do not merely describe a population, but 
they explain why the relationship is as it is. For 
this reason, these statements predict what would happen 
in any such populations. The statements quantify over 
kinds of populations (over species). To repeat, 
populations are spatiotemporally restricted, species 
are not. There is no way for anyone who accepts the 
statements, and the questions it answers, to deny that 
species are something real. I shall now consider in 
more detail the questions statements about species 
answer.
3. The use biologists make of species terms
Species terms are used in statements answering 
many different scientific questions. By looking at 
some of these statements and the questions they answer, 
we will get some idea of what would be lost if we 
dispensed with species' terms.
Many questions in medicine are answered using 
species terms. I have already referred to some of 
these in the thesis. In Chapter One I mentioned the 
mosquito species responsible for malaria. Until the 
problem was formulated in terms of species, there
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seemed to be no answer to the following question : why 
had preventive measures by the WHO failed? Once the 
mosquito populations were seen to be of different 
species, rather than being seen merely as a series of 
varying populations, it was possible to explain the 
failure. Seeing the mosquito populations as of 
different species, meant recognizing that the different 
populations had different breeding habits and different 
ecological habits. And this in turn meant that 
different measures were needed to eradicate each 
different kind of population. Up until that point, any 
measure tried had been applied to all the populations, 
instead of different measures to different populations. 
In Chapter Two, we saw that questions concerning 
Legionnaires' Disease and river blindness were also 
answered using species terms. Some medical statements 
require reference to several different species. To 
answer questions about the bubonic plague, for 
instance, one would need to refer to three different 
species : Mus rattus (the black rat), rat fleas, and 
the bacteria Bacillus pestis transmitted by the 
fleas. As I have said before, predictions could not be 
made if these statements quantified over individuals or 
populations, as these are spatiotemporally restricted. 
Without the ability to predict, preventive medicine and 
medical treatment would be a hit or miss affair.
In agriculture and farming too, many questions 
could not be answered without reference to species. We
138
saw in this chapter that one cannot explain the spread 
of myxomatosis without formulating our statements in 
terms of species (Lepus cuniculus, Spilopsyllus 
cuniculi, Myxoma v irus). The life models discussed 
earlier can be used in pest control. A farmer, knowing 
how a species of pest lives, can see which parameters 
need to be varied to reduce the pest population. (For 
an example of this, concerning the use of the life 
table for the winter moth, see Varley et al. op.cit., 
pp.131 to 134). Seeing organisms as of different 
species, rather than as belonging merely to different 
populations, means that certain consequences follow. 
Genes, for example, can spread across populations of 
one species, but not across populations of different 
species. This knowledge is used in pest control, where 
one can rear in a laboratory organisms which carry 
deleterious genes, and then release these organisms in 
the wild to debilitate the natural population (14).
The important point to emerge from all these examples 
is that, by referring to species, scientific statements 
can explain things which would otherwise remain 
unexplained. When one knows something is true of a 
species, one knows it is true of any population of that 
species. And this contrasts with generalizations 
concerning populations. From this knowledge other 
consequences follow : knowing this is a Bacillus 
pestis population, for example, definite precautions 
need to be taken. If we were not to look upon this
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population as being of a certain kind we would loose 
this explanatory power. It is explanatory power that 
is lost if we dispense with species' terms.
Several additional points can be made to support 
my claim that species are real : the fact that 
important biological relations exist between 
different kinds of population (such as predator/prey, 
parasite/host and all those relationships mentioned in 
Chapter One), is an indication of the reality of 
species. This point is made by Lehman (15). A 
separate point made by Elliott Sober in "Evolution, 
population thinking and essentialism" (16) is that 
something should be considered real if it has causal 
efficacy, and unreal if it is an artifact of a causal 
process. Without doubt species do have causal efficacy;
Typhlodromus for example causes the population 
numbers of Eotetranychus to be regulated (to 
oscillate in a systematic fashion). Rabbit fleas cause 
myxomatosis and so on... Finally, it is interesting to 
note that the study of folk taxonomies reveals that 
different cultures classify organisms into the same 
species categories as Linnaean taxonomy (17). If other 
categories were real groupings in nature, these too 
might have been expected to register in various 
languages, but they do not.
140
4. Vagueness. An objection to the reality of 
species
Vagueness has often been invoked in arguments 
against species being real. The examples used in such 
arguments are the same as those mentioned in the 
section on vagueness in Chapter Two. Borderline 
individuals whether hybrids or new organisms in the 
process of spéciation show that boundaries between 
species are vague.
It seems that if species are real, they must have 
definite boundaries and form discrete units. C.E. 
Bessey claims that since individuals vary, the 
boundaries between species are unclear, and this means 
that taxonomists can choose the limits of a species. 
This in turn means that species are not real : "so
species have no actual existence in nature. They are 
mental concepts, and nothing more. They are conceived 
in order to save ourselves the labour of thinking in 
terms of individuals" (18). Bessey continues by saying 
that "since we make use of species for the purpose of 
saving labour ... it follows that those species whose 
limitations are so faint or vague that we apprehend 
them with difficulty have no reason for existence"
(19), (i.e. we should not even conceive of them as 
species).
The first thing that can be said against views 
such as Bessey's is that on the whole species have 
clear boundaries, and species remain stable through
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millions of years. An average species of invertebrates 
lives between 5 and 10 million years. When new species 
occur, they appear quickly, since any changes which 
represent an advantage spread rapidly through the 
population, and any changes which represent no great 
advantage (and do not lead to spéciation) usually 
disappear from the population. Evolutionary change on 
the relatively rare occasions when it occurs occurs 
fast, usually in small isolated colonies (see Chapter 
One) where gene frequencies can change dramatically. 
This is the founder principle. A small isolated 
colony in a new environment can develop rapidly into a 
new species. The formation and extinction of species
only takes 100 or 1000 years, this represents 1% of the
life-span of a species. A very short period in 
geological time. This accounts for saltation 
(discontinuity), i.e. for the fact that transitions 
between species appear to be missing in fossil records. 
Most changes and even most new species fail to make 
any impact on the world. They usually become extinct 
following pressure from more successful organisms : 
"evolution, at higher levels is fundamentally a story 
of the differential success of species, not the slow 
transformation of lineages" (20). One change in
millions may lead to the formation of a new species and
one new species in a thousand may make it, if it has 
some remarkable new advantage over existing species, if 
it "opens the door to a new world" (21). A single
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species gave rise to birds and a single one to mammals. 
Species are stable entities "with very brief periods 
of fuzziness at their origin, although not at their 
demise because most species disappear clearly without 
changing into anything else" (22). In a stable 
environment common species remain common and rare 
species remain rare.
However, there are cases where boundaries are 
vague. The idea that reality of species requires 
boundaries to be fixed and definite in space and in 
time may seem intuitively right, but it is wrong. So 
long as there are clear central cases where we can 
definitely recognize populations of a specific kind, 
even if some populations or individuals fall between 
two kinds, we can still claim that species are real.
The vagueness is about boundaries and not about the 
central cases.
Exceptions undoubtably show that boundaries 
between species can in reality be vague and just that. 
There is no implication from this concerning the 
reality of species. Vagueness should be tolerated if 
it makes possible the solution to problems which could 
otherwise not be understood. Indeed evolutionary 
processes cannot be explained without taking into 
account the role of borderline cases. Mutants can give 
rise to new species. Furthermore, many of the examples 
mentioned above - which make use of species terms - 
rely for their explanatory value, on the fact that
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species have gene pools. By their very nature gene 
pools have fuzzy edges. If abandoning vagueness makes 
scientific answers too complex or too artificial (too 
far removed from reality), then vagueness should be 
tolerated.
Even if it is not a serious threat to reality, 
vagueness does however call for a closer look at the 
way in which organisms and populations are identified 
as belonging to one species or another. This is what I 
intend to examine in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
INDIVIDUATION AND IDENTITY OF SPECIES
In the previous chapter I argued that species were 
real. In accordance with Quine's dictum "no entity 
without identity", they are entities for which identity 
questions make sense. It follows that if we are to 
vindicate their reality, then we need an account of 
species identity. We need to say what is at issue when 
we seek to tell species apart, or try to settle the 
question whether or not one species has persisted 
through change, or has become extinct as a new species 
emerges.
If species are real, then there must be some means 
of identifying populations as belonging to different 
species (i.e. some sufficient criteria for recognising 
populations as of different, or as of the same 
species). This is to be distinguished from whatever it 
is that explains why populations are of a species (as 
this may or may not be the same as the identifying 
criteria), that is to say whatever explains why all the 
populations within a species have the same overall 
characteristics. This question was discussed in 
Chapter Two. However, Chapter Two left untouched the 
question of membership. The account we need to find of 
the identity and difference of species will not 
resemble any account that would suit universals as
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traditionally conceived - if only because of the 
essential heterogeneity of species, and the 
potentiality that species have for change. Properties 
or universals as traditionally conceived could scarcely 
admit either feature. Faced with the fact of variety 
and change, the account we need cannot elucidate 
species identity simply in terms of characteristics 
belonging to all and only the individuals making up the 
species.
We first need to be clear about the way in which 
we are using the terms 'species’ and 'population'. 
Biologists are neither clear nor consistent in their 
use of the term 'population'. Here we shall attempt to
keep to one use of that term. We shall say that a
population is a group of organisms sharing the same 
geographical area and related to each other by descent. 
A population may last for thousands of years, in the 
sense in which one particular colony of ants has
occupied, say, one particular mound of earth for
thousands of years. Here, individuals die, but the 
population lives on. Descent is important in this 
connection because, had the mound been abandoned by the 
ants, and then at a later stage colonized by 
individuals from elsewhere who were not related to the 
original colony, then one would not say that these 
individuals made up the same population as the first 
ones. They would be a second population of ants. A 
population is in this sense a spatiotemporal unity. A
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population is also an interbreeding group of 
individuals. The individuals within a population 
belong not only to a population but also to a species. 
The population itself is not a species. I shall say 
that a population is of_ a species. Let it be clear 
that this leaves room for the possibility that a 
population will evolve and become of a new species 
while remaining one and the same population. The 
population of ants mentioned earlier could evolve over 
the years to such an extent that it is first of one 
species and then of another. That would not make it 
any less the same spatiotemporal whole or any less the 
same population. What is more the two populations of 
ants colonizing one and the same mound at different 
times, could turn out to be of the same species. My 
interest here is of course in species identity and not 
population identity. I am only concerned with 
populations in so far as they bear on the problem of 
species identity. How then are species individuated?
1. Phenotypes and genotypes
One may think, as indeed biologists used to, that 
species are individuated by phenotypic or genotypic 
characteristics. In that case in order to distinguish 
one species from another, we should need only to look 
at phenotypic or genotypic differences. We have 
already excluded any account of species sameness based 
on characteristics belonging to all and only the
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members of a species. Diversity at the genetic level 
is just as great as diversity at the phenotypic level. 
There are no phenotypic or genetic characteristics to 
be found existing in each and every individual within a 
species and not in any member of any other species. So 
neither phenotypes nor genotypes can give us any 
straightforward criterion for species identity. There 
seems no alternative therefore but to look at 
populations as the key to our problem. This will 
concur with our recognition of species as composed from 
the populations that are o^ these species.
2. Reproductive isolation
One criterion for species difference mentioned in 
Chapter One was reproductive isolation. Two 
populations are said to be of different species, if 
they are reproductively isolated from each other. As 
we saw in Chapter One different mechanisms result in 
reproductive isolation. These mechanisms can be 
genetic, ethological or ecological. Since a species 
can change yet persist as the very same species, this 
suggests that it is not change in itself that matters 
here, but whether the change leads to reproductive 
isolation or not. Large amounts of change in one 
population would probably isolate it reproductively 
from its parent population, but even a single 
chromosomal change can result in reproductive isolation 
(as in polyploidy).
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It might seem then that two populations are of the 
same species if the only barrier to reproduction is 
either spatial or temporal : in other words they could 
reproduce if they were brought together in space, or 
could be brought together in time. The proposal here 
is that the species that one population is of, is the 
same as the species that another population is of, if 
and only if the two populations can interbreed in the 
wild (putting aside problems concerning space and 
time).
As a first attempt, one might try to elaborate 
this criterion as follows:
Axiom o n e :
(X R Y) iff (X S Y ) ,
where X and Y are variables for populations,
R is 'reproduces with' and S is 'is species 
similar t o '.
Axiom two:
Reflexivity of R : (V X) (X R X)
(Any member of a population can reproduce with any
member of the opposite sex in that population) 
Axiom three:
Symmetry of R : if (X R Y) then(Y R X)
Axiom, four :
Transitivity of R :
if ( (X R Y) and (X R Z) ) then (Y R Z)
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Definition :
A species is a maximal set of entities that are 
R-related to one another.
This would count as a criterion for species 
identity, since R is postulated to be an equivalence 
relation.
Are the principles invoked here, true in nature? 
No, they are not. Transitivity is not guaranteed in 
reproducing populations. The following imaginary 
example illustrates this problem: let us imagine three 
populations A, B and C. It could happen that the 
members of each population can reproduce with the 
members of the other two populations. However, a 
problem arises when this is not the case. There are 
cases where the members of A can reproduce with those 
of B, those of B with those of C, and yet the members 
of A cannot reproduce with those of C. Here 
transitivity breaks down. This would occur where A, B 
and C are not completely isolated reproductively.
And so, there is a certain amount of hybridization 
between A and B and between B and C. In other words a 
few individuals from A can reproduce with a few from B 
and a few from B, with a few from C. In these cases we 
would normally say that A, B and C are not of the same 
species.
Our criterion is therefore inadequate for 
identifying species sameness. We need to distinguish 
between interbreeding and hybridization. The above
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attempted definition employs R to cover both. 
Hybridization means either reproduction between small 
numbers of each population, or the failure to produce 
fertile offspring. Interbreeding means reproduction 
between large numbers from each population, producing 
fertile offspring. We could try to restrict our 
criterion for species sameness to interbreeding 
(calling the relation I-relatedness). We could redraft 
the axioms in terms of I-relatedness and the definition 
would now become:
A species is a maximal set of entities that are 
I-related to one another.
Are the principles invoked this time, true in 
nature? Although for the majority of cases 
transitivity would be preserved, in some cases, it 
would still break down. This would not be because of 
the problems of hybridization, but it would be because 
of a problem of vagueness. This is the vagueness that 
occurs between the boundaries of slightly varying 
populations.
These are cases where one would not call the 
relationship between two populations one of 
hybridization because each population fully interbreeds 
with the next. And yet one nevertheless could have two 
or more different species. For example, populations 
sometimes form rings or chains of populations, where 
each population merges slightly with the next. Viewed 
from one angle all the populations are of one species.
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since they can all interbreed with their neighbouring 
populations. But viewed from another angle, they must 
be split into two species somewhere, since the two end 
populations cannot interbreed with each other. One 
example of this is the gulls which form a circumpolar 
ring around the North Pole. The two ends overlap in 
Britain. Here herring gulls breed with other 
populations of gulls to the West, and the lesser 
black-backed gulls with other populations to the East. 
These two populations however do not interbreed and do 
not even look alike. But the further West one goes, 
the more the herring gull begins to look like the 
lesser black-backed gull; and the further East one goes 
the more the lesser black-backed gull looks like the 
British herring gull. The decision has been to call, 
arbitrarily, all gulls west of Northern Russia Larus 
fuscus, and all those to the East of that line Larus 
arqentatus. This divides the ring into two species of 
gulls (1) (See Figure 17).
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Fig u re 17 C i r c u m p o l a r  r i n g - s p e c i e s  o f g u l ls
Species A : 1. Herring gull L. arqentatus arqentatus /// /
2. American herring gull L. arqentatus //// 
smithsonianus
3. Vega herring gull L. arqentatus vegae I I I )
4. Birula's gull L. arqentatus birulae 
Species B : 5. Henglin's gull L . fuscus henqlini
6. Siberian lesser black-backed gull 
L. fuscus anterius







The same vagueness occurs in diachronic cases.
When populations evolve there are borderline 
populations between old and new species. These 
populations represent temporal chains of races, for 
example the populations of mice mentioned in Chapter 
One. Two members of a population of mice colonizing an 
island and giving rise to a new species of mice might 
be atypical of their own species. They still belong to 
the original species, but their grandaughter mice or 
even daughter mice may no longer belong to the parent 
species. There must be a point when the mice could 
equally have been classified with either the old 
species or the new emerging one. The difference 
between the populations of each succeeding generation 
in these cases is so slight that interbreeding can take 
place between populations. It would be unreasonable to 
call it hybridization, yet the differences are large 
enough to bring about the fact that the end populations 
in the chain cannot interbreed.
These cases show that transitivity breaks down 
when we have a long chain of populations with slight 
variations. Why do biologists not say that all the 
populations belong to one species? Why divide the 
chain into two species at all? Because dividing it 
into two species enables us to say that within each 
division transitivity is preserved. This however is 
cool comfort since it is no longer true in this case (a 
chain divided into two species), that the populations
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of two different species are reproductively isolated 
(since the borderline populations are not). This, 
therefore, still represents a difficulty for a 
reproductive isolation criterion for species sameness.
There is another situation where transitivity 
breaks down, this time not because of vagueness. An 
imaginary example (but no doubt such cases exist) can 
illustrate this new problem ; We could have three 
populations A, B and C. Population A comes into season 
twice a year (spring and autumn), population B comes 
into season only in spring, and population C only in 
autumn. A interbreeds fully with B and C, but 
evidently B and C do not interbreed since they do not 
come into season at the same time of the year. One can 
imagine other similar examples.
There is a further related problem. We may have 
difficulty in deciding whether the relationship between 
two populations is one of interbreeding or 
hybridization. This would truly be a Sorites problem. 
How many individuals in any population need to be able 
to reproduce with those of another population for one 
to say that the two populations can indeed interbreed 
and not merely hybridize? There will be cases where it 
is an arbitrary decision, and where A and B may equally 
be said to be the same species or not. The problem 
occurs not only with populations which have split, but 
also with populations which are coming together, as in 
introgression (mentioned in Chapter One). This problem
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of vagueness is inherent to species identity, it is 
indeed because species are composed of populations 
which vary and change that the problem exists. The 
problem is both a diachronic and a synchronic one.
Gene pools explain how reproductive isolation 
works. Maybe an elucidation of the gene pool concept 
will solve some of the problems faced by the 
reproductive criterion for species identity; and it may 
provide us with an alternative means of identifying 
species.
3. Gene pools
The individuals within a population form a genetic 
unit, a gene pool. A gene pool is a group of 
compatible genotypes (compatible for reproduction), 
such genotypes are similar in certain respects such as 
chromosome number and chromosome structure. A gene 
pool is also a well integrated gene complex in as much
as a gene pool is a collection of genotypes related or
relating to each other. This relatedness is formally 
similar to the one used in talk concerning human 
beings, where one may say that a human being is related 
to another either by descent or by marriage. So for 
two organisms x and y we could say that they share the
same gene pool if they are related either by recent
descent or by bonds of mating.
More formally we could list a set of principles 
sufficient to define the bounds of descent or mating
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which will provide the alternative criterion for 
identifying species. These need to be tight enough to 
exclude variations such as hybrids which do not belong 
to the gene pool, and yet be loose enough to include 
variations such as monsters which do. We shall say 
that two individuals x and y are part of the same gene 
pool if they are G-related (G = belong to the same gene 
pool) :
1. if (x could mate with y producing fertile offspring) 
then (x is G-related to y ).
2. if (3z) (x could mate with z producing fertile 
offspring and y could mate with z producing fertile 
offspring) then (x is G-related to y ).
1. would apply to individuals of different sex, and 2.
to individuals of the same sex.
The assumption here is that x, y and z are 
G-related if they can mate when brought together.
Space and time barriers are ignored.
Principles 1, and 2, omit some hybrids from the set
of G-related individuals (those which are sterile), but
they do not omit those which can reproduce. On the 
other hand, the principles exclude some abnormal 
individuals (since some grossly deformed individuals 
are sterile). Yet, these individuals do belong to the 
species. Moreover L  and 2»cannot be used as criteria 
for individuals from asexual species. So we need to 
add something to include all these individuals.
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3. if (x is descended from y and x is phenotypically 
and genetically similar to y) then (x is G-related to
y) •
We need to add 'phenotypically and genetically 
similar' because, it could be that x and y are related 
by descent yet of different species if a great amount 
of change has occurred between the two generations 
concerned. And indeed we would not want to include all 
x's ancestor's since ultimately they would have been of 
a different species. Furthermore, with polyploidy in 
plants we can have a situation where x is descended 
from y and yet of a different species from y.
Such cases would be excluded, since y would be 
genetically quite disimilar from x. And perhaps in 
this sense some monsters do not belong to the same 
species as their parents; cases such as these could be 
treated ad hoc.
We could express G-relatedness as an ancestral 
form of the relation of mating or of being related 
through a mate. In other words for an individual x to 
be G-related to y it would be sufficient to belong to 
every population which contains y and all mates of 
members of that population. This is another way in 
which we can express 1. and 2. We can express 3. by 
saying that x belongs to any population which contain 
y, the phenotypically and genotypically descendants of 
the descendants of y , and so on.
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We now see that a gene pool is not merely a set of 
genotypes (a set is not indeed a relational concept).
A gene pool is not a kind of genotype either since two 
populations could have the same kind of genotype yet 
not share the same gene pool or be of the same species. 
Indeed, they may not reproduce when brought together, 
as happens for example in two species isolated by 
ethological barriers. This is why biologists say that 
the members of a species share a gene pool. By this 
term they mean to refer to the relational bonds between 
individuals in a gene pool.
Do we now have a means of identifying populations? 
Can we say that two populations are of the same species 
if their gene pools could be shared, satisfying one or 
other of the principles above? Would it work for the 
synchronic and the diachronic cases?
G-relatedness would not be a valid means of 
identifying populations because there is, a severe 
restriction to be placed on it. All individuals 
related in the manner described under 1. 2. and 3. (or 
the ancestral relations) belong to the same gene pool 
only if the chain of relatedness is not too lon g ! If 
the chain is long it could be that the first and the 
last individuals in the chain are not G-related in 
spite of satisfying one of the above principles. This 
could happen where there have been slight changes all 
along the chain in any one characteristic, the changes 
finally accumulating and operating a barrier to mating.
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This is presumably what has happened with the 
individual gulls in the chain of races mentioned above. 
And for 3., the changes being such that over a long 
period of time the first and the last in the chain no 
longer resemble each other. Transitivity of 
G-relatedness cannot be guaranteed. We cannot 
therefore make G-relatedness an equivalence relation.
An account of population sameness in terms of gene 
pools has not solved our problems and we are left once 
again with no satisfactory account of species identity.
Conclusion to Chapter Four
In this chapter we have seen that reproductive 
isolation, which is the standard criterion used by many 
biologists for species sameness, carries with it many 
serious problems. And we have seen that gene pool 
sameness suffers from the same faults. We started the 
chapter by saying that if species were real, we should 
be able to give criteria for their individuation and 
identity. We seem to have failed to find any 
satisfactory criterion. Should we therefore conclude
m
that after all we have said in previous chapters, 
species are not real? In the next chapter we shall 








In the last chapter we failed to provide 
satisfactory criteria for the individuation and 
identity of species. It seems therefore appropriate at 
this point in the thesis to look at the views of those 
who deny reality to species. The argument for the 
reality of species, given in Chapter Three, was that if 
some important biological statement is committed 
essentially to species, then species are real. So, a 
view which denies reality to species will, in our 
terms, be one which claims that in scientific 
statements species terms are dispensable. Such a view 
will be arguing that species terms can be reduced, 
without loss, to other terms. It should of course be 
noted that no biological theory has ever claimed to 
have reduced species in any serious sense of 'reduce'. 
To achieve reduction we would need to axiomatize 
theories, and there are certain obstacles to this in 
the present state of biology. However, any view 
claiming that species terms are dispensable is 
reductive. I shall consider two reductive views in 
this chapter : numerical taxonomy and neo-Darwinism. 
Numerical taxonomists claim that species can be reduced 
to sets of characteristics belonging only to 
individuals; and so scientific statements referring to
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species are not committed to. species but to these 
characteristics. Neo-Darwinism claims that, in 
statements concerning evolutionary processes, species 
terms can be replaced by terms relating only to genes. 
This chapter is divided into two parts, each part 
concentrates on one of these reductive claims.
PART I. NUMERICAL TAXONOMY
Numerical taxonomy is a nominalistic view. Such 
views are not new, Bessey whom I have already referred 
to in Chapter Three, claimed in 1904 that only 
individuals are real, and that species terms are 
tolerated in biology simply because they represent a 
shorthand way of referring to a series of individuals. 
He says : "nature produces individuals, and nothing
more. She produces them in such countless numbers that 
we are compelled to sort them into kinds in order that 
we may be able to carry them in our minds" (1). 
Numerical taxonomists make a similar claim, saying that 
species terms are merely a convenient way of referring 
to sets of characteristics belonging to a series of 
individuals. Is this claim true? I shall first give a 
straightforward account of numerical taxonomy, 
including as far as possible the reasons for their 
claim. I shall then assess the claim.
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1. A nominalistic approach
Numerical taxonomists hold that there are no 
typical individuals and no typical characteristics.
Any individual and any character displayed by an 
individual is as important as any other. Numerical 
taxonomists have, on the basis of this belief, devized 
a method which they claim is strictly empirical and 
numerical. They start by gathering as much information 
as possible, collecting as many organisms as possible, 
and recording as many characters as possible 
(morphological, physiological, behavioural, genetic, 
ecological), "every character is of equal weight in 
creating natural taxa" (2).
In this sense numerical taxonomists claim to be 
objective: there is to be no preselection of organisms 
as typical or characters as important. Once characters 
are recorded, classification begins: organisms are 
grouped following the number of shared character 
states. For numerical taxonomists there cannot be a 
limited set of characters defined for a species, since 
one can never be sure of having observed all possible 
individuals : "every systematist knows of instances
where a character previously considered to be 
diagnostic of a taxon is lacking in a newly discovered 
organism that clearly belongs to the taxon" (3). In 
addition to this, quite new character states may 
emerge. For this reason Sokel and Sneath choose to 
speak of polythetic taxa: "for practical purposes we
must consider the possibility of a taxon being fully
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polythetic, since we cannot be sure that we have 
observed any characters that are common to all members" 
(4). Sokal and Sneath compare polythetic to polytypic 
(Simpson's concept), and on p.21 of Principles of 
numerical taxonomy they say : "in a polythetic group,
organisms are placed together that have the greatest 
number of shared character states". This is opposed to 
monothetic where "the possession of a unique set of 
features is both sufficient and necessary for 
membership".
The formal expression of polytypic taxa is given 
by Beckner (whom Sokal and Sneath quote) : "A class is
ordinarily defined by reference to a set of properties 
which are both necessary and sufficient (by 
stipulation) for membership in the class. It is 
possible, however, to define a group K in terms of a 
set G of properties f , f 2  /. . . / f ^  in a different 
manner. Suppose we have an aggregation of individuals 
(we shall not as yet call them a class) such that:
1. Each one possesses a large (but unspecified)
number of the properties in G.
2. Each f in G is possessed by large numbers of these
individuals and
3. No f in G is possessed by every individual in the 
aggregate.
By the terms of 3, no f is necessary for membership in 
this aggregate : and nothing has been said to either
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warrant or rule out the possibility that some f in G is 
sufficient for membership in the aggregate" (5).
The phylogenetic history and the genetic aspects 
of organisms are not necessarily relevant for numerical 
taxonomists, although they may enter into the overall 
calculation as character-state themselves. Numerical 
taxonomists concern themselves only with overall 
resemblances. Such a view is familiar in other fields. 
As Sokal and Sneath themselves say : "polythetic 
concepts are by no means restricted to taxonomy or even 
to biology, for Wittgenstein emphasized their 
importance in ordinary language and especially in 
philosophy. Polythetic ideas are implied by the 
concepts of 'meaning', 'referring', 'description' and 
so on. There is a close parallel between 
Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance' and taxonomic 
resemblance" (6).
Once data are collected numerical methods are 
used. It is from these methods that groupings of 
organisms emerge. A matrix is drawn up showing the 
differences and similarities between the characters of 
a sample of organisms. From the matrix taxonomic 
resemblances between OTU's (7) are worked out. (OTU 
stands for operational taxonomic unit, it is any group 
of organisms being used in a study where overall 
resemblances are being calculated.) OTUs may differ 
from study to study depending on the group chosen each 
time; in other words an OTU is merely the basic group
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in a given study. The relationship between them is 
expressed as a fraction calculated using various 
coefficients of association. This method, according to 
Sokal and Sneath, is unlike that of other taxonomies in 
as much as it is repeatable and objective. They 
believe it is objective because it takes all characters 
into consideration without selection. And it is 
repeatable for two reasons. First because there is no 
choice involved on the observer's part (everyone will 
simply observe what there is). And secondly because 
given the same data, calculations will yield similar 
results for different scientists. One claim made by 
numerical taxonomists is that throughout this taxonomic 
work, there is no need to refer to species. What other 
biologists call species can be seen to be sets of 
characteristics. The taxonomic units (OTU's) are all 
that other biologists, using taxonomic classifications, 
need. Species terms are therefore dispensable.
Sokal and Sneath claim that species terms have no 
particular use. They say : "we do not object to
nonoperational concepts categorically, although we 
would prefer more operational concepts to less 
operational ones, but when the nonoperational concepts 
are vague and ill-defined and have no heuristic value, 
we are opposed to them, concepts such as the biological 
species (sensu Mayr et al.).... are more of a hindrance 
than a stepping stone to new discoveries and it is for 
this reason as much as their low operational value that
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we wish to redefine them or possibly even dispense with 
them" (8).
2. Critique of numerical taxonomy
Sokal and Sneath claim that their methods show 
that taxonomy is not committed to the existence of 
species. In this section I shall assess whether their 
methods justify such a claim..
One reason Sokal and Sneath give for dispensing 
with species is that 'species' carries too much 
theoretical weight. Indeed, if we accept the existence 
of species, then we accept that organisms relate to 
each other in certain ways; and that their 
characteristics are determined to some extent by this 
relationship. Such an attitude towards organisms 
would, for Sokal and Sneath, threaten objectivity.
In their claim to be objective Sokal and Sneath 
maintain that all characters of an organism must be 
recorded. But counting characters can only be done 
against a background of the sort of theory numerical 
taxonomists wish to dispense with. At the very least 
the number of characters an organism is said to have 
must be dependent on some amount of theory, since the
number of characteristics will depend on the way in
1
which an organism is being viewed. Vernon Pratt makes 
this point (9). In order to count characters one needs 
to specify a description, and the number of 
descriptions is itself indefinitely large. Vernon
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Pratt draws an analogy between counting characters, and 
counting the numbers of heaps in a bag of flour :
"Both are unanswerable questions. However, just as you 
can count characters once they have been specified, so 
you can count heaps once they have been poured out.
And just as you can describe a plant in an indefinite 
number of ways and so alter the number of characters 
indefinitely, so the number of possible heaps that the 
bag of flour may be poured into is indefinitely large" 
(10). Furthermore, although Sokal and Sneath claim 
that no character is to be selected as important, they 
do in fact give advice on selecting characters. They 
recommend choosing those characters for which "problems 
of estimation are less serious and hence more likely to 
be overcome" (11), and also those which may be of 
"greater interest and usefulness to systematists and 
biologists in general" (12). Data must be useful if 
they are to explain anything, and Sokal and Sneath do 
in fact select data which make sense. Why else do they 
choose to consider the shape of leaves on a tree as 
important, but not the number of leaves? Why do they 
choose to consider as one character only, having pink 
eyes and white fur (albino characteristics)? Sokal and 
Sneath indeed appeal to genetics to explain this choice 
of a principle of counting (13). The question of 
choosing which characters to consider as relevant when 
classifying organisms is called 'weighting'. Without 
doubt, different characters have different information
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content, and some are just noise (14). Refusal to 
accept this is not what most people would call being 
objective. Sokal and Sneath's claim to be objective in 
their sense of 'objective' is nonsense. But they 
themselves do not practice what they preach, their 
choice is guided by theory just as much, and in the 
same way, as it is in any other taxonomy.
Do the theories which guide the choice of 
characteristics, include theories which are essentially 
about species? If the character traits that are chosen 
as operational are those which explain most other 
characters, then characters relating to genes and gene 
pools become likely candidates. Once we are thinking 
in terms of gene pools, we are thinking in terms of 
species (since a gene pool is by definition the set of 
genes belonging to a sexual species). And this is true 
even if we cannot as yet identify gene pools.
Numerical taxonomists see organisms belonging to a 
species (or a gene pool) because they resemble each 
other. It is more correct to say that they resemble 
each other because they belong together. As seen many 
times in this thesis, species terms are relational 
terms : "the word species corresponds very closely to
other relational terms such as, for instance, the word 
brother. A given person is not a brother on the basis 
of certain intrinsic properties of his, but only in 
relation to someone else. A population is a species 
only with respect to other populations. To be a
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different species is not a matter of degree of 
difference but of relational distinctness" (Mayr) (15).
Numerical taxonomists seem to misunderstand the 
causal link between similarity and relationship. Mayr 
also says : "it is the same as with identical twins.
Two brothers are identical twins not because they are 
so extraordinarily similar, but they are so similar 
because they are both derived from a single zygote, 
that is, because they are identical twins" (16). So, 
if genetic traits are chosen as having a greater 
explanatory role to play in taxonomy, this means that 
theories about species are invoked in taxonomy. It is 
contradictory to accept genes as important in as much 
as they explain characteristics, and yet refuse to 
accept their role in the gene pool. Genes are grouped 
into gene pools because of the links existing between 
different sets of genes.
A further point to be made, against the numerical 
taxonomists claim, is that if one accepts (as numerical 
taxonomists do) that a character is important if it is 
relatively constant within a particular group, then one 
is presupposing that groups are already chosen, and 
that some classification has already been made (17).
The OTUs mentioned earlier could well have been groups 
of females, or males, or different age groups, but in 
fact they are the usual groupings of organisms (races 
and species). And this is precisely what numerical 
taxonomists claim not to do.
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In conclusion to Part I we can say that the claims 
numerical taxonomists make about species are not a 
consequence of the actual methods of numerical 
taxonomy. The methods themselves are not in question 
here. Numerical methods in taxonomy are in many ways 
sound and have produced good results for example in 
arthropods (insects, arachnids), where there are large 
numbers of character states (all seemingly important), 
and here computation is a help. It is important to 
note that the methods yield, on the whole, the same 
groupings as those found in traditional taxonomy. What 
is in questions, is the claim that these methods are 
independent of any theory about species. From all we 
have said above, it seems that there is no 
justification (on the basis of the methods alone) for 
the claim that species are dispensable. Moreover, the 
arguments given in Chapter Two, concerning the 
properties of species, still stand. These properties 
are characteristics and as we saw, they are not 
reducible to properties of individuals. Nothing in the 
methods of numerical taxonomy undermines those 
arguments.
Numerical taxonomy does not succeed in its claim 
that species are dispensable. Are the arguments of the 
second reductive claim any more convincing ?
17 4
PART II. NEO-DARWINISM
Neo-Darwinism is an evolutionary theory. The aim 
of this part of Chapter Five is to see whether theories 
which deny that species play a role in evolution can 
hope to achieve a reduction in evolutionary theory from 
species to genes. Much of Part II is based on Richard 
Dawkins book The selfish gene. Like most 
sociobiologists Dawkins argues from a neo-Darwinian 
point of view. I shall not be concerned with the moral 
implications of sociobiology. In the first section of 
Part II, I shall outline the claim made by 
neo-Darwinians, and I shall assess it in the second 
section.
1. The selfish gene
For Dawkins, our genetic make-up explains the way 
we are. Genes interact with each other inside bodies 
which are the survival machines for the genes. 
Individuals and species are secondary in as much as 
they are merely a "gene's way of preserving the genes 
unaltered" (18). He says that bodies started off as 
fairly simple protective constructions (cells), but 
they then evolved to become more and more complex.
Genes now "swarm in huge colonies, safe inside gigantic 
lumbering robots, sealed off from the outside world, 
communicating with it be tortuous indirect routes, 
manipulating it by remote control. They are in you and
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in me; they created us, body and mind, and their 
preservation is the ultimate rationale for our 
existence" (19). And he adds : "A monkey is a machine
which preserves genes up a tree, a fish is a machine 
which preserves genes in the water, there is even a 
small worm which preserves genes in German beer mats. 
DNA works in mysterious ways" (20). Since genes are 
the only effective elements in living organisms, one of 
the major obstacles to sociobiology has been to account 
for altruistic behaviour. Dawkins shows that in fact 
altruistic behaviour is advantageous to individual 
genes. Altruism exists chiefly between close relatives 
(offspring, siblings). Therefore, by insuring the 
survival of a relative, a gene insures that copies of 
itself, which are more likely to exist in relatives, 
survive. "What is a single selfish gene trying to do? 
It is trying to get more numerous in the gene pool. 
Basically it does this by helping to program the bodies 
in which it finds itself, to survive and reproduce... 
the key point... is that a gene might be able to assist 
replicas of itself which are sitting in other bodies"
(21). That is to say, acts which seem to be for the 
good of the species turn out to be for the good of the 
gene. For Dawkins, in evolution it is not groups nor 
individuals which are selected but genes. A gene which 
gains survival advantages in the gene pool increases in 
frequency (altruistic behaviour has this effect too), 
good genes are blindly selected as those which survive
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in the gene pool (22). Adaptation for the good of the 
species does not exist, since if there were only one 
gene which benefitted itself (survived) but was 
detrimental to other genes within the species, that 
gene would spread rapidly throughout the population 
(23). And as mutations are chance occurrences, such 
genes have no doubt occurred time and time again, and 
wiped out any 'good for the species' genes.
What kind of entities function as units of natural 
selection? For Dawkins the unit of natural selection 
is that which survives. Tautologically whatever 
survives is what is selected. Since natural selection 
is the differential survival of entities, some degree 
of permanence and reproductive success is required for 
such entities. They need "longevity, fecundity and 
copying-fidelity" (24). Actual (token) groups, 
organisms and genes die, what survives is their type. 
This means that whether it is groups, individuals or 
genes which are the units of natural selection depends 
on whether they are capable of reproducing themselves 
accurately, of being what Dawkins calls 'replicators'. 
For Dawkins a replicator is "an entity in the universe 
which interacts with its world, including other 
replicators, in such a way that copies of itself are 
made" (25). A good replicator would be an entity 
capable of reproducing exact copies of itself, thus 
insuring that the type survives. The unit of natural 
selection therefore must be that which survives in
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copies of itself. It is also that which benefits from 
selection pressures in as much as it will increase in 
frequency in ensuing generations.
For Richard Dawkins, the replicator unit is the 
gene ; "The best way to look at evolution is in terms 
of selection occurring at the lowest level of all... 
the fundamental unit of selection is not the species, 
nor the group, not even strictly the individual, it is 
the gene" (26). In other words it is genes which 
compete in the struggle for existence, not individuals, 
not species. Strictly speaking individuals do not 
reproduce, genes do. Only genes survive in exact 
copies of themselves, retain their individuality, and 
faithfully reproduce any changes that occur within 
their structure. Only genes have the simplicity and 
invariance needed for replication. Individuals and 
groups, Dawkins says, are not replicators since they 
vary from generation to generation. They are "like 
clouds in the sky or dust storms in the desert. They 
are temporary aggregations or federations. They are 
not stable through evolutionary time. Populations may 
last a long while but they are constantly blending with 
other populations and so losing their identity" (27). 
Romantically, he adds "genes, like diamonds, are 
forever". For the neo-Darwinians, not only are genes 
the units selected, but genes also play a causal role 
in evolutionary change. They exert 'power' as Dawkins 
puts it (28), in as much as they direct the synthesis
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of proteins and thereby direct the making of bodies 
("machines created by genes for their own survival"
(29)). Ultimately then, according to the 
neo-Darwinians, evolutionary processes must be 
understood in terms of genes, and genes alone. This 
claim does not mean that genes cause evolution, only 
that evolution results from changes in genes, and (now 
a causal claim) that genes are solely responsible for 
the making of bodies. Genes are the only effective 
elements in terms of which the characteristics of 
individuals, groups and species may be properly 
understood.
2. The unit of natural selection
Before assessing the neo-Darwinian claim that the 
gene is the unit of natural selection, one important 
comment needs to be made regarding natural selection 
itself. For neo-Darwinians natural selection is the 
only mechanism which explains evolutionary change. 
Evolution for them occurs following changes in genes 
(due for example to mutations). These changes provide 
a source of variety upon which the forces of selection 
can operate. Different genes give rise to different 
features, some features are better suited to their 
environment than others, so the genes which produce the 
more successful features survive. It is questionable 
whether natural selection is the only mechanism for 
evolutionary change. The assumption that it is rests
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on the idea that every aspect of a living organism is 
perfectly adapted for a particular purpose, an idea 
strangely reminiscent of the claims made by the 
supporters of the argument from design in another 
context. This implies that organisms are divided into 
parts, which can only be understood in terms of their 
separate fitness values, since only the genes for those 
parts which are fit survive. Yet there are 
characteristics which have evolved for non-adaptive 
reasons. The chin, for example, is not the outcome of 
a separate gene, but of architectural constraints (30) 
(in this case the alveolar and mandibular growth fields 
which are both regressing but at different rates, 
thereby producing a chin). In addition to this, there 
are many imperfections not accounted for by 
adaptationists. This means that this facet of 
neo-Darwinism is in doubt irrespective of whether the 
gene is or is not the unit of natural selection.
Natural selection is not the only mechanism for 
evolutionary change, but without doubt it is one of the 
most important mechanisms. However, is the gene the 
unit of natural selection? To answer this the terms 
needed to explain evolutionary processes must be 
identified. If sentences using terms such as 
’individual', 'group', 'species', can be replaced 
without loss wherever they occur in evolutionary 
explanations, by sentences using only the term 'gene'; 
then indeed genes are the units of natural selection.
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They are those entities which in the long run survive. 
They survive in scientific theories in as much as 
references to them are an essential element of these 
theories. They also survive in the real (actual) world 
in the sense of being the entities which actually do 
benefit from natural selection. Is this unequivocally 
true of genes?
Neo-Darwinians claim that natural selection 
operates on genes. An objection often levelled at such 
a view is that selection pressures act not on genes 
themselves, but on the way they are expressed in the 
phenotype. As R.J. Berry says : "it is only
phenotypes which are subject to selection, strictly 
speaking it is impossible'for selection to act on an 
allele because it is phenotypes not genotypes which 
have children. The reproductive success of a phenotype 
is its fitness" (31). A gene survives because it has 
advantages over other genes in a particular 
environment. But it interacts with the environment 
only through the phenotype. The force of natural 
selection therefore acts only indirectly on the 
genotype. Neo-Darwinians recognise this, but claim 
that although natural selection acts on phenotypes, it 
is more properly understood at a more fundamental level 
of reality.
The proper question, according to neo-Darwinians, 
is what survives as a result of the selection (what is 
replicated)? It is what survives that is the unit of
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natural selection. So, is it phenotypic 
characteristics, or is it genes that survives? For 
neo-Darwinians only genes survive, since only they 
reproduce exact copies of themselves, unlike their 
phenotypic expressions which are blurred and blend with 
each other in subsequent generations. The phenotype 
"is the all important instrument of replicator 
preservation : it is not that which is preserved" (32). 
I shall now outline several points against the claim 
that the gene - in as much as it is more fundamental 
than other aspects of living organisms - is the unit of 
natural selection.
(i) Firstly, for a reduction from phenotypes (a 
higher level), to genotypes (a lower level), there must 
be a one to one correspondence between phenotypic 
traits and genes. But there is no such correspondence. 
Some phenotypic traits do result from only one gene, or 
one set of genes, but many result from any number of 
genes (i.e. different genes can give rise to the same 
traits). Therefore individuals with the same phenotype 
could have equal fitness regardless of their genotype. 
In adition to this many genes are replicated without 
being selected, or without their phenotypic expression 
being selected. Elliott Sober discusses this point in 
"Significant Units and the Group Selection Controversy"
(33). He points out that since it is the phenotype 
which is selected, any other genes which happen to 
belong to the individual with that phenotype will also
182
be selected. The role played by individual genes may 
be relatively insignificant. This point concerning the 
reduction of phenotypes to genes is worth explaining in 
more detail. This is what I intend to do in the next 
few paragraphs.
Undoubtedly genes initiate the process which 
produces a phenotypic trait. But the direct expression 
of a gene is merely a protein, and many other 
components enter into the making of a trait. The fact 
that a genotypic change will probably have an effect on 
the phenotype does not mean that a particular trait is 
reducible to a particular gene. One cannot give a 
complete analysis of selection without reference to 
phenotypic traits themselves. It is the phenotypic 
characteristic that is relevant to selection, it is the 
properties themselves of fur (warmth, water repellent 
qualities) that cause the gene responsible for fur to 
be selected and replicated. This is equally evident in 
explanations of mimicry, where an edible species of 
butterfly imitates the wing patterns and colours of a 
distastful species, thus avoiding being eaten by 
predators. It is those wing patterns and colours the 
predators single out. Natural selection favours a 
certain wing pattern and colour, whatever genes 
produced it. What survives is that wing pattern and 
colour. Dawkins answers this objection by saying that 
so long as the gene for mimicry survives, selection is 
acting for the good of that gene, and that gene is
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therefore a unit of natural selection (34). But any 
explanation of the evolution of mimicry by natural 
selection which did not take phenotypes into account 
would be incomplete.
A further difficulty with the idea that a 
reduction from phenotype to genotype is possible, is 
that the genetic difference between two species does 
not necessarily correlate with the phenotypic 
difference between them. The DNA length for Vicia 
sativa (common vetch) is the same as for men and mice, 
whereas Vicia faba (broad bean) has a DNA five times as
long, although the two plants species are more similar
to each other than men are to mice (35). The
difference between two species may be due to a
difference in karyotype, that is to say a difference 
not in the DNA itself, but in the way in which the 
total DNA is broken up into chromosomes (36). For 
example there is a greater genetic difference between 
two very closely related species of Drosophila (40% of 
their genes differ), than between man and chimp (37). 
And yet the two fly species look alike, and the two ape 
species do not. One reason for this is that genes have 
different effects in different contexts. In such cases 
it is not the gene which is selected, but the gene 
within a context. The context may include other genes 
and also other characteristics at higher levels 
possessed by the individual or even the species. In 
many ways it seems that natural selection acts upon
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human beings human beings, and on chimps chimps 
and not on their genes. A one to one reduction from 
phenotypic characteristics to genes is not possible.
(ii) A second point against the claim that the 
gene is the unit of natural selection concerns fitness. 
Quite often what is fit and what survives is not a gene 
but is either a combination of genes, or a combination 
of phenotypic traits. Either of these may characterize 
a species.
It might be useful to look at some examples of 
genes being selected in a context which necessarily 
includes other genes or other properties, over and 
above the gene level. For example in a cold 
environment mammals with thick fur will tend to survive 
better than those with thin fur or no fur. Where there 
is snow mammals with dark fur will fall prey to 
predators, being more conspicuous than those with white 
fur. In countries where the snow falls only in winter, 
animals with white fur will be killed by predators 
during the summer (this time being more conspicuous 
than those with dark fur). So, in some regions mammals 
which have the following combination of genes : 
'fur-white in winter-dark in summer' will survive. The 
ermine (a weasel) is one such animal, so is the stoat 
in some regions on the British Isles. In this case it 
isn't the gene for 'fur' that is selected, since the 
ordinary furry weasel may die in such an area (eaten by 
predators in winter). It isn't the gene for 'white'.
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since a white ermine with no fur would die of cold.
And it isn't even 'white fur', since a white weasel 
would also die eaten by predators in summer. So it is 
the combination of these genes which is selected, i.e. 
fur which turns white in winter and brown in summer.
The same would apply also to any organism which goes 
through metamorphosis. It is the combination of genes 
(the life cycle as a whole in this last case) which is 
the unit of natural selection.
Where natural selection seems to favour a 
combination of genes one might wish to say that it is a 
conjunction or a disjunction of genes which is being 
selected. So genes (this and that gene, this or that 
gene) would still be the units of natural selection. 
This would be the last resort for a selfish gene 
theory. Some combinations such as pink eyes and white 
fur in albinos might be well explained by this sort of 
theory. But in most cases this would be inadequate.
In the first place, one needs to refer to the phenotype 
to explain why a trait is selected and in the second 
place, sets of characteristics behave as units in a way 
which is not reducible to sets of genes. That it is a 
combination of genes which is selected is clear if one 
considers the possibility of there being two or more 
species, one with the combination and one without. If 
both compete for the same niche, one species may die 
out, the other survive. The one that survives, 
survived because the combination was selected. (It is
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true that species need not compete for selection to 
take place. Selection simply occurs where there are 
several varying units, what matters is that the 
possibility of selection is there.)
A well documented case of a combination of genes 
acting as a unit, is that of sickle cell anaemia given 
in Chapter One. Here heterozygotes are selected as 
advantageous over homozygotes. Homozygotes for normal 
red blood cells die of malaria, homozygotes for 
sickle-cells die of anaemia, heterozygotes are 
protected from both illnesses. It isn't the sickle 
cell gene which is selected, it isn't the normal gene 
either (since individuals with two of either of these 
genes die); but it is the combination of both which is 
selected. This illustrates how one same gene can be 
lethal in one context, and yet have a high fitnes value 
in another. Richard Dawkins feels that ESS (the 
concept of an evolutionary stable set of genes), 
adequately accounts for such cases (38). Each gene in 
a combination being selected in turn, against the 
background of other genes which are parts of its 
environment : "gene-pools come to consist of genes,
that do well in each others company"... "If we find 
harmonious and integrated units at one level, these do 
not have to be produced by selection among units at 
that level. ESS theory shows us how harmony and 
integration at a high level can be produced by 
selection among component parts at a lower level" (39).
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ESS have evolved as a result of the selection at the 
genic level. With such a mechanism Dawkins might 
presumably claim in the case mentioned earlier of the 
ermine (this isn't one of Dawkin's examples), that the 
gene for fur survives as advantageous over the no-fur 
gene, white-fur is an advantage in an environment which 
already includes the fur gene, white-in-winter-only is 
an advantage in an environment which already includes 
fur and white. This for Dawkins is how a combination 
of genes is built up and then can seem to act as a unit
(40). It may be that, as Dawkins says, genes manage to 
survive by getting into good company. But this does 
not mean that it is that gene which is selected, it 
survives because the combination is selected. As 
mentioned above, this is clear from examples involving 
competition. What survives and is replicated is the 
combination.
(iii) A third point against the neo-Darwinian 
claim is the possibility of group selection. Group 
selection explains sexuality. Sexuality is the 
mechanism which maintains variety within a group. 
Without variety groups cannot adapt to environmental 
changes and therefore tend to become extinct.
Variation is in itself advantageous. The polymorphism 
found in populations of the land snail Cepeae nemoralis 
given in Chapter One is a good example of selection for 
variation as such. Without variation the species would 
die out. Here it is the group of genes as a whole that
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is selected, (As mentioned in Chapter One, selection 
acts against species which do not display variation, 
those plant species for example which do not reproduce 
sexually cannot maintain variety, and cannot therefore 
adapt to environmental changes ( 4]>. ) A gene for sexual 
reproduction is therefore for the good of the species 
since it insures variation. In sexual reproduction the 
parents can each draw upon either of two alleles for 
any trait. So for the offspring, who will inherit one 
allele from each parent, there may be four 
possibilities for any trait. Of the two the offspring 
inherits, only one will express itself. The other 
however may be passed on to the next generation (an 
additional hidden variation). In mating an individual 
throws away half of his genes. A gene that allies 
itself to sexuality has only a 50/50 chance of 
survival. For the gene it is a risky business, for the 
species on the other hand sex is wholly advantageous.
To repeat, variation and sexuality are selected, and 
are more beneficial to the species, than to any 
individual genes. Dawkins counters this by saying that 
sexuality is maintained simply because it benefits the 
gene for sexuality, even if it is disadvantageous to 
all other genes in any one organism (since it means 
that half of them may not be passed on to the next 
generation) (42). However, even if sexuality arose as 
a result of gene selection, the fact that sexual 
species predominate and that asexual ones die out.
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suggests that selection is operating at the level of 
the group.
Elliott Sober has reviewed examples of group 
selection. These are cases where selection is of an 
objective characteristic of the group, which is not 
individually shared by all the members of the group.
In his article "Significant Units and the Group 
Selection Controversy" (43), he argues for group 
selection quoting some experiments conducted by Wade 
(44) on the flour beetle Tribolium castaneum. In these 
experiments 40 populations of the beetles were used for 
breeding. Each of the 40 populations founded new 
populations (new colonies, communities), until each of 
the 40 had itself created 40 new populations (amounting 
in all to 40 x 40). Each time they were selected and 
bred from again. The experimenter selected each time 
the smallest populations on the one hand, breeding from 
them several times, each time re-selecting the smallest 
populations. On the other hand the experimenter also 
selected the largest populations, and bred from them 
separately, each time re-selecting the larger 
populations to breed from. In addition to these two 
groups of populations (small and large), there was a 
control group consisting of populations which were bred 
several times with no selection for population size.
In these experiments it is the property of smallness, 
or largeness of population size which is being 
selected, regardless of the characteristics of any
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individuals within the group. Some populations 
achieved smallness in numbers by lengthening their 
developmental time, others by cannibalism, others by a 
rise in infertility. But for all it was the same 
property 'smallness' which was being selected. Sober 
also gives two other examples of group selection 
occurring in the wild. One concerns Myxoma and rabbits 
in Australia (45), where there is group selection among 
the myxoma viruses for low virulence. Since virulent 
viruses kill their hosts and with them the viruses' own 
livelihood, the rabbits have survived by becoming 
immune to the virus, and the viruses have survived by 
enjoying an overall lower virulence within each virus 
population. The virulence varies from individual to 
individual within a population, but each individual 
virus benefits from the overall low virulence of the 
group, and therefore has identical fitness. The 
fitness is determined by a property of the group. The 
other example quoted by Sober is that of the male 
segregator distorter t gene in Mus musculus, which 
determines selection for the group regardless of 
whether all individuals in the group have the gene or 
not. Females benefit from the same selective force, 
although they never carry the gene.
The point made by Sober here can be made 
concerning almost any group o f  organisms showing 
variation. In any group where it is advantageous to 
have some members with a certain characteristic, there
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will be selection of that group in preference to other 
groups with no members having that characteristic. All 
the members of the group, where some individuals have 
the characteristic, benefit from the selection simply 
by being members of the group. They have the same 
fitness as those with the advantageous characteristic. 
Examples of these abound. Any bee benefits from there 
being good worker bees in the colony, any ant benefits 
from good guard ants in its population... In each 
example a characteristic of some individuals make the 
whole population fitter. And therefore each organism 
within the population is as fit as any other in virtue 
of the group's fitness. These points concerning 
fitness, echo the point made in Chapter Two on the 
properties of species. Sober points out that accounts 
of fitness involve quantification over properties (46). 
If the properties are properties of species, then it is 
species that are selected in the process of natural 
selection (i.e. it is species that survive).
Neo-Darwinians maintain, however, that even in 
such cases it is still genes which are faithfully 
reproduced and which survive. So it is still genes 
which are the units of natural selection. This seems 
to be an over-simplification. First, it isn't genes 
themselves which survive, but as we said earlier gene 
types (47). But group types survive too. Individual 
groups are (as Dawkins has said) unstable, but group 
types survive just as well as gene types. If a group
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with a certain set of characteristics survives, then in 
future generations it is that phenotype which is being 
replicated, which survives and therefore which is the 
unit of natural selection by the terms defined by 
neo-Darwinians themselves. One could perhaps hold a 
weak form of neo-Darwinism, maintaining that it is 
genotypes and a certain environment (or within a 
certain environment) which are selected and survive.
But what makes this theory preferable to the obvious 
alternative? Natural selection acts on tigers a^ 
tigers and not on their genes. It is the same kind of 
organism which is being reproduced. Species, as kinds 
of organisms with certain characteristics, do have an 
important role to play in evolutionary theory.
(iv) So far, in all the criticisms levelled at 
neo Darwinism, we have accepted that the important 
question is : which entities survive? But this is not 
the best way of putting the question since it has 
become obvious that all sorts of things survive. More 
precisely we may ask as some neo-Darwinians in fact do: 
who benefits from natural selection? It may be a 
question concerning which entities are the most 
important, genes, individuals or species? Mary 
Midgley makes this point saying that genes only 
represent potential individuals, and that potential 
entities are important only in terms of what they will 
become : "could we think of the blueprints as more
important than the builders, the mix than the pudding.
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the match than the fire?" (48). But the question needs 
to be refined even more. It isn't so much a question 
about which entities benefit or which are important.
The question is : what things survival is invoked in 
the explanation of evolving processes? All the above 
points (i to iii) show that it isn't only genes.
Elliott Sober and Richard Lewontin make a related 
point, and argue that neo-Darwinism in choosing genic 
fitness as the entity in terms of which we should think 
of natural selection, are misrepresenting the true 
causes at work in evolution (49). Without doubt 
natural selection has an effect on gene frequencies, 
but this does not mean that it is selecting genes. To 
say that some entity is selected for is, for Sober and 
Lewontin, to say that that entity has a causal role in 
evolutionary processes. Genic fitness is not a cause 
but an effect. Genic fitness (the fitness of.a 
particular gene) is mathematically derived from 
genotype frequencies and genotype fitness (the 
individual's or population's gene complex). Genic 
fitness is not a causq, it is an artifact. Sober and 
Lewontin make this point saying that : "selfish genes
and grue emeralds bear a remarkable similarity" (50). 
They add "grue is not a property for the-same reason 
that genic selection coefficients are pseudoparameters 
in models... non-properties cannot be causally 
efficacious" (51).
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In summary our argument against neo-Darwinism has 
been, first that there is no one to one correspondence 
between genes and phenotypic characteristics; secondly 
that genes cannot be taken singly, their role in 
selection depends on their context; thirdly that cases 
of natural selection of groups and of properties 
attributable to species are not accounted for by 
neo-Darwinians; fourthly that neo-Darwinians 
misconstrue the role played by genes in the course of 
natural selection.
Richard Dawkins believes that his theory is at 
least as plausible as any other evolutionary theory 
because it is as compatible with the facts as any other
theory (52). But there are too many cases where it
doesn't truly fit the facts and in those cases where it 
does fit well, is mere consistency enough? (53). Other 
theories might indeed be simpler. It seems that the 
neo-Darwinian hope of reducing species (or even
individuals) to genes cannot be fulfilled.
Conclusion to Chapter Five
Numerical taxonomy and neo-Darwinism are the two 
main biological theories which make any claim 
concerning the dispensability of species. Neither 
theory has been successful in its claim. This is a 
good indication that species should still be considered 
as real. In view of this fact we need once again to 
look at Dossible criteria for species sameness and
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difference. This will be attempted in the next and 
final chapter of this thesis.
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CHAPTER SIX
A CRITERION FOR SPECIES SAMENESS
The first chapter described species as genetic and 
ecological systems. The second chapter suggested that 
species were natural kinds. The third chapter argued 
that species were real. Following this it seemed 
natural in the fourth chapter to look for criteria of 
species identity. The standard criteria used by 
taxonomists do not square with our philosophical 
intuitions. Vagueness is a problem for identity in 
philosophy. If something is real it should be possible 
to find definite identity criteria. This is not a 
problem for biologists, biological sciences are 
probabilistic and vagueness is not of concern to them. 
Acknowledging that the failure to find satisfactory 
criteria for species sameness might seem to cast doubt 
on the reality of species, we went on in the fifth 
chapter to examine theories that seek to dispense with 
species. We found that both the reductive attempts 
considered failed in their claim. In the light of this 
failure it seems appropriate to return now to the view 
that species are indeed real, and look again for 
criteria of species identity. This is the aim of 
Chapter Six.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first section looks at a non-reductive criterion for
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classification. The second section attempts a new 
approach at the individuation and identity of species, 
and reviews examples which bear out the new approach. 
The third section draws conclusions, on the basis of 
the two previous sections, concerning the nature and 
reality of species.
1. A non-reductive approach
In Chapter Four we saw that all criteria for the 
individuation and identity of species failed in as much 
as there were exceptions to each criterion. One cannot 
exhaustively classify all organisms by their individual 
characteristics, or by criteria based on reproductive 
isolation, or by gene pools. Perhaps the difficulty 
that we encountered in Chapter Four was that we were 
insufficiently realistic about species and their 
identity. The problem may have been that we stayed too 
closely within a reductive pattern of explanation. 
Indeed all our criteria in Chapter Four were reductive 
in nature. They all depended on some internal 
characteristic of populations. They sought to exploit 
the idea that the individuals or populations of the 
same species are related to each other in a way in 
which the individuals or populations of different 
species are not. This was the basis of all criteria.
It was a bottom to top approach, which rested on at 
least one questionable assumption. This is the 
assumption that relations between individuals or
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populations can be characterized independently of the 
species they are of. Dropping this assumption, we can 
now look for a non-reductive criterion of identity or 
elucidation of species identity, a criterion which is 
not founded solely in the internal or constituent 
properties of populations.
Identifying the population to which an individual 
belongs calls for a different answer from identifying 
which populations are of which species. The principles 
of G-relatedness, expounded in Chapter Four, did indeed 
cast some light on ways of assigning individuals to 
populations. But, if we make the experiment of seeing 
species more realistically, then we can contemplate the 
possibility of assigning populations to species by 
looking down on populations (and maybe on individuals 
too) from the level of the species, instead of trying 
to reach upwards to the species entirely from the level 
of populations or the level of individual organisms.
In this new framework, my main interest is not in 
individuals, but in populations - both the 
individuation of populations and the relation of 
populations to species. For species, as we have said 
before, are made up of populations. We do not need an 
antecedent theory about the way in which individuals 
are identified in order to define species identity - so 
long as we have the prospect of finding some 
alternative access to species themselves.
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Our failure in Chapter Four will remind anyone who 
knows, of the long history of failures to find a 
satisfactory general criterion for the correct 
demarcation of semantic categories. There, a new 
perspective on the whole problem has been achieved by 
Gareth Evans in "Semantic structure and logical form"
(1). Rising above the difficulties that have been 
encountered by all those who have tried to define 
semantic categories in 'immanent' fashion, from within 
the recourse of their own particular theory of syntax 
and semantics, what Evans suggests is a 'transcendent' 
approach to the problem. The semantic category of a 
word is the class it will be assigned to by any theory 
that measures up to the explanation of relating sound 
to meaning. Categories must be set up in such a way 
that expressions, that are counted by the best 
explanatory theory as functioning similarly, end up in 
the same semantic category. What has to be explained 
can be stated in a fashion that is not internal to any 
particular semantic theory. And this is what makes it 
possible to lay down a general criterion of correct 
demarcation for all particular theories. Thus words 
must be assigned to the same category if they behave 
(function) in the same way. If two words are assigned 
to two different categories yet behave in the same way, 
this represents a 'lost generalisation'. But two words 
should be seen to belong to two distinct categories if 
this makes possible new and better explanations than
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those which are possible if they are seen as belonging 
to one category only. Bad categorization stands in the 
way of good explanation. Good explanation will provide 
"the most determinate and yet economical statement of 
the kind of semantic contribution made by any 
expression of a given type". (2).
2. A new criterion for species identity
Taking inspiration from Evans's approach in 
linguistics, we can now attempt a similar transcendent 
approach to categorizing populations in biology. The 
complex nature of biological theory as compared with 
linguistic theory is bound to make this task difficult. 
Although linguistic theory is not altogether clear, it 
is one theory and it can say in advance what its aims 
and objects are. Biology is clear neither about its 
objects nor about its aims. Many biological sciences 
are still young (ecology for example) and ill-defined. 
The subject matter of biology - the living world - is 
so complex and diverse that each different way of 
approaching it constitutes an independent inquiry 
(evolution, genetics, ecology, physiology and so on). 
Each of these disciplines concentrates on different 
aspects of the living world and has its own aims and 
its own objects (populations, individuals, cells, 
genes). It is populations we are interested in here.
We need a means of identifying when a population is of 
one species or when it is of another species.
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In order to know which sort of theories might be 
called in to help individuate species, we need to know 
something about the explanatory role of species. 
Semantic categories relate sound to meaning, what would 
be the equivalent of this for species? Very 
schematically, one could say that species provide an 
explanation for the characteristics organisms and 
populations have, by invoking genetic systems and 
ecological structures. Once we have an idea of the 
work species do in scientific explanations, then we can 
proceed along the same lines as Evans does for semantic 
categories. We can say that any biological theory 
which enables us to group populations in such a way 
that their characteristics are explained by a genetic 
system and ecological structures, can be used in the 
individuation and identity of species.
Philip Kitcher (3) seems to be doing something 
along these lines (although he does not refer to 
Evans), when he suggests that we should stop looking 
for a criterion for species sameness. He believes that 
since all criteria have exceptions, we could - as a 
solution - accept them all. Kitcher claims that each 
method of identifying species is based on a particular 
theory about the way in which organisms should be 
grouped. In this Kitcher is echoing views held by Mayr 
and others. Mayr, for example, says : "the most 
important meaning of a classification is that it is a 
scientific theory, with all the qualities of a
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scientific theory. First of all, it has an 
exp^lanatory value... it is sometimes argued that the 
descriptive and the explanatory aspects of 
classifications should be neatly separated. This is 
impossible. A good classification of organisms is 
automatically explanatory" (4). Biological theories 
which underlie taxonomy are theories explaining the 
overall characteristics of organisms. For Kitcher 
there are "two main types of inquiry which generate 
different schemes for classifying organisms" (5). The 
first relies on historical explanations, invoking the 
evolutionary forces behind any characteristics 
organisms or populations may have. This leads to one 
type of taxonomy. The other concentrates on 
explanations invoking immediate causes (how one 
characteristic is affected by something in its 
proximity). This leads to another type of taxonomy.
It isn't clear in Kitcher's article which taxonomies he 
is thinking of; but certainly cladism goes well with 
genealogical theories, and morphological 
classifications (including numerical taxonomy) with the 
second type of theory.
Kitcher's view does not, however, achieve our aim. 
It doesn't cover all the theories which do the job 
'species' do. There seems to be no good reason why we 
should limit ourselves to theories in taxonomy. So, 
following Evans, we can state that our criterion 
includes any theory which groups populations into
2 0 7
species if by grouping populations into species we make 
sense of phenomena which otherwise would remain 
unexplained. We need to bear in mind that the 
explanation is any explanation of characteristics which 
is given in terms of genetic systems and ecological 
relations.
We wish, to make the most determinate yet 
economical classification of populations into species. 
We can compare the behaviour, and function (in 
ecosystems and so on) of different populations. We can 
say that if by assigning two populations to one species 
we lose a certain measure of explanation, then this is 
an indication that the categorization is mistaken. If 
on the other hand by assigning two populations to one 
species we gain a certain measure of explanation, then 
we can take it that the assignment is correct. Another 
way of putting the same point (and adding strength to 
it) would be to say that when two populations are seen 
as of two different species (where they were previously 
seen as of one species), and when this new 
categorization opens up new scientific vistas (new 
areas of research), then this is a strong indication 
that the new categorization is correct. If, on the 
other hand, it means that our understanding of natural 
phenomena is reduced, then the categorization is 
mistaken. If scientists are successful in their 
predictions, once the populations are seen as of 
different species, this is a good indication that
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allocating these populations to different species is a 
correct assignment. In such cases, seeing the 
different populations as of one species represented a 
lost generalization. This would show how bad 
categorization does indeed stand in the way of good 
scientific explanation.
Following this criterion, suppose we have two 
populations which differ in some respects only, which 
for example do not look alike yet share ecological 
systems. We will say that these two populations will 
be seen as two races within one species, if seeing them 
thus enables us to understand natural phenomena which 
could otherwise not be explained. The two populations 
will then be seen to be playing 'upon a theme', the 
populations being variations and the species the common 
theme. Compare the point Evans makes concerning 'and' 
and 'or' : he says that [P and Q] and [P or Q] have the 
same semantic structure "the word 'and' plays upon a 
theme it has in common^ with 'or'" (6). Linguistics 
imposes a typology of semantic categories which are 
like themes. The members are like variations in these 
themes. Conversely, if studies on two populations, 
which had appeared to be two races of one same species, 
yielded greater scientific advances (in understanding 
and prediction) when the two populations are seen as of 
two species, then we would say that these are not 
different races within one species but indeed 
populations of different species.
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It may appear that we have two different tasks 
which should be distinguished here. One is the 
assignment of populations to taxonomic categories 
(race, subspecies, species), where we ask whether the 
differences existing between two populations make them 
of different species or simply of different races 
within one species. This task would involve 
comparisons with other populations, and the question 
asked would be : are the differences species specific 
or racial? The other task is to decide whether two 
populations are of the same species or of two different 
species. This is not taxonomic ranking, we would not 
be looking here for the taxonomic categories (races, 
subspecies, species) of these populations (i.e. we 
would not be asking whether these two populations 
should be classified as of different races, sub-species 
or species). But we would be looking for their taxa 
within the species category alone (i.e. are these two 
populations both of the A species or of the B species, 
or is one of the A species and the other of the B 
species?). These indeed appear two different tasks 
(taxonomic ranking and assignments within the species 
category), but in both cases the question is in fact 
the same. We find two populations, similar in many 
respects but different in some, and we ask ourselves : 
are they of the same species or of two different 
species? And indeed another way of putting this same 
question is : are these two populations of one species
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with racial variations (in which case their differences 
would be merely racial and not species specific), or 
are they of two species (each with its own specific 
characteristics)? This is now the same question as the 
one in the first task outlined above, e.g. one of 
ranking taxa (are they of different races, subspecies 
or species?).
To summarize, species can be seen as themes and 
races and sub-species as variations upon these themes; 
two races will be said to be of the same species or of 
different species depending on the explanatory 
advantages of such categorizations. Such explanations, 
if they involve species, are given in terms of genetic 
systems, ecological relationships (and whatever else we 
know characterizes the species). The decision whether 
to attribute the differences between populations to 
differences in race, subspecies, or species will depend 
on the heuristic value of any one of those decisions.
Unlike all the criteria given in Chapter Four, 
this criterion applies equally well to sexual and to 
asexual species. Indeed, the decision to assign two 
populations to two separate species does not 
necessarily depend on their reproductive habits. Would 
we still, as in Chapter Four be left with a problem 
concerning vagueness? Yes, but to à much lesser 
degree. There will be times when a population could 
equally be said to be of one species or of another, in 
as much as nothing is to be gained by classifying it as
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of one species or of another. We can learn from 
Science when decisions have to be arbitrary, as for 
example in cases of rings of races (gulls' example in 
Chapter Four). Here the ring is divided into two 
species, because seeing it as one large diverse species 
simply does not explain enough (there are too many 
differences between the end populations, in terms of 
ecology and so on). Populations central to each 
species will be clearly different, and yet there will 
be intermediary populations placed arbitrarily in one 
of these two species.
If we accept that species are real, and that 
nature clearly separates populations into species, then 
we can use biological sciences to see whether the 
criterion outlined above matches biological practice.
To this end, I shall now review some examples. We have 
already described in the PhD many suitable examples.
The decision to assign the populations responsible for 
Malaria and the populations responsible for River 
Blindness to different species, enabled scientists to 
answer a host of questions, and to plan a programme of 
eradication. Seeing the populations as of different 
species meant recognizing different reproductive 
patterns (e.g. different gene pools) and different 
ecological patterns. These explained in turn, the 
populations characteristics. This means taking 
different measures to control the disease.
Legionnaires Disease was another example where
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identifying populations as of different species led to 
improved prevention and cure, following a recognition 
of different breeding habits and different ecological 
habits. These are all examples of populations first 
seen as of different races within one species, and then 
reclassified as of different species. In each case, 
research was aided by the reclassification. Scientific 
spin offs resulted from seeing the populations as of 
different species, rather than classifying them as 
anything else. There are also examples of populations 
being seen as of one species when previously one had 
thought they were of two species^ for instance the 
realization that the smoothed-stemmed foxglove is of 
the same species as the hairy-stemmed one (both are 
Digitalis purpurea). This is important for the 
production of Digioxin (used in heart failure), which 
is extracted from Digitalis. The realization that the 
two kinds of populations of locust (gregaria and 
solitaria) are not of two different species, but two 
alternative forms of the same species is another 
example. This has enabled farmers to control locust 
swarms by controlling the solitary form alone.
We are now in a position to be more precise about 
the species category, and attempt to specify what is 
special about the species classification (as opposed to 
any other classification). Some classifications in 
biology are at taxonomic levels other than the species, 
and some cut across species. Examples of the former
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would include classifications into races, genera, 
families. These could be for the purpose of making 
generalizations which apply to only one feature found 
in all organisms at that level. For example 
generalizations about gestation periods or lactation 
would apply to all mammals. Generalizations about 
certain diseases may apply only to some racial groups 
(sickle-cell anaemia and blacks for instance). An 
example of a classification which cuts across species 
would be all the plant species which produce 
anti-histamine, this sort of classification is used in 
the drug industry. In contrast to these 
classifications, does the species category have any 
privileged status in biology?
What does looking at organisms as being of
different species (as opposed to anything else) entail?
In all cases, seeing the populations as of different
species, or as of one species, means looking at the
situation from a different angle. It means adopting a
different scientific attitude towards understanding the
situation and towards predicting future paths of
development. In particular, it means seeing the
populations as different genetic units and different
ecological units. If populations are of the same 
%
species certain consequences follow. As we have seen 
in this chapter, sharing a gene pool and an ecology 
means that characteristics will be the same for the 
populations of one same species. These consequences do
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not follow when the populations are of different 
species.
3. Conclusion
The different consequences which follow from 
assigning populations to species imply that certain 
relationships hold between the members of a species. 
Correct classification leads to good results in 
biology. The examples also vindicate the assumption we 
started with, concerning species. Seeing species as 
genetic and ecological enables one to explain the 
characteristics of populations.
Species represent well integrated complex systems. 
As we saw earlier in the thesis these systems have 
their own rate of loss and replacement, and thus 
maintain their stability. This degree of integration 
does not exist in any other taxonomic category, whether 
it be at the level of races or genera. Races are not 
determinate systems and the members making up a genus 
are in no way related to each other. Species act as 
homeostatic yet dynamic systems, when changes occur 
they are usually controlled and regulated within the 
species (as in the case of the Axolotl or the locust). 
Species regulate themselves in response to changes in 
the environment. As well integrated systems, species 
are not so much different groups of organisms as 
distinct groups of organisms. They may have very few 
differences between them, yet quite definite gaps
215
between them.
In conclusion to this thesis we can say that there 
is much to be gained from seeing species as real. 
Furthermore, given that contemporary statements in 
biology are committed to species, it would be absurd to 
accept the truth of these statement, and yet deny the 
reality of species. Different philosophical attitudes 
towards species can accommodate the fact that species 
are real. However, the view I haved taken in this 
thesis has been that species are natural kinds, and 
that what makes a species the species it is is not a 
description but having a particular nature.
We may still wonder why there should be species in 
nature at all? Why did evolution not produce merely a 
series of varying organisms? Mayr (7) answers this 
question by saying that forming species makes 
evolutionary sense. Indeed we have already seen that 
competition and survival lead to spéciation, in forming 
say a new genotype which produces organisms which can 
exploit new niches in the environment. This advantage 
can only be maintained if genotypes are preserved and 
form discrete groups in nature.
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with plastids without plastids
(2). Green plants (3). Fungi '^^ imals
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Procaryota : cells without membranes (to separate the 
organelles within the cell).
Eucaryota : cells with membranes.
Plastids : these enable plants to use light (energy) 
to drive synthetic reactions (photosynthesis is 
the process by which plants convert sunlight into 
energy). Fungi and animals get their energy by 
consuming other living organisms.
2. Classification of organisms :
Taxonomy is the classification of organisms. Organisms 
are grouped into species, species are grouped into 
genera, genera into families, families into 
orders, orders into classes, classes into phyla 
(for animals) or divisions (for plants). Each of 
these categories comprises different taxa. Species are 
the lowest ranking taxa.
Examples :
An animal (Hano sapiens): A plant (Rosa canine):
Sapiens <----------------- Species--------------> Canine
Homo <----------------  Genus----------------> Rosa
Hcminidae <:----------- - --- Family  --------------^ Rosaceae
Primate 4 =---------------- Class --------- :------) Pteropsida
Mammalia ^___________ Order, Subdivision---------^Embryophytina
Chordata -^---------- Phylum, Division----------- ) Chlorophyta
Animal / _______________ Kingdom  --------------) Plants
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Chordata : animals which have segmented bodies, axial 
notochords, dorsal tubular hollow nervous systems, 
paired gill slits, bilateral symmetry.
For plants one often adds between family and class ; 
series (here dicotelydonae) and subclass (here 
angiospermidae).
Pteropsida : ferns and seed plants.
Embryophytina : embryo forming plants.
Chlorophyta : green plant.
3. Cells; All living organisms are made of cellsy 
unicellular organisms of one cell. Cells come in 
different shapes and sizes.
4. The ultrastructure of the cell*
In human beings, all cells have a nucleus except 
red blood cells. The size and shape of the nuclei 
varies from species to species, and within a species 
from organism to organism. Cells have a membrane 
surrounding them, inside the membrane is the 
cytoplasm. Several structures exist within the 
cytoplasm, these are subcellular organelles. They 
include mitochondria, centrioles, endoplasmic 
reticulum, Golgi apparatus, ribosomes and the 
nucleus.
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Each organelle is highly specialized :
The membrane is organized so as to let only certain 
substances into the cell and others out.
The mitochondria make the energy for the cell.
The centrioles are involved in cell division.
The endoplasmic reticulum is involved in protein 
synthesis (packaging chemicals).
The Golgi apparatus adds carbohydrates to proteins. 
The ribosomes assemble proteins.
The nucleus carries the genetic information.
Figure 18 Schematic view of a generalized cell ;
mitoehondrion-usual ly severe










The nucleus is partially separated from the 
cytoplasm, which surrounds it, by the nuclear envelope. 
The nuclear envelope has pores to enable molecules to 
go in and out of the nucleus. The nucleus is made up 
of a nucleolus, and a general substance called the 
chromatin network. During cell division, the 
chromatin organizes itself into chromosomes. Only at 
this time do the chromosomes become visible. The 
chromosomes carry the genetic information. All cells 
have a nucleus (with a few exceptions) which contains 
chromatin. Every cell in the body carries the whole 
genetic information for that individual, within its 
nucleus.
6. The chromosomes;
Chromosomes are made of protein (70%). This 
protein does not function in the transfer of genetic 
information. It is the role of nucleic acid (DNA, 30%) 
to pass on the genetic information. The quantity of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) contained within the 
nucleus is constant within the cells of the organisms 
of any one species. It does, however, vary from 
species to species.
Each species has a fixed number of chromosomes in 
each and every cell of its members. Human beings have 
46 chromosomes, drosophila 6 to 12 depending on the 
species.
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Chromosomes form pairs within the nucleus. Half 
the chromosomes are inherited from the mother, and half 
from the father. In human beings there are 22 matching 
pairs of chromosomes (same size, shape, each half 
coding for the same traits). The last pair do not 
match, they are the X and Y chromosomes, XX codes for 
female, XY for male.
Photomicrograph of stained human chromosomes :
îX: 5-t =•
1 Chromosomes of normal Human Male (displayed in 2 Same but for Female
sequence below) 
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Fig ure  19
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7. Reproduction:
Cell division occurs constantly throughout the 
body, new cells being needed for growth, repair and 
replacement. When division occurs, each chromosome 
within the nucleus of the cell separates into two 
stands (chromatids). These strands then separate into 
two identical sets of chromatids. The cell then 
divides. The two new cells have identical chromosomes 
to the original cell.
This process is called mitosis ;
Mitosis
(imaginary organism) cell divides
Figure 20
two new cells
In reproduction, cells undergo a different kind of 
division. This occurs in specialized reproductive 
organs (ovary, testis). Here the cells undergo 
meiosis. As with mitosis the chromosomes separate
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into two strands (chromatids), but also pair up. So 
for example, human being's 46 chromosomes form 23 
pairs. When the cell divides half the chromosomes go 
into one new cell and the other half into the other.
But unlike mitosis, the two daughter cells now have 
different chromosomes (pairs of chromosomes code for 
the same traits, but often different aspects of those 
traits, for example blue or brown eyes). One 
individual having received chromosomes from both 
parents may caSry a gene for blue eyes (from her 
mother), and one for brown eyes (from her father). At 
meiosis, the chromosome with the blue eyed gene goes
into one daughter cell, the chromosome with the brown 
eyed gene into the other (whereas in mitosis it was an 
identical pair blue/brown into each new cell). The 
daughter cells then divide again, this time following 
the same mechanism as mitosis, each daughter cell 
dividing into two identical new cells with half the 
chromatids each. The new cells then have 23 chromatids 
each. The final outcome of meiosis is 4 new cells, 
each pair of cells having different chromosomes from 
the other pair, but each cell within a pair having 
identical chromosomes.
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Meiosis (same imaginary organism as above, with only 
4 chromosomes)?
Figure 21 4 new cells
Only germ cells (egg and sperm) are used in 
reproduction. These cells are called gametes. Unlike 
the other cells in the body which for human beings have 
46 chromosomes, germ cells have 23. At reproduction, 
when two gametes fuse to form a zygote (which will grow
into an embryo), the new cell (the zygote) has 46 
chromosomes. .Germ cells are haploid (they contain only 
half the number of chromosomes), all other cells are 
diploid.
It is these germ cells, produced by meiosis, that 
are used in reproduction. Fertilization is the fusion 
of 2 germ cells, one from a female, the other from a 
male (egg and sperm). These two cells form a zygote. 
This single celled zygote, immediately undergoes 
mitosis and forms two cells which divide into four 
cells, then 8, 16, 32 etC;.. as the embryo grows.
There is no direct route of growth between a zygote and 
an adult. In the human species for example, neither 
the zygote nor the adult have a tail, but the embryo 
does.
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A zygote contains all the information (and has the 
capacity to use it) for making all the different types 
of cells which make up the body, it is said to be 
totipotent. As division proceeds, so does cell 
differentiation, different types of cell appearing in a 
specified order. This occurs with the controlled use 
of the genetic information in the zygote. It is partly 
dependent on the information from the DNA itself 
(predetermined timing of the use of genetic information 
is particularly evident in metamorphosis), and partly 
on the interaction with the environment (signals from 
the environment which switch genes on and off).
The development from zygote into differentiated 
cells of an embryo is called morphogenesis. The 
influence on development from surrounding cells is 
crucial to differentiation, this is called embryonic 
induction. A cell will develop in a certain way 
depending on where it finds itself (for example 
becoming nerve cell if it finds itself near other nerve 
cells...). In a developing embryo a celly which because 
of its location would have become one type of cell, can 
be transplanted to another part of the embryo and 
become another type of cell. But once a cell becomes 
set on a path (its position having influenced which 
genes are switched on) it is determined, and will 
thereafter develop into a particular type, it can no 
longer change its path. In some organisms cells remain 
totipotent, for example one can take a cell from a
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full grown carrot and it will eventually grow into a 
new carrot (differentiating into skin, leaves etc..). 
Cells such as these, although totipotent, maintain 
their differentiation according to their place, in 
association with their neighbouring cells. All cells 
contain all the genetic information, but most cells 
cannot be reactivated to produce a new organism.
The organization of cells is also important, a 
hand is different from a foot, yet each contains the 
same type of cells (skin, bone, muscle, blood, etc...).
8. Genes;
Genes are carried on the chromosomes. Genes code 
for traits. The DNA of the chromosomes are the genes. 
The total number and kinds of genes encoded in the DNA 
of a nucleus is the genotype. The total number of 
traits an individual has is the phenotype. The genes 
carry the information needed for the body to make a 
trait (such as 'blue eyes'). Chromosomes are like 
threads with the genes carried along them. The genes 
are lengths of DNA (DNA is a giant molecule ), the 
genes are sequences of chemical subunits along the DNA 
molecule. The part of the chromosome which is not DNA 
is protein. Each gene or sequence of subunits is a 
template for the synthesis of one protein molecule 
(proteins eventually build up into the visible 
characteristics we see e.g. blue eyes, this is a long 
and complicated process; strictly speaking the outcome
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of a gene is only a protein). The DNA molecule on one 
human chromosome contains in the region of 100 million 
subunits. These subunit% are sufficient to code for 5 
million proteins, in fact only 100,000 different types 
of protein are known in our bodies. What the surplus 
DNA is doing, no one knows for sure.
9. Deoriboneucleic acid (DNA);
DNA is a long molecule with a chain-like backbone 
DNA probably looks like a double helix. Each strand 
of DNA is a long molecule itself, the two backbones of 
both these strands crossing over :
Figure 22 
(schematic)
The two strands twisting round each other carry bases, 
these bases form bonds between the two strands, holding 
them together. There are only 4 bases in DNA: adenine 
(A), thymine (T), guanine (G) and cytosine (C).
Adenine always bonds with thymine (A-T), and guanine 
with cytosine (G-C). The two strands of DNA can unzip, 
and then synthesize two new strands, each joining on to 
the old ones, the two original strands act as 
templates, guanine joining cytosine, cytosine joining
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guanine, adenine joining thymine and thymine joining 
adenine. The backbond of the strands is made up of 
sugars and phosphates (see Figure 23). Each DNA strand 
can be represented chemically (see Figure 24).
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F i g u r e  2 3  DNA repl icat ion  :
S _  sugar P= phosphate G rap h ic  represen ta tion :
One strand  
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One strand




During th e  unzipping =
two new m olecules fo rm ing  along the old ones
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Figure CL4 DNA, chemical structure t
H : hydrogen, N : nitrogen, C : carbon, 0 
lines between them are chemical bonds.
oxygen, the









10. Translating the genetic code:
•The four bases on the DNA molecule {A,T,G,0 form 
a code. This is the genetic code. This code is 
universal, it is the same from yeast to human beings. 
Three bases taken together form a codon, each codon 
codes for one amino acid. Amino acids are the 
building blocks for proteins. Proteins as we saw make 
up bodies. There are 64 codons in the genetic code, 
several may be needed to code for one amino acid.
There are 20 amino acids. Some codons serve as 
punctuation, for-example a îstop' to signify the end of 
some piece of information.
Figure H5 The genetic code :
A G T C
A A A Phenylalanine A G A Serine ATA Tyrosine A G A Cysteine A
A A G Phenylalanine A G O Serine AT G Tyrosine AGG Cysteine G
A AA T Leucine A G T Serine ATT Stop A G T Stop T
A A C . Leucine A G G Serine AT G Stop AGG Tryptophan G
G A A Leucine G G A Proline GTA Histidine GGA Arginine A
oti' _ G A G Leucine G G G Proline GTG H istidine GGG Arginine G PX--
' t GA T Leucine G G T Proline G T T Glutamine G G T Arginine T -3 :
G A C Leucine GG G Proline GTG Glutamine GGG Arginine G
TA A Isoleucine T G A Threonine TTA Asparagine TG A Serine A ê
_ TAG Isoleucine TG G Threonine TTG Asparagine TG G Serine G 'm-
TAT Isoleucine T G T Threonine T T T Lysine TG T Arginine T .-3
TAG Methionine TG G Threonine TTG Lysine TGG Arginine G
GAA Valine G G A Alanine GTA Aspartic Acid GGA Glycine A
GAG Valine GGG Alanine GTG Aspartic Acid GGG Glycine G
GAT Valine G G T Alanine GTT Glutamic Acid GGT Glycine T
GAG Valine GGG Alanine GTG Glutamic Acid GGG Glycine G
11. Building and maintaining a bodyj
DNA carries the genetic code, mRNA is a single 
strand molecule which carries the code from the nucleus 
to the cytoplasm (messenger RNA). DNA acts as a 
template for mRNA; mRNA has also 4 bases complementary
234
to those of DNA except that instead of thymine it has 
uracil (Ü), which bonds to adenine'. In the cytoplasm, 
the code is translated on the ribosomes into amino 
acids. Here another RNA binds mRNA to the anticodons
carrying the amino acids corresponding to mRNA's
codons. This new RNA is called transfer RNA (tRNA).
So the sequence of decoding is DNA ^ mRNA-
tRNA amino acids ^ proteins. The sequence is
also: nucleus •> ribosomes---------;> protein free in
the cytoplasm >  out of the cell.
Figure 2,6
mRNA bonding to the ribosome :
mRNA
ribosome





For example : AÜG-GCC-ACÜ etc... form the message which 
corresponds to : n-formyl methione (met), alanine (ala) 
and threonine...
A reaction takes place between the amino acids,bonding 
them together as they leave each tRNA anticodon. The 
amino acids then form a chain, while tRNA moves along 
the ribosome as the next bit of the code is being 
translated :




When a stop is translated, the protein chain becomes 
free and folds up into the appropriate shape for that 
protein.
Each length of DNA determines the structure of a 
particular protein chain (including enzymes, enzymes 




An example of a folded chain of amino acids — the 
protein myoglobin :
overall shape :---- ----- -
amino acid chain :  ------
(both very schematic)
The shape is characteristic for that protein. The 
chain contains 153 amino acids. The first 15 are :
glycine leucine serine aspartic acid----
glycine glutamic acid tryptophan----
glutamine leucine- valine leucine----
asparagine valine tryptophan glycine etc
The genetic code is replicated during cell 
division (growth and replacement^. The genetic 
information is read, translated and proteins are 
produced for cell differentiation and the general up­
keep of the body. Proteins used by the body (such as 
haemoglobin in the blood cells) are constantly being
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made (translated from the genetic code). Other 
substances that circulate through the body (enzymes, 
hormones etc...) once produced in the cell, pass 
through the cell membrane into the blood stream, and 
into a cavity such as the gut.
12. Sources of variation;
Natural selection, one of the main mechanisms for 
evolutionary change, requires that there be vast 
amounts of variation in any natural population. As 
environmental conditions change, new traits may be 
found to be advantageous. There are many sources of 
variation . Below is an account of the different types 
of genetic change which may give rise to variations.
a. Multiple alleles
This leads to a reshuffling of genes. For
example, there are 4 different human blood groups : A,
B, AB and 0. A and B are dominant to 0. That is to 
say that an individual who inherits an A or a B from 
one parent, and an 0 from the other will have an A or B 
blood group. A genes are neither dominant nor
recessive to B genes, therefore an individual who
inherits an A from one parent and a B from the other, 
will have an AB blood group. An individual will only
have an 0 blood group if he receives 0 from both
parents. In this way the following reshuffling of genes








Blood groups: (AB) fB






Figure 29 Multiple alleles
b. Crossing over of chromosomes
During meiosis chromosomes may be crossed and 
produce a new chromosome with a new combination of 
genes. Two or more cross-overs can occur at a time
Figure 30
chromosomes in the nucleus new chromosomes
from Patterson, Evolution, p.43.
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c. Mutations (point mutations)
Different point mutations occur with different 
changes in the genetic code :
(i) deletion ;
The following codons are part of a gene for an enzyme, 
if one letter is deleted the enzyme will not be 
produced :
CAT - TAG - GAT - ACT (1)
these code for : valine-isoleucine-leucine- stop 
if the first C is dropped the message becomes:
ATT - AGG - ATA - CT ; ATT= stop
Since the code starts with 'stop', nothing would be 
produced.
Deletion could also result in a change of message, and 
a different substance being produced.
(ii) insertion :
If in the above code a G could be inserted at the 
start, it would then read :
GCA - TTA - GGA - TAG - T
these code for : arginine-asparagine-proline- 
methionine--------
A different substance would be produced. And since 
there is no longer a 'stop' at the end, subsequent DNA 
information would be added to the molecule. As with 
deletion, insertion could result in the first codon 




A G could be changed for a T : in the above example
TAG could become TAT. In this case it would change 
nothing since both TAG and TAT code for isoleucine.
But as with (i) and (ii), substitution can lead to a 
new substance or no substance being produced at all. A 
change in one codon may lead to the same protein being 
produced, but with a new structure. For example 
haemoglobin (the protein which transports oxygen in red 
blood cells) has different segments of amino-acids in 
different species.
The basic source of mutation is error in 
replicating the DNA. That is to say the message is 
wrongly copied. Certain chemicals and physical events 
(such as X r a y s ) can cause a rise in mutation rates. On 
the whole the mutation rate per gene is one in 100,000 
per generation (2), that is for mutations with visible 
effects. Many mutations have no effect, many are 
lethal, a very small proportion are beneficial, some 
are neutral but still have a visible effect.
Since mutations can occur every time DNA 
replicates, and since cells divide and DNA is 
replicated constantly throughout an organisms lifetime, 
mutations accrue. The only mutations however which are 
passed on (the only ones which matter for natural 
selection) are those which occur in the germ cells. So 
of all the mutations happening in the body in a 
lifetime, very few have any importance for evolution.
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d. Chromosome mutations
Chromosomes may become rearranged as a result of 
radiation or the effects of certain chemicals. Again 
there are different types of chromosome mutations : 
deletion, duplication, unequal division, fusion. Two 
of the most common are :
(i) inversion :
Figure 31
Imaginary example of an organism with two chromosomes 
which break and mend in a new arrangement of genes :
chromosome segments numbered 1 to 7
(ii) translocation :
Figure 32
Same organism with two chromosomes which break and mend 
in a different way, also resulting in a new arrangement 
of genes :
e. Polyploidy
This type of genetic change is extremely common in 
plants. It occurs when chromosome numbers are doubled.
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This happens when the chromosome division into 
chromatids is not followed by a division of the 
nucleus, so that instead of two sets of chromosomes 
(i.e. as in the normal diploid), the new organism will 
have 4 sets of chromosomes. Polyploids are rare in 
animals, but half the number of flowering species of 
plants are polyploids. Self-fertilization is essential 
for polyploidy to lead to a new species since an 
individual with a new number of chromosomes could not 
reproduce with other individuals with different 
chromosomes numbers (the chromosome pairs could not 
match up). Self-fertilization is common in plants, 
rare in animals.
Examples of polyploids are particularly common in 
agricultural plants. The history of bread wheat is one 
such example (3). Originally bread wheat was from 
Triticum monococcum which has 14 chromosomes. A 
hybrid was then formed between this and a grass 
Aeqilops speltoides which also has 14 chromosomes. A 
doubling of chromosomes in this hybrid produced 
Triticum durum, the wheat now used for pasta. This 
wheat produced another hybrid with Aeqilops 
squarrosa, a grass, the hybrid's cromosomes doubled 
again. The wheat we now have is Triticum aestivium, 
a hexaploid (six sets of chromosomes) species with 42 
chromosomes, derived from the original diploid (2 sets) 
Triticum monococcum.
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f. External sources of variation
Variation may also arise from hybridization 
between species producing genetic changes due to gene 
flow or gene migration (introduction and spreading of 
new genes into a population).
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